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Abstract
THE POTENTIALS AND PERILS OF PUBLIC URBAN LAND OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
A CASE STUDY OF THE LAGOS EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT BOARD (NIGER!A) 1928-1982
By
Donatus C.I. Okpala
This Thesis evaluates the potentials and perils of public involvement in urban land
management in the Nigerian setting. This is done by way of a critical examination of
the operations of the Lagos Executive Developmant Board (LEDB) which was an instru-
ment of such public involvement.
The Thesis postulates that the realization of the supposed potentials of public urban
land ownership and management are not necessarily achieved simply because land is
publicly owned or managed. That the degree of success of realization of these po-
tentials depends essentially on what form the public ownership and management take;
on the nature and character of the society involved; on the structure and character-
istics of the traditional land tenure system involved; on the quality of the personnel
involved in the public administration, as well as on the condition of the exercise of
such public authority in the process of this management.
This evaluation of the potentials and perils of the public role in urban land manage-
ment is carried out by (i) identifying and characterizing the Nigerian traditional land
market as the setting for this public involvement; (ii) identifying and characterizing
the role that the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) as a public urban land
management and development agency has been playing in the area of urban kand marn-
agement and development; (iii) determining the effectiveness and consequences of
such a role or policy; and (iv) assessing the desirability of such consequences and
discussing alternative goals, policies, and strategies for improved performance.
From the results of this evaluation, the conclusions are that the Board was to a large
degree successful in improving the infrastructural facilities in Lagos, in bringing more
land into use and development, and in producing some classes of housing; but that
the beneficiary distribution of these resources and facilities tended to be biased in
favour of the middle and upper classes of the urban society.
In the course of its operation, the extent of the Board's performances were greatly
inhibited by three main factors, viz.:
(a) The peculir indigenous land tenure structure which in many cases tended tc frus-
trate the Board's development pians and projects by making it difficult for the
Board to acquire the lands needed for such projects.
(b) The perennial financial weaknesses of the Board, which crose out of the various
constraints placed on its financing mechanisms and sources. This inadequacy of
funding was a very real weak link in its chair of operation and succes.
(c) Above oil, problems of management skills and administrative inefficiencies on
the part ot the Board, especially in its later years, had much to do with the
failures or weaknesses that could be attributed to it. These problems were more
transparent in the manner the Board dealt with people whose lands got acquired,
in compensation assessments and payments, and mostly in the allocation or dis-
posal of acquired and developed lands, and in its forms of housing developments.
Its problems and failures notwithstanding, the concept of the Board is still useful and
desirable, if its management skills and administrative efficiency can be improved.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph A. Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Land in the Urbanisation Process
As countries become more and more urbanized, the issue of the efficient
management of their urban land resources becomes more critical. With in-
creasing urban populations and their increasing need for housing, the changing needs
of production processes, with changes in the transportation and communications tech-
nologies and systems, the intensification of migration and rapid household formations,
and with greater demands for higher space standards, cities are experiencing acute
problems in providing adequate supplies of land to satisfy these needs and demands
at the right places and at the right times.
While these demands for urban land continue to grow, however , its supply is
both genuinely and artificially limited. This arises from the fact that supply and lo-
cation of land is generally fixed, so that increased demands can in many cases
only be met by intensification of use, but intensification of use often brings about
problems of congestion which can give rise to serious social costs and other negative
externalities that adversely affect the environment.
Increased demand for urban land is also often reflected in higher land price
and higher prices lead to expectations of continued price rises, and thus to hoard-
ing and speculation, thus further limiting the availability and accessibility of land
facilities to an increasing proportion of urban residents.
The problems of urban land shortages are in some parts of the world further com-
plicated by social and political attitudes and cultural norms towards land ownership
-2-
and cont.'ci of transfers. Where, for example, communal, group, or even individual
rights of ownership are highly regarded, it can be difficult for public authorities to
exercise control and management over them in the social interest. This is particularly
so where there is, as in Africa in general and in parts of Nigeria in particular, a
long tradition of family and communal land ownership system, based not necessarily on
land's economic significance, but rather on deeply held socio-religious and even
ritualistic beliefs. In such cases, the problems are complicated by the inability of
traditional land owners to develop their land in a manner that will not detract from
the general environmental good, and also by their reluctance to make such lands avail-
able to the government or to private developers to develop in a more efficient
("socially desirable") way.
Land related questions lie at the roots of most national urban growth and de-
velopment problems and policies. Land related issues, for example, affect the dis-
tribution of population, the distribution of jobs, housing, and infrastructural services,
as well as mechanisms for controlling the growth of cities.
The significance of land derives from the very wide and important ramifications
which its ownership and control has for the individual and for society.
Land ownership and control is a source of power in many societies. It is also
the ultimate platform for almost all of man's everyday activities, and as a result, he
who controls the land can in many ways affect the way people use the land. Land,
too, is a great source of wealth, particularly in the urban areas where such wealth
comes through rents and the rapid land value appreciation due to various external
influences, not necessarily connected with any expenditures or investments by
-3-
the land owners themselves.
Land, too, is the base of man's home, and the deep-seated, almost primeval
desire of people for security and safety within their home is often inseparable from owner-
ship and control of some piece of land.
Because of its significance and implications, the manre r of ownership and control
of land has to a large extent epitomised the political controversy and struggle be-
tween "the- right" and "the left" through most of modern human history. On the one
hand, it is argued that the freedom of the market in land reflects a basic belief in
the efficiency of the market to best allocate scarce resources; on the other hand,
there is a recognition that if social needs are to be given over-riding priority, then
land must be vested on the State, who, it is envisaged, would use it in the most
socially advantageous manner.
A brief review of the arguments in this controversy will provide some relevant
setting for this study.
1.2 Urban Land Management: The Opposing Views
Two opposing views are distinct, with respect to the systems of control and manage-
ment of land, namely: (i) that which advocates the total nationalisation or complete public
ownership of urban land and the enforcement of stricter planning controls; and (ii) the
"market" view, which espouses a non-public interference policy in urban land questions,
and little or no planning controls. To this group, economic forces should be left to allo-
cate land to its "best" uses, "best use" here meaning the most profitable use.
(i) Public Ownership of Urban Land
One of the strongest advocates of public ownership of urban land in recent years is
the Cambridge (England) Group. 1 They argue for public ownership of land on the
grounds that it will "transfer the undeniable benefits of ownership of land
1IJack Brocklebank, Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Maynard, Robert Neild and Oliver Stutch-
bury: The Case for Nationalising Land, Campaign for Nationalising Land, London, September
1973.
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from the hands of individual capitalists to the community as a whole". They cite
2
and bel ieve in the argument of J.S. Mill that, "The ordinary progress of a society
which increases in wealth, is at all times to augment the incomes of landlords; to
give them both a greater proportion of the wealth of the community, independently
of any trouble or outlay incurred by themselves. They grow richer as it were, in
their sleep, without working, risking, or economizing." And like Mill, they ask,
"What claim have they on the general principle of social justice, to this accession
of riches?" It is further argued that public ownership of urban land would "secure
consistency and continuity in framing and executing a national policy with respect
to the use and development of land" (Buchanan, 1972).3 They insist that exclusive
or even primary reliance on the private market mechanisms always exacerbates a
number of social problems. Firstly, that accessibility to land is not neutral, and
therefore it favours those who enter the marketplace with more money. This leads to
the exclusion of the poor from the market, and consequently results in a society in-
creasingly segregated along economic lines. Secondly, the allocation of land ac-
cording to the test of the market tends to neglect broader societal desirable objec-
tives which have no dollar values placed on them, but which nevertheless are very
vital for the peace and stability of the society.
2J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Ch. 2, para. 5.
3Professor Sir Colin Buchanan: The State of Britain, Chichele Lectures,
1971. Oxford University, Faber and Faber, 1972, p. 20.
4
Arthur P. Solomon:" The Effects of Land Use and Environmental Controls on
Housing: A Review". (Working Paper No. 34, Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T.
and Harvard University, Cambridge, Massa :husetts).
The relhted concept of urban land banks5 has become very current in recent
years. Because of the importance of land, particularly urban land, and because of
its basic characteristics of apparent lack of substitutability, immobility, and inflex-
ibility in quantity, high prices, and its susceptibility to speculation and all its con-
sequences, it has often been suggested that National Governments and Municipal
Authorities should acquire all lands in and around all major cities, hold it and allo-
cate it as is needed to different uses and users -- private and public, in a manner
consonant with the best needs of the society and smooth functioning of the environ-
ment.
It is argued in favour of this public land banking or land reserve system that
it makes for: (i) easier access to land for development when and where it is needed;
(ii) better distribution of private land wealth as the State has the potential of main-
taining a fairer distribution of such resources; (iii) security of tenure; (iv) increased
efficiency of land management through better planning of land use; and (v) control
of land values.
In the Nigerian context, for example, it has been suggested that public owner-
ship would confer on the State a kind and extent of control which it cannot other-
5 Harvey L. Flechner: Land Banking in the Control of Urban Development
(Praeger Special Studies Publication); Charles M. Haar: Wanted: Two Federal
Levers for Urban Use - Land Banks and Urbanks (U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Banking & Currency, June 1971, p. 928); Stuart C. Myers: Investment Policy for Land
Banks (Urban Land Research Analysts Corp.,Monograph #4);and various other publications
on the su cect by this Corporation);Wm. A. Doebele: A Commentary on Urban Land Policy
in Swedei (Draft IBRD Discussion Paper, 1974).
wise have
gued, the
namely:
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.6through its ordinary powers of legislation. With this control, it is or-
State can try to achieve certain social objectives with respect to land,
6
Nwabueze, B.O.: Nigerian Land Law (1973), pp. 635-637.
7 Ibid.
(a) Greater social justice in the distribution of land. By its power to grant
occupancy rights, as in the Northern States of Nigeria, the State can
ensure that land is fairly and equitably distributed among the people.
It can also impose restrictions as to the amount of land an individual can
have at a time; or to what use such land should be put.
(b) Since under State ownership of land, everybody is a tenant of the State,
those who hold land, it is often argued, will have in many cases to pay
rent to the State. This means that it is the State, and not private land
owners who get the income from land. The State, it is hoped, will then
apply this income for the benefit of the whole community or society. In
this way, those who hold no land at all will also indirectly benefit.
(c) The State can check the incidence of land speculation, which in areas of
population pressure has become a positive evil, some of whose consequences
include: (i) division of the society into a landed and a landless class;
(ii) encouragement of absentee landlordism, with all its exploitative
tendencies; (iii) enabling the speculator to get unjustly enriched from the
government's planning schemes which increase the value of land. It
has always been said that private ownership encourages speculative rises
in land prices, and enables owners to reap unjustified profits from plus
-7-
values which, because of their origin, should belong to the society
and community; (iv) fostering of land litigation, a phenomenon whose
expense has impoverished many an individual or family.
(d) The State can also ensure proper use and development of land by at-
taching to the grant of a right of occupancy, a condition regarding its
use. Thus, it may be made a condition of a grant, in the case of a
grant of residential land, that the grantee must erect upon it building
of a certain value. 7
Various United Nations Conferences and those of its related agencies have also sup-
ported and advanced these potentials of public land ownership and management.
They contend basically that because of its unique nature and the crucial role it plays
in human settlements, land should not be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled by
individuals and subject to the pressures and inefficiencies of the market. Further, they
point out that private land ownership is a principal instrument of accumulation and
concentration of wealth, and therefore contributes to social injustice; and that if un-
checked, private land ownership may constitute a major obstacle in the planning and
8
implementation of development schemes. In its most recent conference on the subject,
the United Nations insisted that,
Public control of land use is indispensable to its (land's) pro-
tection as an asset and the achievement of the long term ob-
jectives of human settlement policies and strategies.
7 Nwabueze, op. cit.
8 U.N. Report of Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements
(Vancouver, Canada, May 31 to June 11, 1976), p. 61.
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Ernnasizing that land is one of the most valuable natural resources, and there-
fore "must be used rationally," the Conference seemed to equate this "rational use"
with public control. It insisted that,
Public ownership or effective control of land in the public
interest is the single most important means of improving the
capacity of human settlements to absorb changes and move-
ments in population, modifying their internal structure and
achieving a more equitable distribution of the benefits of
development whilst assuring that environmental impacts are
considered.9
In addition to the various potentials of public ownership and management already
outlined, this Conference also believed that public ownership and management of
land would enable and facilitate the re-capture by the public of,
... the unearned increment resulting from the rise in land
values, resulting from change in use of land, from public
investment or decision or due to the general growth of the
community.10
Whether these supposed advantages are or can be realized in practical terms is far
from certain. No empirical studies have conclusively demonstrated them. It would
seem from their arguments, however, that proponents of public ownership and man-
agement imply that the state and its personification constitute the plenitude of virtues,
the repository of social justice and fairness, which presumably would blindly and self-
lessly give every man or woman his or her due. They also tend to imply that public
ownership and management are always better than the system it seeks to replace.
9 lbid., p. 65.
1 0 Ibid., p. 62.
-9-
(ii) The "Market" View
This espouses the traditional economist's viewpoint. Its most vocal con-
11
temporary exponents are the Institute of Economic Affairs London Group. This
view basically argues that the prices of land are determined by the demand for it,
and that the price which people bid serves to allocate land to its most productive
uses and serves also as an incentive to further supply; high land prices are
caused by high demands for it or its services and its limited supply, not by
speculators' profits as advocates of public intervention and ownership of urban
lands have argued.
11
Walters, A.A., et al.: Government and the Land (Institute of Economic
Affairs Reading 13). Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1974.
-10-
12
In the cn :logous field of zoning, Bernard H. Siegan (1972), for example, cites his
studies, which he claims, show that the land market works better in the absence of
government controls.
My studies show that zoning is neither necessary to maintain
or protect property values, nor an aid to'planning' -- its
principal justification. On the contrary, it has adverse
effects on both... In the absence of most government controls,
the private sector is much more likely to utilise the land
to provide better for the environmental and material needs
of people.
This view, therefore, insists that a structure of voluntary contracts in a mar-
ket can achieve many of the benefits supposed to be the purpose of public land
management, without some of its defects. In the analogous issue of housing, as a
13
further example, this group cites 'well-documented' evidence on the capacity of
the market to provide adequate housing once basic income deficiency has been
corrected (Frank de Leeuw & Nkanta Ekanem (1971); Muth (1960, 1969). On the
other hand, they argue, attempts to overcome the lack of a systematic policy on
poverty by disabling the urban land and housing market is a recipe unlikely to yield
success, as poverty is most effectively and efficiently alleviated by increase in in-
comes. Moreover, public control and management of urban land imposes a double
cost in terms of money: the administrative cost of management and control, and the
12
Bernard H. Siegan: Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
& Co.), Lexington, Massachusetts, 1972.
13Frank de Leeuw & Nkanta Ekanem: The Demand for Housing: A Review of
Cross-Section Evidence (Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1971);
and The Supply of Housing (Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C., 1971); De
Leeuw: The Housing Allowance Approach (Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C.
1971); R. . Muth: The Demand for Housing in Cities and Housing, Univ. of Chi-
cago, 1969).
-1I-
econom'c cos; of distortion; yet the objective of such public involvements are sel-
dom achieved. They reject the conclusion that the solution is yet more government
controls and management. "The solution lies in fewer controls and fewer public
interventions, and in the more sophisticated use of market systems to facilitate the
14
harmonisation of supply and demand", they argue.
They further contend that the public land and public building system
of urban management gives the public authority too much control and
too much freedom from the tests and disciplines of both the market and ability to
pay as a guide to the preferences of land users. Advocates of the market view
point to the assumption or implication of the assumption by the proponents of public
management of land that, "State power will make men virtuous", and they hasten to
point out that, "Far from giving everyman his acre of land, the most extreme forms of
collective society apprehend all land titles in the name of the state, and drive mil-
lions of peasants from their land against their will into collectives and state farms." 14
Public land ownership and management, they claim, simply puts power into the hands of a
few in a manner "which towers above the petty powers of individual land owners." 1 4
The state as landlord, they claim, allows no alternative. Furthermore, the proponents of the
free market system go on to argue that the legitimate arguments which can be made For re-
organizing the land development'and redevelopment process, and which can be made for public
urban land management and control, are not arguments for abolishing the (private) property
market.
14
A.A. Walters et al.: op. cit.
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1.3 The Real World Situation
While substantial elements of facts and realities are contained in each of these
two views, it is more likely that the most desirable and acceptable position cannot lie
wholly and exclusively with any one only of these polar opposites. In either case, some
institutional factors that have serious potential social consequences are not fully taken into
consideration. While traditional economic theory can, for example, show that based on
certain assumptions (perfect information, demand-supply price responses, etc.), the Free
or perfect market can achieve an efficient distribution of goods and services, the urban
land market anywhere, because of various institutional factors, is neither free nor perfect.
Furthermore, the "best use" of the traditional economist is seldom the same as the "most
desirable" use. On the other hand, the public management view assumes that state power
would make men virtuous and that they would always manage such lands with the public's
interest at heart. These assumptions notwithstanding, however, experience shows that
what is reasonable or unreasonable is not a simple exercise of logic, but depends more
often on the social and political climate of the society involved, the time, the stringency
or relevance of the need for desired actions, and sometimes on precedents.
Even then, either view tends to emphasize their respective strengths and ad-
vantages, without as much discussion or acknowledgement of their respective weak-
nesses or disadvantages. Important questions of distributional equity and social justice,
and their implications for the general income distribution structure and social peace are
either ignored, treated with levity, or taken for granted by either of the two
views. While the case for some public involvement in urban land management could
be made on grounds of the negative externalities (both physical and social) and
outcomes of the free and private market or decision-making; proponents of public
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involvement would seem to be too optimistic in taking the human element for granted.
The State ("public") after all is personified by fallible human beings, who could con-
ceivably exercise public authority in such a perverse manner that the resulting outcome
could prove as undesirable as or even worse than the outcome of "private" land market
that it sought to remedy. In other words, management skills and competence, inte-
grity and administrative efficiency on the part of public administrators -- qualities
that essentially determine the success of any policy or enterprise, are often implicitly
assumed as given in the public ownership and management arguments.
In any case, these two modes or systems (private and public) of land ownership
and management do not represent the whole systems or scope of the problems involved
in land ownership and management issues. Various land tenure and distribution sys-
tems exist in various societies of the world today, which systems have different ,
characteristics and attributes and therefore different incidences in distribution and
accessibility, from those of both -the public and market systems as discussed above.
These other systems pose some different kinds of issues and problems from those posed
by the private or public systems as such. These issues and problems neither the
proponents of the private nor proponents of the public modes of management have fully
appreciated, or taken into account.
The Nigerian traditional land tenure system, which forms the setting for this
study, for example, is different from both the private free market characteristics and
public ownership patterns. It is a system in which centuries of culture and tradition
have systematized a group and family system of land ownership, and one therefore in
which individual ownership of land is an exception and not the rule. This system of
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ownership and management, for example, poses problems both for the public system
of ownership and controls and for the private "market" system.
It poses problems for public control because it does not fit into the modern
legal or legislative frameworks, nor does it respond to them according to their intents
and objects. Given the colonial history and experience of the context, the social, economic,
and legal concepts of the traditional setting differed-considerably from those of the Anglo-Saxon im-
personal legalistic framework of approach to land matters which were then being intro-
duced. As was observed, by Lord Lugard, a former Governor-General of Nigeria,
... The European lawyers is likely to discuss native conditions
by forcing them into terminology borrowed from European
law. The untrained European, on the other hand, used such
words as 'Communism,' 'individualism,' private property',
'tribal property,' and what not, without giving them the
slightest intelligible meaning or understanding himself
what he is talking about. 15
The result was and still is that political remedies are proposed which are entirely un-
related to social or economic facts, and their (those who make the laws and those for
whom the laws are made) resolution of their common problem on land remained very dif-
ficult and often times impossible, in spite of the force of legislations, and all the
"eminent domain" and "police powers" of the State.
This system also poses a great problem to the "private market" because, in
the first place, exchange or market transactions in land are strictly limited, because
land sales are not culturally approved conduct, and even then most such transactions
are intra-communal or intra-group. Secondly, as against the "private market" phen-
omenon of the "highest bidder wins," traditional transactions do not follow this rule,
15 Cited by Malinowski in "Practical Anthropology: Africa", 1/29.
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particularly with respect to land, when it is exchanged for money at all. The
determination of price is dictated by very many intangible variables that do nct have much
to do with market forces, but rather with the degree of relationships (consanguinal)
between the buyer and seller, and on the traditional beliefs of the seller. Thirdly, the
feature of security and certainty which strengthens market transactions on land is minimal
in the traditional land tenure system. Because of the extended communal and family net-
work of land ownership, and given the traditional rules of valid land transactions and
transfer as discussed in Chapter 2, both the security risks and the transactions costs are
very high.
On the other hand, the incidence of land resources distribution and accessibility
tends to be superior (wider spread) in this traditional land tenure system thcn it is in the
"market" system, for example. In the light of all these differing characteristics, at-
tributes and outcomes of the various modes or systems, the public-private market con-
troversy tends to become simplistic and perhaps irrelevant.
The practical and relevant question then becomes not necessarily whether land
is privately, publicly, or traditionally owned and managed per se, but rather that
of how the given system or mode is applied and with what effects, outcomes, or con-
sequences for the various groups affected and for the general public good. After all,
the borderline between public, private, or any other ownership system of land is
often vague, since anyone of the many rights associated with private or communal
ownership may be pre-empted by the state, for public purposes, or
ostensibly so, and public ownership is often times accompanied by con-
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considerable freedom in private use. As had been aptly observed by Mace,16 or
example,
The long theoretical controversy whereby private ownership
was set against collective ownership seems largely devoid
of practical meaning. It ignores the reality we can see ob-
jectively all around us. The countries which have retained
private ownership have been unable to ignore completely
the argument in favour of communal ownership. Nor hcve
those countries which have opted in theory for collective
ownership been able to ignore the human reasons in favor
of private ownership. In practice, both camps have made
fairly wide concessions. All agree that collective life
clearly imposes a certain social order which limits and
controls the individual's right to act and to use what belongs
to him. Moreover, this distinction between ownership and
use which nineteenth century capitalism tried to abolish,
is a permanent feature of universal law. It is reflected
throughout history in two systems which clash in their
theoretical premises, but unite in their practical applica-
tion. Quite naturally, therefore, the argument ceases in
part to bear upon ownership itself and concentrates in-
stead on the conditions of its exercise in an urban environ-
ment, and the outcome of this exercise.
In addition, there may not be a universally applicable single "best" solution or
system in the urban land problem. Solutions may have to vary from context to context,
taking socio-cultural, economic, and political environments into consideration. This
view was supported by the recent U.N. Habitat Conference*, which acknowledged
that although there existed a common denominator, which was the general awareness
of the challenge of development and its complexity, and a general appreciation of the
16 R. Mace, in an opening statement as Chairman of the Seminar on "The Supply,
Development, and Allocation of Land for Housing and Related Purposes", held in Paris,
France, March 28-April 6, 1965 (U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ST/ECE/HOU/
15), Vol. 1, p. 10.
*U.N.: Report of Habitat, op. cit., p. 139.
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urgent need to improve the quality of life for a more equal and just sharing of r -
sources and for improvement of the living conditions of the less favoured population
groups, it was the consensus that,
The ways and means for solving the current (land and settle-
ments) problems differed for everyone of these three* groups,
and differed further from nation to nation in accordance,
inter alia, with their social and political systems. (emphasis mine)
Given the foregoing background, this study examines the potentials and perils
of public urban land ownership and management, not in the context or comparative
pole of the "private free market" system for land, but in the context of the Nigerian
traditional communal land tenure setting and its attributes. The Thesis aims specifically
at assessing how much of the often assumed potentials of public land ownership and
management were realized in the LEDB -- which was an instrument of public manage-
ment -- and whether these potentials can be assumed to be a given irrespective of the
prevailing socio-cultural and economic contexts.
The Thesis postulates that the realization of the supposed potentials of public
urban land ownership and management are not necessarily achieved simply because
land is publicly owned or managed. The degree of success or realization of these
potentials depends essentially on what form the public ownership and management takes;
on the nature and character of the society involved, and on the structure and character-
istics of the land tenure system involved; as well as on the quality of the personnel
involved in the public administration and on the conditions of the exercise of such
public authority in the process of this management. It is intended in this essay, then,
*The three groups in reference are (i) developing countries; (ii) developad
countries, and (iii) the group of countries that suffered extremely severe war co.mage
during the Second World War.
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to (i) identify and characterize the Nigerian urban land situation;
(ii) identify and characterize the roles the Lagos Executive Development Board as a
public urban land management and development agency has been playing in the area
of urban land management and development,(iii) determine the effectiveness and
consequences of such role or policy, and (iv) assess the desirability of such con-
sequences and discuss alternative goals, policies, or strategies for improved per-
formance.
The impact and effectiveness of public intervention in this traditional land
control system and the configuration of the outcomes of the involvement is empha-
sized in the study. The analysis will emphasize the socio-cultural matrix within
which the traditional land tenure system functions and how this matrix affects the
efforts of the LEDB to achieve a rationalized land management and land holdings
system, and to bring about and maintain good sanitary urban environment.
This will be done by way of examining the activities and mechanisms of the
Lagos Executive Development Board and the problems which this agency had had to
encounter with the customary land tenure, and those problems it has tended to create
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itself. From the resulting findings, it is hoped it might be possible to establis en-
forceable guidelines for an efficient and equitable urban land management mechan-
ism as and when the traditional tenure arrangements break down under the pressure
of public action or under the impact of development.
The choice of one particular ag'ency--the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) -- for
analysis, while reducing the scope of the study, provides a more concrete basis for an in-depth analysi s
than a more general study would, to evaluate the potentials and the effectiveness of
public intervention within the traditional land tenure system. The findings on one
particular agency will also be relevant in varying degrees to all other agencies.
The LEDB is the oldest such agency in the country, and therefore has a longer his-
tory and experience on which valid generalizations and inferences about the per-
formance of the public role can be based.
It has been rightly said that, "The reason that a question is good for enquiry
is because it has consequences; and that a good research ought to have the potential
for changing somebody's or an institution's behaviour". It is hoped that this case
study will play some part in providing knowledge not only about the substance of
Nigeria's tenure problems, particularly with respect to urban lands, but also
provide knowledge about the missing insights for solving them.
The remaining chapters of the study are set as follows:
In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of the traditional land tenure
is presented and discussed as a setting and background for examining the rationale
and framework of public involvement in the traditional land tenure problems; and for
*Aaron Fleisher: Seminar Discussions October 1974 (M.I.T.).
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evaluating the effectiveness of such interventions for the achievement of the Uesired
objectives. This setting and background is provided by a review of historical evi-
dence relating to administrative and court decisions on the subject, and by reference
to the various studies on land tenure problems in that part of Nigeria over the years.
In the main, the chapter represents what the land market is like for a private buyer.
Chapter 3 examines the rationale for public intervention and the framework
and instruments for such intervention. It represents what the land market is for the
government -- and the various rules it introduces for dealing with the problems it
encounters from the traditional tenure. The chapter also traces the growth of gov-
ernment involvement in the urban land problems in Nigeria and the features of such
involvement.
Chapter 4 presents a more in-depth profile of the LEDB as an instrument of
public urban land management. Its origin, and evolution, its activities in urban land
management, and the degree of effectiveness of its legal powers in the face of
traditional land tenure constraints are examined.
Chapter 5 examines the actual patterns and processes of land acquisition by
the LEDB. The Board's rules of procedure in this respect are examined and their
operational effectiveness evaluated in the context of the cultural milieu. The pro-
cesses and equity in compensation assessments are also examined.
Chapter 6 assesses the performance of the Board in urban land supplies, and
its prices, as compared with other sources (private, traditional, real estate market)
of supplies in the city, and elsewhere.
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Chapter 7 analyzes the distributional aspects of the Board's land management
and its efficiency in the provision and use of urban land. It assesses the impact of
the Board's land and housing activities on the different income groups.
Chapter 8 recapitulates and summarizes the main points of the thesis, and
makes suggestions for a better and more efficient and effective approach to urban
land management.
CHAPTER TWO
URBAN LAND MARKETS IN NIGERIA:
STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
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Chapter Two
URBAN LAND MARKETS IN NIGERIA: STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
Introduction
This chapter describes the nature and characteristics of the traditional land
tenure as a setting and background for examining the rationale and framework of
public involvement in the land tenure problems in Nigeria; and for evaluating the
effectiveness of such interventions in achieving the desired objectives.
This setting and background is provided by a review of historical evidence
(documentary) relating to administrative and court decisions on the subject, and by
reference to the various studies on land tenure problems in Nigeria over the years.
In the main, this chapter represents what the land market is like for a pri-
vate buyer. For the government, it is different -- at least in the number of rules
(laws) introduced to guide the transactions, if not in their effectiveness. These
rules are discussed in subsequent chapters.
The Complexity of the Land Tenure Situation
Land (markets) Tenure and holdings in Nigeria can be described as peculiar-
ly varied and complex. This variety and complexity arise from:
(i) The almost unparalleled diversity of social, religious, and economic
conditions -- Nigeria comprising some 260 distinct ethnic groups of
different cultures and at different stages of modernization and development.
(ii) The significant fact that the rate of economic and social change is not uni-
form, but varies from one locality of the country to another.
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(iii) The differing pattern of political evolution through which the groups
and communities had passed.
Following from these, it can be said that there are as many systems of cus-
tomary law as there are ethnic groups, and even within a single ethnic area, there
may be variations, not in essence but in detail, with respect to the particular lo-
calities of the area. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the various systems
reveals some common characteristics. The evidence which one gets from compara-
tive estimates (of the studies of field workers) and also of the available data from
judicial decisions, points to a large measure of common basic principles, which
1
underlie indigenous systems of land tenure in various parts of Nigeria.
The Nigerian urban land market, as most African urban land markets, has
generally been characterized as consisting of "clouded unmarketable land titles
resulting from customary land systems, which militate against the development of a
workable urban land market."2 This urban market is characterized by:
(i) The communal land tenure system which makes market commercial trans-
actions in land difficult and sometimes impossible;
(ii) The unwillingness of owners of urban land to sell, particularly to strangers
or migrants, even at any price;
(iii) The generally uncertain and defective titles to land, arising from a general lack of
registration of land and titles to land.
1Elias, T.O., "Nigerian Land Law and Custom" (Routledge, Keagan, Paul:
London, 1960), p. 93.
2U.N. Urban Land Policies and Land Use Control Measures, Vol. I: Africa
(U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1973,), p. 21.
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A United Nations Mission to Lagos (1964), for example, observes thct. "ia
Lagos, competition for land is intense. There is land hunger, but practically no land
3
market. Prices are high, but few plots are offered for sale...".
To understand the Nigerian land market, therefore, is to understand the
traditional land tenure of the communities and the politico-religious basis for them.
Considerable attempts have been made by governments to reform and modernize
these traditional land tenure systems, but with minimal effects as yet, except in the
Northern States of the country, where a radical law in 1962 vested all lands in the
State. To discuss the structure and characteristics of land markets in Nigeria, there-
fore, it would be reasonable to treat the north and the south of the country different-
ly and separately. Our study deals principally with the land tenure system in the
south, where our study site (Lagos) is located. Our emphasis, therefore, would be
on what obtains in the south.
2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF LAND MARKETS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES OF NIGERIA
Communal Ownership of Land
A considerable proportion of land in the southern states is still communally
owned, and its control and administration are in the hands of the recognized heads
of families -- who have no proprietary title or claim to ownership, but act as trust-
ees of the land, passed on to them by their ancestors. This trusteeship is not merely
3 Koenigsberger, et al., Metropolitan Lagos (U.N. Technical Assistance
Mission, 1964).
an economic or social arrangement. These titular heads have also a religious cuty
both to the ancestors and to future generations of their people, and in addition, they
are held to be responsible, in accordance with custom, for ensuring that fit and proper
respect is paid at the appropriate time of the year to the "earth deity", thus expressing
their people's gratitude for the past fruits of the soil and their prayers that nature and
the ancestors will continue to be equally beneficient in future years. Land, there-
fore, has a special significance rooted in values that transcend immediate economic
considerations. Communal ownership of property has profound sentimental and social
values as an expression of group cohesion.
In this system, each member of the group has by right of birth a valid claim to
beallottedas much land as he can can conveniently farm, if in the rural area, and as
much as is his due, if in the urban area and depending on his position of seniority in
the family; and to be consulted whenever it is proposed to allocate land to a non-
member of the group.
4
Speed in his Report and Recommendations on Aien Land Tenure Problems in
Ibadan, accepted as accurate statement of the native law on the subject of Ibadan
land tenure system, the contention of the Bale (Chief) and Council that:
The whole of the land of Ibadan is owned by the people
of Ibadan, for and on behalf of whom the Bale and Council
exercise control as guardians and trustees, whose duty it
is to enforce the native law and custom relating to land.
Under the Bale and Council are the families, occupying
the land of their own right, entitled to occupy in per-
petuity during good behavior, but with no right of trans-
fer outside the family. Those who are not natives of
Ibadan can hold land only with the consent of the Bale
and Council, with no right of t ransfer and subject to the
same conditions as natives, with this exception that in
4-Speed, Edwin Arney: Report and Recommendations on the Proceedings ofTe
Commission to Investigate Alien Land Tenure Problems in Ibacian (April 10, 1916).
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as much as every Ibadan is entitled to land and strangers
are not, strangers are in the last resort liable to be dis-
possessed in favour of natives, that is to say, the Bale and
Council in their case retain the right to dispossess them
without cause shown, which right they do not possess in
the case of native occupiers.
It is to be pointed out, however, that in actual practice, the real unit of land
holding is the family.5 It is the family unit that exercises acts of ownership, the
chief interest of the community or village in the land being purely the social and
6
political one of maintaining group solidarity and joint ownership and maintenance
of institutional spots.
The essentially family character of landholdings is reflected in the facts: (a)
that grants to individual members of the group or to strangers leave the ultimate title
in the family; and (b) that land formerly held as an individual owner by a grantee
under a crown grant or an English conveyance devolves on his death upon all members
of his family whose rights therein are recognized by local law and custom. A member
of the family who has been allotted some piece of land for his use cannot sell that
land without the knowledge and consent of the other members of the family, nor
could his inheritors. This is because he has no separate interest in such family prop-
erty. For the same reasons, the interest of a member of a family in family land cannot
be attached for the payment of his personal debt. Justice Graham declared in the
5 The family system in Nigeria is an extended one. The Nigerian society, too,
is a polygamous one. So family would include all the children of a polygamous father,
the children of these children into as many generations as can be remembered and
traced. A family can therefore sometimes be as large as a small town.
6Elias, T.O., Nigeria Land Law and Custom (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
London, 1951, p. 95.
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case of Jacob v. Oladunni Brothers that,
I am unable to find anything repugnant to natural justice,
equity or good conscience in a native custom which pro-
tects 'family property' from attachment for the individual
debts of one or more members of the family. In fact,
Counsel for the execution creditors admitted that once
this property was held to be family property, it was well
settled by authority in this court that it could not be
attached for the individual debt of one or more members
of the family and that in that event he had no case. 7
Likewise, a member of the family cannot dispose of his interest in family property by
will. In the original sense of native law and custom, therefore, land is heritable,
but inalienable, and reverts to the grantor in the event of 'misbehavior' or of an
attempt on the part of the grantee to alienate or charge it.
In fact, ownership with its implication of the "fullest plenitude of rights of en-
joyment, management, and disposal of which the nature of things admits, and the im-
plication that title to these rights is paramount and not dependent upon or subordinate
to a superior title" does not exist in the Nigerian land tenure context.
7
Nigerian Law Review, 12, 1, 1935.
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The public notice below, for example, (which is only a representative sample
of numerous similar notices regarding land tenure matters in various newspapers in
the country today), published in the Observer newspaper of August 3, 1976, implies
PUBLIC NOTICE
NOTICE is hereby given that
ALL land in AMUKPE is
COMMUNAL
(2)'. It has bieen observed that certain
indegenes of the Community who have recei-
ved grants enjoyable in perpetuity within
the individual family- from the Community
tave thereafter alienated the same to third
parties who are neither members nor tenants
of. the Community on terms out of pro-
portion and in derogation of the original
grants from the Community. The effect of
these illegal transactions is to subsitute the
original grantees with' strangers purporting
the same to be grants*'made by and/or with
the consent of the Cornmunity. -
(3) The public is therefore informed
-that no stranger is entitled to an absolute
- grant or one made in fee simple, all aliena-
Stion of AMUKPE Communal Land being sut;-
--iect to the reversion which resides in the
Community- The General Public is therefore
warned that any person or persons, Company,
or public utility bodies, negotiating cr pur-
porting to acquire any interest in AMUKPE
Land whatsoever wit-out the knowledge of
I the Community do so at his risk. All such
acquisition or alienation is null and void.
Dated at Sapele this day 22nd July, 1976
P. S 4. Ofoborh E, - - -
9, itsekiri Road Extension -
Spele.(Solicitor for the AMAUKPE COMMUNTY).
two things: (i) That some individuals in the community are trying to find ways of
selling their share of family or communal land -- thus trying to break from the trad-
ition of respect for inalienability of land. This could be attributed to the pressures
of economic development and modernization, which in various ways, and for vcrious
reasons have impelled these individuals to venture a deviation from the custom. (ii)
The notice on the other hand indicates that even today, the system still resists the
various changes and defends itself, interestingly enough, by use of modem legal and
governmental mechanisms -- a legal notice. Thus, the rate of change is still very
small.
Non-Alienation or Non-Marketability of Land as a Commodity
The conception that land ownership is vested in the departed and in the yet
unborn, as well as in the living members of the group, renders the permanent alien-
ation or sale of land unusual in the light of strict native law and custom. But it is
possible, in certain circumstances such as the need to raise funds to carry out a
common purpose, for a family lineage or exogenous group to execute, by common
consent, a valid conveyance transferring permanent title to a purchaser. On the
whole, however, outright sale of land is repugnant in the eyes of the people.
As already mentioned, various reasons have been advanced for the customary
insistence on the inalienability of land. (1) It is said by some that the notion of
inalienability derives from a religious and spiritual attitude towards land, regarded
as an earth deity and conceived as a sacred trust of the living, undertaken in memory
of the dead. To sell land would therefore be sacrilege. (2) Some postulate a myth
of the original ancestor according to which the common origin of the members of a
community renders inconceivable the giving away of ancestral land to non-
autochthonous individuals or groups. It is to be pointed out here that in most places
there were not and still are not any cemeteries as special places for the burial of the
dead. The dead of each family were buried in the family compounds and lands, and
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most graves are unmarked. The thought of selling lands which might include a grave
of an ancestor is not palatable to the people's beliefs and values. (3) A third hypo-
thesis asserts that land has been held inalienable from a desire to preserve it for the
requirements of the owning groups, past, present, and future, this being a simple
soci o-economic device to protect the interest of present and future generations of the
group, as otherwise the living might fritter away the contingent interests of their
progeny. The reference to the dead in this context is similarly to the duty, incum-
bent upon them when alive, not to compromise the rights of the present occupiers.16
This idea was put to the VAst African Lands Committee by an liebu-Ode chief who
said, "I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are
living, and countless members are yet unborn." Sale of land, therefore, is a cultural-
ly disapproved action in the society, in general.
A survey of responses on acquisition and disposal of land in parts of Nigeria,
for example, showed the following results:
Table 2.1
Responses on Methods of Acquisition and Disposal of Land in Nigeria (expressed in percent)
Language Source of Land Ownership Aware Supportive
Area of Area Family Purchase Rent of Sale of Sale
West:
Olugbo Yoruba 96 4 -- 96 14
Alade Yoruba 100 -- -- 41 0
Bendel:
Obazagbon Edo 90 10 -- 100 10
Abraka Urhobo 90 10 -- 83 0
Akwumasi Ibo 100 -- -- 0 0
East:
KEak Efik 57 29 14 93 42
lgbo-Ukwu Ibo 80 10 10 44 0
North:
Iloffa Yoruba 100 -- -- 0 0
Source: Abstracted from Adegbouye, R.O., "Analysis of Land Tenure
Structure in Some Selected A:oas in Nigeria" (The Nigerian Journal of
Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 8 , No. 2, July 1966, pp. 259-68.
8Colonial Office Legal Library (London) Folio 13080, dated April 1917 (cited
in Elias, T.O., op. cit., p. 182.
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Although the samples on which the above Table was based were small relaitive
to the population of the country, it nevertheless spotlights some of the points already
made about the structure and characteristics of the troditional land market. The
dominant source of ownership is still the family -- through a share in the inheritance.
Although generally a substantial proportion of the respondents have been aware of a
sale of land somewhere, yet only 10% have owned land by purchase themselves, and
the weakness and unconvincing nature of hypothetical questions and answers notwith-
standing, only 8% would support the idea of sale. The samples, though drawn from
the rural areas, they serve to show the basic attitudes and beliefs that condition trans-
fers of land in the urban areas as well. The urban areas, though, because of the
pressures of economic development, are likely to record greater numbers of trans-
actions and transfers in land than the rural areas, but the same basic constraints
still exist. Furthermore, a larger proportion of an urban population is more likely to
be supportive of sale and transfer of land because of the usually greater proportion of
migrant populations in urban populations and because the lands in question are not
theirs, and so they have no cultural or religious or other stake at preserving the status
quo in the place of their migration.
Table 2.2 for example, shows the trend of private land transactions in two
major urban areas -- Lagos and Enugu. It can be seen that the number of these trans-
actions recorded from year to year is relatively small in each city, though it seemed
to increase in the 1970's. The rate of change towards marketability or transfers can
therefore be said to be small and slow, even in the urban areas. It is noted also that
there were more leases than freehold sales and in the case of Lagos, 28 of the 92
leaseholds (30.4%) transactions were by a single family as the lessor - the OLwa
-32-
Table 2.2
Trends in Land Transfer Transactions as Proxy for the Rate of Change of Cultural Atti-
tudes Towards Land Matters (Markets) in Urban Areas
(Sample)
Total No. of "Private" Transactions
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
0
2
10
5
5
18
131
179
Percent of Total
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.6
0.5
0.5
0.0
1 .1
5.6
2.8
2.8
10.0
73.2
100.1
No. of leases were 92
No. of freehold sales
1
1
3
1
0
0
4
26
4
9
10
.
or registrations were 87.
1.7
1.7
5.0
1 .7
0.0
0.0
6.8
44.0
6.8
15.2
17.0
59
No. of leases were 29.
No. of freehold sales or registrations were 30.
Year
A. Lagos
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
B. Enugu
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
YY. y
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family, so that in terms of changes in attitudes toward transactions in land, this
feature reduces the proportion of people that are affected by such attitudinal change.
9
In any case, the transactions were noted to be still dominantly intra-ethnic groups in
both cities, which is another important characteristic of the traditional land tenure.
lntra-Ethnic/Intra-Group Pattern of Land Transactions
Table 2.1 showed that the idea of the sale of land is in existence, but has
not yet been widely accepted. It ought to be pointed out also that when it is said
that land is not sold or transferred, that what is meant is that it is not sold or trans-
,10
ferred to 'strangers' -- i.e., outside the lineage or group -- but may be 'sold' or
transferred between or among people within the lineage or group. This distinction
between transfers or transactions in land within the 'group' and its non-transfer out-
side the 'group' was unintelligible to many foreign (British Colonial) administrators,
9 The data on Table 2.2 was compiled by making a systematic examination
of six of the latest Registers of Titles and Deeds in the Land Registries in Lagos and
Enugu, containing leaseholds and freehold registrations. The data taken out of the
Registers for this particular table were only those of private or communal transactions.
Transactions involving the Government or state or public agency as lessor or seller
(which class are the more numerous in the Registers of both cities) were not included in
the calculation for the above table.
It is also pertinent to point out that the numbers represented on the Table may
not represent all the actual transactions in the given years because of substantial
under-registration of land transactions in the private, particularly communal, sector
land markets.
10
'Stranger' here means anyone not a member of the particular lineage or group
and in its widest connotation, it means one outside the particular ethnic group con-
cerned.
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but was very distinct to the natives. It was the failure of earlier administraton, to
perceive the significance of this distinction between 'strangers' and group members
1*1
that prompted Simpson to somehow angrily charge that,
We are firmly told that native law and custom does not
allow the sale of land, and yet we know that land has
been bought and sold in Lagos for a century or more.
Is it in defiance of custom, or because custom has
changed?
Certainly custom has been changing a little, but it had not been a defiance of
custom to transfer ("sell") or exchange land within the family or lineage group, as
such a transaction does not take the land outside the group. Land transfers even
within the group is by gift, exchange, or lease. Freehold sale is an exception,
rather than the rule, and is culturally frowned upon. Under the pressures of economic
12
development, however, such compromises are emerging as observed by Rowling,
that,
.. the mortgage of urban land and property may be per-
mitted to all, but the mortgage of agricultural land is
permissible only if both parties are fellow-ethnics. Some-
times a rule has been made that while freehold land or
house property may be mortgaged to anyone, in the event
of foreclosure, or of sale under writ of execution, the
property shall not pass to anyone who is not a fellow-ethnic.
The suggestion that "the mortgage of urban land and property may be permitted to "all",
however, tends to overstate the observed pattern in practice. Transactions in land
11
C.W. Rowling: Land Tenure in liebu Province, para. 100. S. Rowton Simpson
was the British Legal Officer appointed to enquire into the Registration of Titles to
Land in Lagos. He produced the report titled, "A Report on the Registration of Title
to Land in Lagos"(1957), Federal Government Printer, Lagos).
12 Ibid.,
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still remain dominantly intra-group or intro-ethnic.
A feature of the intra-group (intra-community and intra-ethnic) pattern of
land transactions is that these transactions are consummated at less than what would
be Considered the market value13 in a purely monetary transaction setting, for the
property involved. That is because the transaction (grant or lease or even sale) is
with family or community members, or co-ethnics, or other such relations; they are
often not charged the commercial market price for the plots of land concerned, as
buyers outside the group would be required to pay for such same property. There is
on understanding that a relation should not exploit the full force of the market on
14
another relation.
An examination of about 200 sample private15 (non-state or non-government
16
sources) land titles and deeds in the Lagos Land Registry , for example, showed that
private individual to individual or community to individual conveyances or leases
was the lowest in price, for a given size of plot and location. About 98% of these
13
'Market value' is defined as "the value of the land, estate, interests or profits
which such land, if sold in an open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer, is
expected to realise". More detailed explanation of the 'fair market value' as defined
by law is given in Chapters 3 and 5. The problem, however, is not so much how the
'market value' is defined, as how it is observed and applied.
14
IAlthough this is difficult to prove empirically or statistically, it is nevertheless
understood and accepted as so in the society, and in part could account for the com-
paratively lower prices in the traditionally private sold or leased land. Cf. private
communal sales with LEDB sales or leases and real estate firms sales (Chapter 6).
15Private here includes both private individuals, real estate firms, and community
or family group transactions.
16This examination was carried out from November 1975 to February 1976. It
involved an examination of six registers of Titles and Deeds and analysis of the entries
as to location, size, price and tenure and year of transaction, as well as the number
of years in case of leaseholds. A substantial proportion of this sample is represented
in Section A of Table 2.2 and therefore need not be documented further here.
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were intra-ethnic transactions. A similar number of government and quasi-government
conveyances to individuals was also examined. The price per plot of a given size
and location was in every case higher than that of a private individual or communal
transactions. The ethnic pattern of this transaction remained the same as for private
individual or community transfers, i.e., dominated by the ethnic group indigenous
to the locale, which dominance may, of course, be a function of the proportion of
the given ethnic group population in the total city population. The share of the 'in-
digenous ethnic group' in the transactions (98%) though, was more than proportional
to their share in the city population (72.2%) (See Table 2.3) so that the inclination is
to attribute the more than proportionate share as due to the persistence of traditional
land tenure and transactions patterns seems reasonable.
In the same sample, it was noted also that the highest price for comparable sized
17plots of land and location was that conveyanced by real estate firms. Most of those
who bought from such firms were 'strangers' (people not indigenous to Lagos or to the
ethnic group to which the people of Lagos belong) and incorporated firms . Real
estate firms were also noted not to deal in leases.
A 1960 sample survey of the ethnic origins of landlords in Lagos (Table 2.4 )
throws further light into this intra-group feature of land ownership and transactions.
The important columns to note in Table 2.4 are the "Lagosian column" and the "Total
Yoruba" column. The "Lagosian" column shows that with a few exceptions, Lagosians
or peoples of Lagos origin, dominate as landlords. Particular attention is drawn to
A fuller discussion of this point is undertaken in Chapter 6.
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Table 2.3 Ethnic Group of Nigerians in the City of Lagos (1963)
Ethnic Group Total Pop. % of Total Pop. (Nigerians)
1 . Yoruba 465,406 72.20
2. Ibo 99,638 15.46
3. Edo 20,450 3.17
4. Hausa 13,225 2.05
5. Efik 12,606 1.96
6. ljaw 11,754 1.82
7. Urhobo 7,171 1.11
8. lbibio 5,819 0.90
9. 1tsekiri 2,703 0.42
10. Isoko 1,785 0.28
11. Ekoi 658 0.10
12. Nupe 556 0.09
13. Tiv 555 0.09
14. Idoma 485 0.08
15. Fulani 434 0.07
16. Igala 220 0.04
17. Annang 204 0.03
18. lgbirra 193 0.03
19. Poli 100 0.02
20. Yalla 67 0.001
21. Ogoni 65 0.001
22. Others 515 0.08
Total: 644,609
Source: National Census of Population, 1963.
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such areas as Idumagbo, Ebute-Ero, Idunshaqbe, Idumota-Alakoro, Olowogbowo,
Epetedo, and Faji, which are the traditional areas of Lagos. Here, Lagosians con-
stitute over 60% of the landlords.
- The "Total Yoruba" column brings out the point made that as a matter of cus-
tom, land is hardly transferred across ethnic lines. Yoruba is the ethnic group to
which the people of Lagos belong. Other people of the same ethnic group who are
not Lagosians include the "Egbas" (second column), the "Ijebus" (third column), and
"Other Yorubas" (fourth column). A careful examination of the "Total Yorubas"
column indicates that almost in every residential area, the Yorubas constitute 90-100%
of the landlords.! 8
'Strangers'19 (Nigerians outside the Yoruba ethnic group) constitute a very small
proportion of the landlords in the metropolitan area. The only exceptions are in
Surulere and Obalende, areas where a "stranger element" (the lbos) constitute about
23% and 13% respectively of the landlords. These exceptions, however, are accounted
for by political processes or influences in which such lands were likely to have been
obtained mainly through government allocations of state lands. Intra-group pattern
of transactions in land has been a long-standing feature in the country, and the follow-
ing Egba statements- are fairly representative of the situation in most of southern Nigeria.
Among the Egba, for example, the law relating to urban lands was stated by
18C.W. Rowling: Land Tenure in liebu Province, para. 100.
19 By Nigerian custom, a migrant is never a 'legal' resident of the place of his
migration - resident in terms of having all the rights and privileges which the people
indigenous to the place have. This is irrespective of the length of time he has resided
in the given place. The migrant, however, has all rights and privileges back in his place
of origin, irrespective of how long he stays away from it. In terms of "legal residence
and origins", therefore, Nigerians are placr!-specific and therefore 'strangers' in any
other place.
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Table 2.' ~
Ethnic Origins of Landlords in Lagos Residential Areas, 1960
Residential Other Total Other Non-
Area Lagosian Egba lIjebu Yoruba Yoruba lbo Nigerian Nigerian
ldumagbo 75 -- 15 10 100 -- -- --
Ebute-Ero 634 25 -- 12 100 -- -- --
Idunshagbe 73 18 9 -- 100 -- -- --
Oke Awo 18 11 35 18 82 -- -- 18(D)
lsalegangan-Aroloya 46 29 17 8 100 - -- --
Idunmota-Alakaro 60 10 10 20 100 -- --
Offin-Itolo 40 20 10 30 100 -- -- --
Olowogbowo 56 11 11 22 100 -- -- --
Ereko-Agarawa 29 57 -- 14 100 -- -- --
Okepopo 42 16 16 24 98 -- -- 2(T)
Epetedo 86 7 -- -- 93 -- 4(B) 3(G)
Faji 47 16 5 16 84 -- 5(l) 11(D)
Brazilian Quarter 56 33 -- -- 89 -- -- 11(T)
Lafiaji -- 66 -- 31 10C -- -- 11(T)
Okesuna 11 25 - 39 12 88 -- -- 12(G)
Araromi -- 18 55 27 100 -- -- --
Obalende 9 6 13 23 52 13 3(H) 33(TG)
Ebute Metta East -- 35 18 47 100 -- -- --
Yaba -- 48 25 25 98 2 - --
Ebute Metta West -- 37 36 27 100 -- -- --
COjuelegba -- 21 42 17 80 8 4(E) 8(T)
Yaba east 16 34 34 16 100 -- -- --
Musnil. 11 36 17 28 92 4 4 --
Shomotu -- 18 35 39 92 8 -- --
Surulere -- 31 23 19 93 23 4(E) --
KEY: B - Bini -D - Dahomian E - Efik G - Ghanian H - Hausa L - ltsekiri T - Togolese; SOURCE: A.L. Maboguniie,
"Lagos" A Study in Urban Geography" (Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1961), p. 144. Cited in Baker, P.: Urbani-
zation and Politicai Change: bThe Pollitics of Lagos, 1917-1,967.
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the Secretary to the Egba Government as follows:
Where, in the family land, a member of the family has
obtained from the other members, through the head, a
definite portion, and by his own individual men he has
built upon, or in other ways improved it, this portion
becomes his own individual property. He may pledge
it or sell it, but never outside the community. No
Egba man can pledge or sell land to anyone who is
not an Egba.
This is in accordance with a formal proclamation made by the Egba Government in
1904 that,
Houses and Lands in Abeokuta territory cannot be sold
or mortgaged to anyone not a native thereof... and
No private individual may lease houses and lands to
anyone not a native of t e 'country' without the
sanction of the Alake.
Thot exchanges of land (lease, gift, mortgage, or even sale) do occur within
the group is further attested to by Governor Donald Cameron, who observed that,
It further seems clear that by native law and custom, the
natives have complete freedom to deal with their land as
between themselves, with the sole restriction that in the
case of strangers to the community, the permission of the
head Administrative unit is required for the admission of
the stranger as a member of the community; a consideration
20
West African Lands Committee Report, 1048, p. 187.
Egba Government Gazette, No. 2 of 1904, The Alake is the King of the
Egba Yorubas. The word 'country' means the ethnic area of the Egba (Abeokuta).
solely of a political nature, nor arising out of any power
over the land possessed by the Chief. 22
The foregoing portrays how the people see themselves in land matters. The way
the GovernmentAureaucracy and the Courts perceive the same land tenure and their
respective responses to them are briefly examined in the following sections.
2.2 The Response of the Government or Bureaucracy to the Traditional Land Tenure
System
A distinction could be made between how the Colonial Government or bureau-
cracy reacted to the traditional land tenure and how the post-Independence National
Governments responded to the same tenure system and their respective attitudes to-
wards it. Both Governmental periods recognized the system as a constraint in carrying
out land development schemes, and as an indirect source of environmental danger,
particularly in the urban areas. But while the Colonial Government, possibly out
of its incomplete understanding of the system and out of fear of social unrest from
attempts at a radical change, preserved its essential features and approached it with
caution, the national Government has made more direct efforts at changing or modi-
fying some aspects of the system.
While the Colonial Administration concentrated mainly on getting the people
to register their titles to land, so as to ascertain titles to land and ensure their security,
the post-Independence administration emphasized a more direct action by trying to
2 2 Sir Donald Cameron: A Note on Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces (Ap-
pendix C of H.L. Ward Price: Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces, Government
Printer, Lagos, 1939.
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make urban land essentially public, through massive compulsory acquisition, ser-
vicing, development and disposal to individuals by public urban development agencies,
or housing corporations. In a general way, therefore, it could be said that the
Colonial bureaucracy responded to this tenure system with caution with indirect at-
temps at modifying it; while the post-Independence administrations reacted more
directly and radically in attempts to change the system.
The Nigerian colonial government, for example, formally recognized and
strengthened the intra-group and intra-ethnic transfers and transactions patterns in land by
enacting the Native Land Acquisition Ordinance (Southern Nigeria) and the Land and
Native Rights Ordinance (Northern Nigeria) by which people from outside a district
were barred from acquiring land in that district without the written consent of the
Governor -- a consent that was seldom given.
Elias 23later commented with respect to this law that,
Desirable as might be the original government idea to pro-
text the unsophisticated Nigerian against a wanton alienation
of their land which is their only source of wealth, it would
seem that while the existing restrictions should continue in
the case of non-Nigerians acquiring land rights in both
provinces, the analogous discrimination against Nigerians
acquiring lands from areas of the country other than their
own places of birth, could with proper safeguards be
abolished.
But it would seem that the social and political stresses in the country, particularly the
state of inter-ethnic and other inter-group relations have seemed to make this suggested
change or abolition of the rule premature.
2 3 EIias, T.O., op. cit., p. 205.
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As has been pointed out, sustained attempts were made by the colonial bureau-
cracy to get titles to land registered as a first step to rationalizing the system. To
this effect, a Registration of itles Ordinance was passed and came into being in
1936. The law required the registration of all lands and transactions in land from
that date. Responses to this legislation have been low. Table 2.5 shows the progress
of the responses. It shows that up to 1957, only 2,518 freeholds and 569 leasehold
registrations had been recorded, after some 21 years of the registration cf titles
ordinance. This is obviously negligible for a country the size of Nigeria (376,000
square miles and 31 million people -- 1952/53 census). It was little wonder, then,
that of the 600 suits in the Lagos High Court during the twelve months ending Octo-
ber 31, 1956, 147 (24.5%) were "land cases," and most of these could be traced back
to uncertain titles.
Mr. S. Rowton Simpson, who was later (1957) appointed to examine the working
of the Lagos Titles Registry, observed with respect to this high proportion of land suits
that, "it looked to me as if a high proportion of them could have been avoided by
Registration., 24
He went on to explain why registration was important, and what was the under-
lying rationale of the administration's priority on registration of titles to land. He
pointed out that,
Having worked for so long in a territory where settlement
(i.e., adjudication) and registration of title was the in-
variable prelude to any development, and where in the
24S. Rowton Simpson: A Report on the Registration of Title to Land in Lagos,
p. 11. Lagos, Federal Government Printer (1957).
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Table 2.5
Progress of Land Title Registration
No. Freehold
Registrations
90
133
148
129
96
108
1937
1941/42
1943/44
1944/45
1946/47
1953/54
1954/55
1955/56
1956/57
No. Leasehold
Registrations
7
9
8
5
82
70
73
Total to Date Since the Registration
of Titles Ordinance came into Being
Freehold Leasehold
125 10
703 42
999 60
1,123 65
1 ,267 90
1,974
2,082
2,518
353
423
569
Source: Compiled from various issues of the Annual Reports of the
Federal Land Department.
Year
218
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big towns it had been so long established that it had come to
be regarded almost as the natural order of things, I find it
very difficult to imagine how administration can proceed
without it. That it can, of course, is evident, for it is the
normal state of affairs in England, but there, the processes
of private conveyancing do assure a sound title free of the
uncertainty characteristic of land transactions in Lagos. 25
At certain times and under special circumstances, the colonial government
intervened more directly to stabilize land matters, especially where law and order
were threatened as a result of land tenure situations. In fact, within two years of
British Colonial administration in Lagos (1863), an ordinance "for appointing certain
commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining the true and rightful owners of land with-
in the settlement of Lagos," made provision for adjudication. As a result of this,
3,932 grants were made in the 51 years between 1863 and 1914, each certificate of
grant declaring that a claim had been investigated and granting the land "unto....
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns for ever." A privy council decision in
1931, however, declared the form of these Government grants "inconsistent with the
whole idea of native rights, " 26 thereby stopping the process.
Another example of this type of registration and grant was the case of the
Glover Layout in Lagos. Land ownership titles in this area became such a subject of
bitter controversy and litigation that the Government appointed an officer to inves-
tigate claims and issue certificates to claimants who proved their titles. The area
contained about 1,440 plots of residential land. But in response to the claims inves-
tigation, only 456 applications for certificates of titles were submitted, and all of
25 Ibid.
26 S.R. Simpson, op. cit., p. 36.
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these were contested and subsequently referred to the Supreme Court for determina-
tion. Subsequently, 261 certificates were granted; 30 cases were withdrawn, and
36 were struck out; and 129 of the cases remained outstanding. About 1,000 plots
or persons out of 1,440 did not respond at all to the exercise and did not apply for
the certificates, and therefore the problems of uncertainty and security of title
remained. The Government's efforts at stream-lining titles to land were receiving
little positive responses from the people, but such attempts continued anyway.
However, these registrations, while they defined title to land, did not neces-
sarily succeed in individualizing such titles. This is because of the prevailing system
of inheritance whereby the estate of a Nigerian dying without a will devolves upon
all his children as family property, which rule applies with equal force even where
the property has been acquired and held by the intestate under English law. The
operation of this rule imposes a severe limitation upon the process of individualization,
for it means that whatever progress is made in one generation is stultified in the next,
as property reverts from individual ownership to family ownership -- family of the
individual that owned it in the preceding generation, unless the owner specifically
willed each plot of his land to specific individuals in his family before his death.
Otherwise, the tenure under which land is held can vary with the status of the
owner, and no present owner can impress on the land, any permanent form of owner-
ship.
Adjudication and registration of titles was the main thrust of the colonial bureau-
cracy' s response, while the post-Independence period saw the intensification of the use
of public land development agencies to counter the problems of the traditional I and
tenure. This role and the extent of its success is a major part of this thesis. Fuller
discussion of it therefore has to await subsequent chapters.
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2. 3 The Response of the Courts to the Traditional Land Tenure
The Courts, in contrast to the Government/bureaucracy that attempted to
change or modify the system, were sympathetic to it. The attitude of the Courts to
the system is more aptly conveyed in the words of criticism which Simpson* uttered
on the Courts in this respect -- that "the Courts presumably were more accustomed
to following principles than to evolving them." A dissenting opinion in a judicial
decision that attempted to set aside the inalienability of land and its communal or
family group ownership pattern, for example, was later vindicated on appeals.
Chief Justice Kingdon, in the Supreme Court of Lagos, on the dissenting opinion
27
under reference, observed as follows:
In passing, I wish to refer to one point in connection with
the question of changing the law which should not be over-
looked. I refer to the right of future generations. Under
native customary tenure, an individual cannot alienate the
land he occupies; consequently, the rights of his des-
cendants are safeguarded and cannot be realized by him.
But once the tenure becomes a fee simple, the rights of
generations yet unborn can be sold and the proceeds
squandered by the present generation. This alone should
in my opinion, make the Court slow to implement in the
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the actions of persons
who have selfishly sold or purported to sell the fee simple
of land previously held under native customary tenure.
The equities are not all on one side.
In consonance with this dissenting view, the West African Court of Appeal
(W.A.C.A.) later reversed the majority decision of the Supreme Court at Lagos, 28
thus sustaining the communal character of traditional land tenure.
27Supreme Court at Lagos in Balogun & Ors v. Oshodi (1931), 10 N. L. R.
at 36 at p. 58.
28
W.A.C.A. (1936) 4, W.A.C.A. 1 (cited in Elias, T.O., op. cit. , p. 182.
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Various other judicial decisions later strengthened the fact or presumption that
29
land is communal property. In Eze v. lgiliegbe, it was held that the burden is
on the person claiming that land is not or has ceased to be communal property to
prove his claim. Similarly in the case of Ovie v. Onoriobokirhe, Justice Onyeama
declared that,
The onus is on the plaintiff to establish by credible
evidence that under local custom, land could be owned
by individuals; that is to say that the general principle
of communal land ownership which has been recognized
and acted upon in all courts in West Africa, does not
apply in his locality, or is in any way modified in its
application.30
The courts still void land transactions that are done without the consent of all
relevant members of the community or family as required by customary land law. The
Nigerian Federal Supreme Court in 1959 declared in the case of Ekpendu v. Erika that:
Whether a sale of family land is void or voidable depends
on the person effecting the sale. If it is by the head of
the family without the consent of the principal members,
it is voidable. If it is by the principal members without
the consent of the family head, it is void.31
In another similar case, the West African Court of Appeals in judgment observed that,
We can find no authority for the statement that the
principal member of the family can give any title in
2914 W.A.C.A. 61 (1952).
30
W.R.N.L.R. 169 at p. 170 (1957). Also Aderimi v. Adedire (1966), N.M.L.R.
398.
31Simpson, S.R.: A Report on the Reo:stration of Title to Land in the Federal
Territoty of Lagos (Government Printer: Lages).
-49-
q conveyance of family land without the head
of the family joining in the conveyance, even
though he may be in agreement.
The principle, then, is still upheld that the head of the family must join in the con-
veyance of family land, that the principal members must concur therein, and a
conveyance purporting to transfer family land without these consents is void from
the start.
The implication is that a prospective purchaser of land must first find out:
(i) the family which owns the land, (ii) who the head of the family is for the time
being, (iii) who the principal members of the family are -- i.e., how many branches
does the family consist of. In other words, how many wives did the progenitor of
the family have; each wife being the foundation of one branch of the family, for
her male children carry on the line. It is not sufficient to obtain the concurrence
of just anyone in the branch; he must be a principal member, usually the oldest man
in the branch. Quite often, a purchaser is actively deceived by members of the
family in his search for these very important facts in relation to their family. These
problems notwithstanding, the Courts still uphold the process.
31Simpson, S.R.: A Report on the Registration of Title to Land in the
Federal Territory of Lagos (Government Printer, Lagos).
32
Crown Grants (Lagos) Act 1947 Cap. 44, Laws of Nigeria, 1958. Pre-
amble. Cited in Nwabueze, B.O.: Nigerian Land Law, p. 152.
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The Court's recognition and respeciof the customary land law is very
extensive and seemingly all-pervasive -- to the extent that registration of title to
land does not assure security of tenure if the original conveyance was not done in
accordance with the customary laws. Section 48 of the Registration of Titles Act,
Cap. 181, provides that:
In so for as registration of title affects land, the
title is guaranteed only after first registration, but
affords no guarantee of title prior to first regis-
tration.
What this means in practice is that the most solemnly and ceremoniously registered
title under the Act, and subsequent registered owners, can be deprived of their
holding by proof, for instance, that the grant to the first registered owner was not
made by the owners, or by those entitled to make the grant or that it was not con-
sented to by the principal members of the family, or that it was transacted without
33
the knowledge or consent of the head of the family.
Moreover, title in sale of land under native law and custom is not neces-
sarily transferred validly by legal conveyancing. The presence of witnesses who
saw the actual handing over of the property is a necessary pre-condition of a valid
sale under customary law, the implication being that the sale is ineffective with-
out it. The Courts have accordingly often held that,
33 Supreme Court of Nigeria in Taiwo v. Ogunsanya (N.M. L.R. 375
(1967), cited in Nwabueze, op. cit.
'Nwabueze, B.O., op. cit.,p. 344.
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In order to transfer an absolute title to a piece of land
under native law and custom, it is necessary that such
a grant or sale should be concluded in the presence of
witnesses who saw the actual "handing over" of the
property.34
Not all members of the Judiciary, however, were sympathetic to the traditional
land tenure system. In fact, some were utterly disgusted with the system and tried to
discredit and do away with it. Justice Speed, who was one of its ardent critics, for
example, once declared that,
The institution of communal ownership has been dead for
many years and the institution of family ownership is a
dying institution. .. 1 do not wish for a moment to be under-
stood to be speaking with any disrespect of the customs of
your ancestors. There was much that was admirable and
much which I hope will be retained for many years in the
family system which they evolved, but it can hardly be
denied that their ideas as to ownership of property were
utterly unsuited to modern requirements, that these ideas
have been dying a more or less natural death ever since
the people of this country entered into commerce with
European nations, and that sooner or later, either the
Legislature of the Colony or this Court in the exercise
of its equitable jurisdiction will have to give the coup
de grace to the whole system. 35
Along these same lines, Justice Mervin Tew commented in another similar land case
that,
This conflict between the English law of real property
and the customary native tenure, to which I have pre-
viously referred, has become very acute in Lagos and
has given rise to cases of extreme difficulty and hard-
ship. It suggests that the Legislature may before long
decide that within the Township of Lagos at least, the
34Supreme Court of Nigeria in Taiwo v. Ogunsanya (N.M.L. R. 375, 1967).
3%peed, Ag. C.J. in Lewis v. Bankole (1909) 1, Nigerian Law Review. 31,
103, cited in Nwabueze, B.O.: Nigerian Land Law, p. 45.
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time has come to make the change which was foreshadowed
by Speed in Lewis v. Bankole, and sweep away the whole
system of native land tenure.
But so entrenched and resistant to change are the customary practices, that com-
munal ownership system still retains a firm grip and legitimacy in the society long after
the above suggestive prediction was made by Justice Speed. In fact, Justice Butler
Lloyd, in another Supreme Court case some three decades later, observed in reference
to that prediction of the death of the traditional. land tenure system, that,
Now with oil due respects to the opinion expressed by
Speed, acting C.J. in the case of Lewis v. Bankole,
to the effect that family ownership is a dying institution,
I am bound to place on record my view that notwith-
standing the lapse of nearly a generation since that
judgment was delivered, the institution of family owner-
ship is still a very live force in native tenure in Lagos. 36
Even Sir Mervyn Tew had had to repudiate his own earlier prediction of the death of
the system. In his Report on Titles to Land in Lagos, thirty years later, he observed
that,
I do not believe that even in Lagos today family owner-
ship can be said to be a dying institution, to which an
end can be put by the wave of the Legislative wand.
On the contrary, I am convinced that the idea of
family ownership is so deeply ingrained in the minds
of the large proportion of the community which is
still illiterate, that any such sweeping change would
cause widespread consternation even if, as is un-
likely, it were widely understood. 37
36
Justice Butler Lloyd in Bajulaiye v. Akapo (1938) 14 NLR 10, cited in
Nwabueze, B.O., Nigeria Land Law (Nwamife Books, Enugu), 1972.
37
Tew, Mervy, Report on Titles to Land in Lagos (Sessional Paper No. 2,
1947, Gcvernment Printer, Lagos).
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The Courts therefore essentially interpret and apply the customary land tenure
law. It thus seems rather paradoxical that the unlimited regulatory authority that the
successive modern governments in Nigeria have attempted to superimpose upon the
indigenous system of land tenure, with a view to modifying and controlling it, have
seemed in effect to accord the system greater efficacy -- through one of the apparatus
of the modern State -- the Courts.
But the Courts do protect the rights of strangers and migrants over
land that they honestly acquired or were granted. The general stance of
the Courts today regarding customary tenancy in this respect has often
been, . that, where 'strangers' or 'immigrants' have been granted land for occupation
and use, they are entitled to continue in peaceable enjoyment until they forfeit their
rights on such grounds as: (i) alienating a portion of the land to others without the
prior consent of the grantors, or (ii) putting the land to other uses other than those
originally agreed upon, or (iii) by failure to pay the customary tribute or by denying
the title of the overlord. It is also well established now that customary tenants should
not suffer forfeiture for minor acts of misbehavior, and that the Courts are loathe to
order forfeiture except "in the most exceptional circumstances."38 A 1974 judgment
sets out this protection of customary tenants:
A very important factor is that a grantor of land, once it
has been given to the grantees as customary tenants, cannot
thereafter grant it or part of it to a third party without the
consent or approval of the customary tenants. The grantor
is not allowed to derogate from his grant.39
380. Chukura, op. cit.
39 Wagnoreghor and Ors v. Aghenghen (1974) 1, s.c.p.1 at p. 8.
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2.4 The Disadvantages of the Traditional Land Tenure in Urban Development
The various problems posed by the features of this land tenure system must have
become apparent by now. These are reflected in the inter-related areas of land as-
sembly for urban development schemes, housing production, rationalization of land
uses, and in the areas of environmental quality and protection.
Because of the prevailing reluctance to sale or other forms of land transfer, it
becomes difficult to assemble land for any substantial development programs, either by
the Government or by private developers. In effect, this tenure system has the tendency
to obstruct important programs involved in the country's growth and development.
Quite often, for example, commercial and industrial activities by Government,
its agencies, or private entrepreneurs are delayed or completely halted by the fact that
business and factory sites are not held with certainty of title or that such sites are dif-
ficult to acquire.
On occasions, too, an ostensible owner of land is unable to establish his ownership,
either because he cannot satisfy interested parties, usually financial institutions, that it
is not family land, but individually owned land, or that he holds it as a result of parti-
tion, as distinct from allocation, or that his family granted the land to him and so cannot
borrow money with which to develop his land, nor could he sell it to those who are pre-
pared and are able to develop it. With increasing urbanization, loss and waste through liti-
gation on land have become features of the traditional land tenure or market. 0  The Annual
Report of the Nigerian Federal Land Department (1954/55), for example, points out that,
It is apparent that the difficulty of obtaining, whether by lease or
purchase, secure title to land in many parts of Lagos causes a re-
grettable degree of loss and waste through litigation arising from
this cause and materially hampers commercial development by its ad-
verse effects on capital development.
0. Chukura: "Legal Problems in Housing Provision in Nigeria"(paper presented to the
Second International Conference on Housing, University of Ibadan, April 21-25, 1975).
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In fact . the Third National Development Plan 1975-1980 repeats this same problem
when it pointed out that,
.fraudulent land transactions and endless legal
tussles over title ownership have combined to stifle
housing development with consequential and sig-
nificant escalation in the prices of rented accommo-
dation. And virtually all public agencies have
cited difficulties in land acquisition as the most
intractable factor which delayed the implementation
of their development pro ects and schemes during
the second Plan Period.'
The British West Africa Mission's Report of 1948 reflected the same theme in its
observation that,
We are informed that the only method by which title
to land could be obtained in many areas was by
means of a law suit and that suits of this nature are
liable to drag on for long periods owing to the
numerous claimants involved.
A classic example of these problems was the delays encountered. by the Ni-
gerian Government in the acquisition of land for the Apapa scheme. The compulsory
acquisition proceeding was started in 1913, but was snarled and effectively held
up by legal suits from the affected Chieftaincy family. It wasn't until 1925 that
the Federal land Department was able to report (somehow with relief) that,
The arbitration proceedings in connection with the
claims of Chief Oluwa and a few others, who rejected
the compensation offered by the Government were
continued during December, and concluded on 2nd
of January of this year (1925). The settlement of
41 Federation of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan, p. 37. (Lagos:
Federal Ministry of Economic Development).
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this long standing dispute, dating back to the year
1913 should not now be delayed. 42
These give some idea of the difficulties posed by land tenure in Nigeria
in particular, and in West Africa in general.
The Lloyd Committee on the Registration of Title to Land in Western
43Nigeria summarised these problems of land tenure as follows:
The problems which arise from the uncertainty of title
to land in the Region are too well known to need
lengthy exposition. A man who wishes to purchase or
lease and cannot find out who are the right people
to convey it to him; many men buy their land twice
from rival claimants, or from two sections of a
family. Having acquired the land, a man is reluc-
tant to develop it, being unsure of his rights to it.
When he does take the plunge and build an imposing
house or plant permanent crops, he finds that his lack
of a secure title prevents him from readily selling the
property or from mortgaging it to raise credit for
further expansion of his business. Well known is the
unscrupulous debtor who has cited his house as a
security for a loan and who immediately defaults,
claiming successfully that the building is on family
land, and cannot therefore be attached for his
debts. Once caught out, creditors are extremely
reluctant to advance money to build a house on
what seems likely to be family land, or to loan money
with a house on family land as security. Creditors
presume therefore that all land within the traditional
built up areas of a town is family land until the con-
trary is shown. Another serious aspect of the problem
is that valuable land lies unused because it is not clear,
by customary law, who are the persons empowered to
dispose of it. These issues have continuously been
42Annual Report of the Nigerian Land Department, 1925.
43
Report to the Western Region Legislature. Sessional paper No. 2 of
1962, para. 2.
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raised before the Minister of Lands and Labour by
creditor organisations such as banks and building
societies. A committee set up in Lagos to investi-
gate the problems of the Nigerian businessman
reported that his inability to raise credit was one
of his foremost handicaps.
These same problems were reflected and articulated also in the Report of
a United Nations Housing Mission to the Gold Coast (Ghana, November 1954),
whose land tenure problems are similar to those of Nigeria. The comment is as
valid in Nigeria as it is in Ghana. The report pointed out that,
It has long been acknowledged that a serious need
exists for clearing titles to land in certain areas of
the Gold Coast and for instituting a system of land
registration. These reforms are essential to record
the rights of people to their land, to secure those
who have purchased property against eviction as to
assure people who build their homes that they can do
so without fear or uncertainty. It has been iterated
and reiterated that only when a sound system for
buying and selling property exists, will the funda-
mental wealth represented by the country's land
be brought into use for the benefit of the people.
All too often, though, no one may be disputing
ownership to land, the imputed owner is unable to esta-
blish his ownership, cannot borrow money with -
which to develop his land, nor sell it to those able
to develop it. A legal mechanism able to define
and record his interest is needed to enable him to
bring his land into use.
The evils and mischiefs of the current situation are
known. They rise to obstruct important programmes
involved with the country's growth. They loom in
the conflict between stools in some of the rural areas
and between owners and tenants in the burgeoning
cities. They affect large landowners and small.
Cited in Simpson, S.R.: Report on the Registration of Title to Land
in Lagos (Federal Government Printer, Lagos, 1957), para. 20.
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They have cost many persons into uncertainty as
to their rights. Almost every phase of the housing
problem which the team of the United Nations
experts has explored has brought forth the un-
certainties of land tenure as a primary obstacle.
It has been emphasized in conferences with
architects and builders, who have been obstructed
in their operation; by small folk seeking to build
a roof over their heads; by Government officials
who have the duty of making housing loans or
carrying out legislative policy; by those con-
cerned with advancing the building and loan
movement, and by local government officials.
Because of these many complexities, transactions in land, particularly by private
individuals, is incalculably risky and expensive, to say the least.
Closely related to this is the effects it has on housing and housing production
in the cities. Because it is difficult to assemble land, much less good and secure
titled land, production of housing all the time falls far short of the demands for
housing, with the consequent overcrowding in residences. Table 2.6, for example,
shows the housing conditions in the urban areas of Nigeria, indicating very high
percentages of urban households living in one room dwellings. On the average,
about 50-70% of all the households in Nigeria's urban centers live in one room,
and most of the major urban centers have an occupancy rate of 3-4 persons per room,
and in no urban center is the rate below 2 persons per room.
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Town
Lagos+
lbadan+
Oshogbo+
Ilorin+
Kaduna+
Jos+
Port Harcou
Benin City*
Kano*
Warri*
Enugu**
Onitsha**
Owerri**
Abakaliki**
Nsukka**
Umuahia**
Table 2.6
Housing Conditions in Selected Urban Centers in
Households Occupy-
ing 1 Room (%)
74.2
48.1
36.4
38.2
73.5
74.1
rt* 51.5
48.0
69.1
59.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Nigeria
Average Number of
Persons per Room
4.1
3.2
2.2
2.6
3.8
3.7
2.4
2.2
2.4
2.6
3.0
3.5
2.5
2.5
2.8
Sources: + = NISER, University of Ibadan, Survey of Housing Conditions
in Selected Urban Centers in Nigeria (preliminary).
* = Third National Development Plan 1975-80, Vol. I (p. 307).
** = Field Survey of Housing Conditions in Seven Urban Centers
of the (Former) East-Central State, by C-E Tec, Inc.,
Waltham, Mass.
These are definitely serious housing situations which, incidentally, may
improve only when the production of new housing has caught up with the demands
and needs of a growing urban population. Studies of population growth rates of
most Nigerian urban centers show annual growth rates of 3% to 5% per annum,
with the highest rate of 8% for the city of Lagos and 11% for its metropolitan area.
The rates of housing construction are not anything near meeting existing
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needs. nucih less the housing needs created by these rapid urban population
growths.
Because of the tenure system, valuable land lies unused because the owners
do not have the resources to develop and build the houses as needed, and are not
disposed to transfer them to those who can develop them properly. This in some
was contribute to-the housing problems.
Another effect is on land development or housing finance. Generally, over 90%
of all residential houses in Nigerian cities are built with the personal savings of
their owners. Consequently, most of them are realtively small rooming houses of
8 to 9 rooms on the average, and generally housing some 16 to 20 persons (about
4-5 Nigerian urban families) each. Bigger, better, and more housing develop-
ments are generally limited because housing development finance from commercial
banks or other private sector commercial credit institutions are practically non-
existent, and the trickle that exists in the public sector is restricted to a very
small segment of the civil service. Housing finance is generally not available
because the commercial credit institutions and other creditors are reluctant to
advance loans for housing and other land development activities because of the
insecurity of titles in land, nor do they accept land as security or collateral on
loans, for the same reasons of uncertainty and insecurity of titles in land, so that
even when they refuse to sell or lease these lands to developers, the traditional
land owners may not be able to develop the lands themselves because they don't
have the financing. The result is a heavy housing deficit in the cities, with its
all-pervading ramifications.
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A further negative implication of the features of this land tenure sys'em
is the problems it poses for a more desirable rationalization of land uses. In addition
to irregular and confusing sub-division practices, the 'traditional' developments in ur-
ban settings are often characterized by mixed uses, and often these 'mixes' are considered in-
compatible uses and therefore undesirable from the point of view of health
and the general environment.
Table 2.7 shows the different residential areas of Lagos with the proportion of the
residences with subsidiary uses in each area. These subsidiary uses include light
industries, offices, and all kinds of shops.
Table 2.5
Lagos: Subsidiary Use of Residential Buildings
Area Percent of Dwellings with Subsidiary Uses
Lagos Island 28.0
Ebute Metta 43.6
Yaba 15.6
Surulere 10.4
All Areas 22.1
Source: LEDB: Lagos Master Plan (draft), 1971, p. 95.
The Central Business District (CBD) of Lagos is located in Lagos Island.
This area (CBD) and other areas in the Island generally recognized as 'commercial
areas' were not included in this table. This accounts for the lower rate of dwellings
in Lagos Island recorded as affected by subsidiary use (28%) than might have other-
wise been the case if designated commercial areas, in which there are also many
dwelling houses, were included. The areas dominated by the indigenous people of
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Lagos -- Lagos Island and Ebute Metta, clearly have a preponderance of subsidiary
uses in their residential buildings. There are less of such mixtures in Surulere,
which is largely developed and controlled by the Lagos Executive Development Board --
a public agency. In the indigenous areas, too, road spaces are narrow and without
sidewalks, and open spaces are scarce.
Following from all these other implications of the traditional land tenure features
are their environmental implications. Because land is difficult to assemble, irregular
subdivisions exist, and sub-division controls cannot be effectively enforced. This
means narrow or no streets, inadequate frontages and very high proportion of site
coverage, inadequate drains and shortages of other utilities. These result in very un-
sanitary conditions. The lack of housing development finance results in inadequately
serviced houses, particularly with respect to sanitary facilities, water systems, sewers,
and other refuse disposal systems. These, added to the subsidiary and incompatible
uses to which a substantial proportion of the dwellings are put, creates a serious, un-
desirable environmental situation.
These problems created by the traditional land tenure system had prompted the
suggestion that,
One way of reducing their significance (significance of
the traditional land ownership pattern), in this respect is
to valorize urban land through property tax. This is be-
cause lineage land is believed to be the real nexus of
their relationships to the city...
and that,
a ..once this is pushed into the stream of economic ex-
chance relations, the majority of such individuals wuld
be forced to re-define their relationships to the city.45
45Mabogunje, A.L., "Urban Land Policy and Population Growth in Nigeria" (in Ominde,
S.H. and C.N. Ejiogu, Population Growth and Economic Development in Africa, p. 242).
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But the problems that might result from this approach might create more ccial
and political problems than it might have solved.
2.5 Good Features of the Traditional Land Tenure System
We have discussed at length the problems posed by the traditional land tenure
and its constraints on marketability and supply. In spite of these problems, however,
it can be said that the traditional land tenure system has the distinct advantage of
horizontal distribution. Ownership and accessibility to land is horizontal -- across
the socio-economic stratum (Figure 2.1A). Most people have at least a piece of land,
and therefore a house, because he or she can build a house of a sort. As against
the modem market system in which there is a tendency for land to be monopolized by
a relatively few wealthy people or firms (Figure 2.1B), this system has a wide social
distributional pattern -- across the economic stratum. Land ownership is dispersed over
a reasonably large number of people, so that a monopoly situation does not exist,
except in cases where the public authorities themselves wield monopoly power and
alter the distributional pattern (Figure 2.1C).
46This horizontal pattern of land ownership has come about as a result of the system
of inheritance -- through parents and ancestors down the generations. As cultural
This ownership of land by both the rich and the poor refers principally to the
cases of populations indigenous to any given city, town, or village, and does not in-
clude migrants to the given place. The migrant rich or the migrant poor do not 'tradi-
tionally' own land at the places (destinations) of their migration, though in all prob-
ability, they own land at their indigenous places of origin. Migrants could, of course,
own lands in their places of migration through buying or leasing such lands from the
indigenous population, but as has been noted, in this essay, it is not always an easy
thing to do.
The implication of this feature, then, is that migrants are generally dominantly
renters, while the indigenous people would more likely be landlords and owne:-
occupiers.
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Figure 2.1
Conceptual Diagrammatic Comparisons of Land Ownership Distribution Across the
Socio-Economic Stratum in Three Land Tenure (Market) Systems .
A
Traditional Land Tenure System
Socio-Economic Status - %,
B
Market System
Socio-Economic Status --
C
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norms usually disapprove of land sales, they succeed to a large degree in keeping
the lands in the hands of the relatively poor people, without much danger of their
being bought out, or being induced or pressured to sell to the wealthy or to commer-
cial developers. While this feature or attribute may by dysfunctional or undesirable
at times, its greater advantage of enabling accessibility of land to a cross-section
of the society's income groups is very desirable, and if well channelled and utilized,
this feature is positively sufficiently broad and inclusive of "public purpose" character-
istics as such and could serve as effectively as the public mode of ownership as a
matrix of investment in urban land improvements and development.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to describe the features of the traditional land
tenure, to show what the land market is like to a potential private buyer of land.
To one non-indigenous to a given place, the land market is complicated, risky, and
expensive. These problems derive from the extended family or community pattern of
land ownership, and the consequent difficulty and expense of locating those members
of the family that can validly transfer titles; the general non-registration of titles
which makes it difficult to know which titles are genuine, and the general reluc-
tance to "sell" landwhich derives from the traditional cultural and religious ab-
horrence of such sales.
It was noted that in various ways the features of this land tenure have
serious limitations to proper urban planning and environmental safety. In the trad-
itional land tenure system, however, the distribution of land ownership is horizontal --
that is, ownership is accessible both to the rich and the poor, through the inherit-
ance structure and mechanisms. This horizontal distribution and accessibility pat-
tern is one of the strongest points in the traditional land tenure system, and is
really unique to it.
CHAPTER THREE:
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN URBAN LAND IN NIGERIA:
FRAMEWORK AND RATIONALE
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Chapter Three
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN URBAN LAND IN NIGERIA: FRAMEWORK & RATIONALE
Chapter Two had discussed the nature and characteristics of the traditional
land tenure system in Nigeria, and its implications for urban land transactions and
land supplies, for the production of housing, for the rationalization of land uses, and
for environmental quality. It was pointed out that the Chapter mainly portrayed what
the land market picture was for the private buyer of land, which implies that the
picture could be different where the government was the buyer of land. It would, of
course, be unimaginable for a government to allow a land tenure system with such
apparently "social cost" implications to continue to exist without any attempts at
changing, or at least modifying, its undesirable features or aspects.
This chapter attempts to look into what this land market is when the gov-
ernment or its agencies enter the market for land -- how much the rules of the game
get altered as a result, and with what effects. A brief historical review of public
encounters with the problems of this tenure system (particularly in the early colonial
period, when it was hardly well understood by British Colonial Administrators) is
undertaken, and the initial official ambivalence towards it analyzed. The rationale
and mechanisms for public acquisition of lands are presented and discussed.
3.1 Sovereign Powers of the. State over Land.
The traditional land (market) tenure system in Nigeria poses as much prob-
lem for the Government as it does for the private individual, if not more. This
will become evident from our discussions in the next chapter. Suffice it to say,
meanwhile, that the only difference between the two (public and private) with
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respect to these problems is that the government has a sovereign right to expropriate
what it cannot purchase by negotiation and voluntary contract, it can make arbi-
trary rules to guide the transactions and impose and legitimize those rules as
binding on all other relevant parties under its political jurisdiction. What we are
going to discuss here, then, are the expropriatary rules of the government, and how,
to what extent, and in what framework it deals with the traditional land tenure
system under consideration, and its effectiveness in doing so.
The regulation by the State of the manner in which private owners of land
are to hold and dispose of their land invariably results in some qualifications being
imposed upon private rights of ownership for various public purposes such as town
planning, social justice and equity, or even the protection of the private owners
themselves against the dangers of unhealthy environment and sometimes against land
trafficking by unscrupulous dealers or speculators. Private ownership is, therefore,
subject to the "eminent domain" and "police powers" of the State, which implies
that the rights of private ownership can be enjoyed only subject to such qualifications
as the State may in the exercise of its sovereignty impose upon them. Theoretically,
these are universally accepted facts, irrespective of ideological systems.
In addition to taking land for such "public purposes" as stated above,
Governments or their agencies in Nigeria could also acquire land for housing and
other urban land development or commercial schemes. In this respect, a slight
distinction (sometimes a distinction without a difference) is made between: (a)
"Public acquisition for 'public purposes", and (b)" Public or Quasi-Public Acquisi-
tion for Planning schemes and residential developments".
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Acquisition for 'public purposes' i where 'public purpose' is used in the
very restricted sense of a purpose that benefits all or most of the people or a sub-
stantial proportion of the relevant 'public' -- a sort of 'public-free good' criterion.
This sense of public purpose is approximatel y defined by the criterion of 'public
purpose' outlined on page 71-72.Under this restricted sense are also classified such
purposes that though ordinarily would be classified under (b) above -- (quasi-public)
are directly used by the Government or are necessary for the smooth and more ef-
ficient functioning of the Government. Acquisition of land for housing to public
servants would come under the meaning of this definition.
Public acquisition for planning schemes and residential developments de-
notes public action in the acquisition of land, which in a very general sense can be
justified as of benefit to the public, but which nevertheless benefit certain individuals
or groups more than it benefits others or benefits them to the exclusion of others. In
other words, the public purpose character of this class of public actions could be said
to be largely incidental to the benefits of the intended prime beneficiary individuals
or groups.
This slight distinction was implied in the dictum enunciated by Oliver
Lyttleton with respect to urban housing development, when he stated that,
In so far as government is concerned with providing
houses for its own purposes, or its ownemployees,
it will no doubt find it convenient to provide the
finance from revenues and entrust the execution
of building programmes to the Public Works De-
partment or departmental works services. When
however government is concemed to promote the
provision of housing for {e general public, it
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will almost certainly fird it more satisfactory
to work through other agencies,'
This in effect explains the basic framework for public involvement in urban
land management and development in Nigeria -- direct government acquisition
(by government departments) for purely "public purposes" as roads, medical facilities,
educational facilities, and land for the building of government stations and offices
and housing and industrial/commercial developments, and through Urban Land De-
velopment Agencies for "quasi-public purposes", as housing and industrial/commercial
developments.
As had been pointed out, however, these are slight distinctions, and the
two types of "public purposes" can and do overlap from time to time. "Pure public
purpose" is the basic general rationale for the exercise of eminent domain or com-
pulsory acquisition powers and acquisitions for quasi-public purposes are extensions of
Ihis main rationale. A further discussion of these powers of compularoy acquisition,
its evolution, and application in the Nigerian context, are undertaken in the next
section.
A. Acquisition for "Public Purpose"
Theoretically, the government or the State can obtain private lands and
interests in them needed for "public purposes" through gifts, purchase in the open
market, or by compulsory acquisition. These, though practicable, are not as easy,
peaceable, and straightforward as they sound. The complexities of the Nigerian
traditional land market system is fairly familiar by now. From the discussion of the
nature and character of this tenure system in Chapter 2, it can be inferred that the
time-consuming process of scouting out and i ientifying those members of a family
ISir Oliver Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a letter to the
Colonial Governors of British Territories (which included Nigeria at that time), Nov-
ember 3, 1953.
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who hold interest in a given piece of lar d and whose consents are required for a
valid purchase of such land to be made are unlikely to make easy, peaceable, and
straightforward acquisition of land by any "body" possible. Compulsory acquisition
has therefore come to seem the only potentially viable option for the Government.
Where, for example, a communal decision has to be taken on whether or not to dis-
pose of a piece of communal land, there are too many complex matters to contend
with and the State may not want to wait indefinitely. To ensure, therefore, that
the Government has access to land at the right times and places, legislation is
often passed to empower the government to acquire,compulsorily if need be, land
required for "public purposes". In Nigeria, this basic eminent domain legislation
is formally provided by the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance of 1876, amended and
re-enacted as the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance of 3rd May 1917, otherwise
titled: An Ordinance to Empower the Governor to Acquire Lands when Required for
Public Purposes.
The definition of 'public purpose' usually varies from place to place, and
often depends on circumstances too, but certain general guiding criteria are ac-
cepted as determining when an action is for a 'public purpose' or in the 'public
interest'. These criteria 2 include:
(i) Whether the benefit of the action is available on equal terms to
the entire public in the locality affected;
(ii) Whether the service or commodity supplied is one needed by all or
a large number of the public;
(iii) Whether the enterprise bears directly and immediately, or only
remoteiy on the public welfare;
2Allydonn Realty Corporation v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass
288, 293, 23 N, E. 2d 665 (1939).
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(iv) Whether the nature of the no ed to be met requires united effort under
united control, or can be served as well by individual (private)
competition;
(v) Whether private enterprise in the past has failed in supplying the
want or eradicating the evil; and
(vi) Whether insofar as benefits accrue to individuals, the whole of
society has an interest in seeing those individuals benefited.
Not all these factors need necessarily be present in each particular case to
make an action a "public purpose" one. The essential determination is that the
real, primary, dominating or fundamental purpose be 'public'.
Public purposes in the context of Nigeria include Government offices and
stations, utilities and land for institutional establishments -- hospitals, post offices,
educational institutions, transport facilities, and other urban or rural land uses of
a public nature. Section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Act (Cap. 167) formally
defines "public purposes" as:
(a) "Exclusive government use" or "general public use",
(b) Use for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind in-
cluding reclamations;
(c) Use for or in connection with the laying out of any new townships
(urban center) or government station or the extension or improvement
of any existing township (urban center) or govemment.This involves
a very broad scope of acquisition of lands for new towns and/or for the
extensions of old ones, but is limited to the planning and installation
of basic infrastructure. It does not include ownership of the land
involved. Such lands usually revert to the owners, who are required
to pay planning fees after the planning exercises are completed.
(d) Obtaining control over land contiguous to any port;
(e) Obtaining control over land, the value of which will be enhanced by
the construction of any railvcy, road or other public works or con-
venience about to be undertaken or provided by the government;
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(f) Obtaining control over land required for or in connection with
mining purposes; and
(g) Obtaining control over land required for or in connection with
planned rural development or settlement, development of tele-
communications, housing estates, economic, industrial, and
agricultural development.
As originally applied, the statutory powers of compulsory acquisition could
not be validly invoked for other than public purposes as defined. But even then,
the definition of scope as above is so wide that it hardly excluded much, and most
acquisitions could by that definition still be justified as of 'public purpose'.
In the earlier days of the British Colonial Administration in Nigeria, how-
ever, most lands required for the services of government were readily made avail-
able free of charge by the customary owners (mainly from the pool of communal
lands). Land was relatively a surplus good then, and modem urbanization was as
yet embryonic. The Government did not therefore have to resort to large-scale
compulsory acquisition of lands. But as time went on, and more demands were made
by the governments on the lands of the natives, and with increasing urbanization,
land assumed increased scarcity, and therefore money value. Willing supplies
naturally dried up and compulsory acquisition became necessary, and actively used.
Earlier instances of the exercise of what might be called powers of com-
pulsory acquisition were not general in scope, but were confined to particular
projects. The first of these was the Town Improvements Ordinance of 1863 which with
the object of "laying out the town of Lagos in broad streets, roads and highways",
empowered the Governor of Lagos to pull down buildings or erections and to pay
due compensation for them as well as for the ground upon which they stood.
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The second enactment, the Swamps improvements Ordinance of 1863, required the
owners of certain swamp lands on the Island of Lagos to fill them up on pain of
sale of such land by public auction to anyone ready to carry out the requirements
of the Ordinance, and if no purchaser was forthcoming, the Governor could him-
self take possession of it for the services of the Colony on payment of adequate
compensation.
The Public Lands Acquisition Act, No. 9 of 1917 (Chapter 167 of the Laws
of Nigeria) with various amendments and modifications, is still the law governing
compulsory acquisition of land in Nigeria today.3 The basic authorization for
public compulsory acquisition of land is provided by Section 3(1) of the Act, which
states that,
Where any lands are required for a public purpose of
the Federation or of a public purpose of a State, the
President in the former case, and the government of
the State concerned in respect of any lands within
the State, in the latter case, may acquire such lands
for an estate in fee simple or for a term of years as
he may think proper, paying such compensation or
consideration as may be agreed upon or determined
under the provisions of this Act.
3.2 Conditions for Compulsory Acquisition
Three conditions have to be fulfilled for a compulsory acquisition to be
valid: (i) the acquisition must be for a public purpose; (ii) notice of acquisition
must be given to the land owners or those claiming interest in the land. This
3Umeh, J.A.: Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation in
Nigeria (Sweet & Maxwell, 1973), p. 21, 28.
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notice rlust be sent directly by the acquiring authority to such interested persons,
and the notice should also require them to send to the acquiring authority within
six weeks from the date of the notice, a statement of their respective rights or
interests, and of the evidence thereof, and of any claim made by them in respect
of such rights or interests. (iii) Fair and adequate compensation must be paid to
the land owners. Fair and adequate compensation is defined as "the fair market
value" of the land or property, or "the value of the land, estate, interest or profits,
or the amount which such lands, estate, interest or profit if sold in the open market
by a willing seller to a willing buyer might be expected to realise".4 And no
allowance shall be made on account of the acquisition being compulsory.5
In determining this "fair market value" of the land, relevant factors6 of
consideration would include:
(a) The assessment made by the officers of the acquiring authority;
(b) The price paid for the land by the owner (if he had bought it);
(c) The price at which the owner had sold land forming part of the area
compulsorily acquired;
(d) The price at which land has sold generally in the locality;
4 Public Lands Acquisition Act, Cap. 167, s. 15(b).
5 An earlier provision of the Lagos Local Government Act (Cap. 93) now re-
placed by PPD 199 D284 of the Laws of Nigeria (1959) provided that a fair market
value be paid to an owner as compensation, plus 10% of that in addition in lieu of
the acquisition being compilsory. This provision for a 10% addition was, however,
statutorily stopped in 1945 on grounds that the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance
did not specifically provide for it.
6
Nwabueze, B.O,, op. cit.
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(e) The rate at which compensation has been paid for lands acquired in
the locality;
(f) The capital value of any rent payable in respect of the land.
Which of these or combinations of these that would be conclusive in de-
termining the "fair market value" of any particular case, however, depends upon the
particular circumstances of the case. Ultimately, therefore, "fair market value",
however defined, basically involves substantial subjectivity in assessment. As was
rightly (if statutorily incorrectly) observed by the judge determing such an assess-
ment, "In such a state of things, any amount fixed by the Court as payable to a
claimant must be arbitrary assessment." 7
Cognizant of the complexities and intricacies of the Nigerian land tenure
system, provisions were made in the enabling legislation to ensure that the acquiring
authorities are not deliberately or unreasonably held up or obstructed by land owners.
Legislation gives the Government or other relevant authorities:
(i) The right to enter the property in question to carry out preliminary
investigations on the land;
(ii) The right to go to the appropriate High Court for the settlement of
the amount of compensation due, if any, and/or disputed interest
or title, if for six weeks after service and publication of notice
of intention to take lands, (a) no claim was lodged with the auth-
ority, (b) the claimant and the acquiring authority have not agreed
upon the amount of compensation; or (c) the claimant fails to give
satisfactory evidence in support of his claim, or (d) separate and
conflicting claims are made in respect of the same lands.
7Chairman, LEDB v. Williams (1 All Nigeria Law Review, 267 (1963).
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(iii) A further proviso that where a party upon whom a summons has been
served fails to appear at the appointed time, an effective decision
may be given in his absence;
(iv) A provision that lands or any estate or interests thereof belonging
to such other persons under disability to sell and convey, such as
infants, or lunatics, can be acquired through the appropriate guard-
ians, committees, trustees, executors and administrators. Section 6
of the public Land Acquisition Act -- power of persons under dis-
ability to sell and convey -- specifically states that,
It shall be lawful for the persons being seized,
possessed of or entitled to any lands or any estate
or interest, therein, to sell and convey the
same to the Governor.. .and the power to sell
and convey as aforesaid may lawfully be
exercised by such persons, not only on be-
half of themselves and their respective heirs,
executors, administrators and successors, but
also on behalf of every person entitled in
reversion or remainder after them or in de-
feasance of their estates.
These obviously were designed to circumvent the complex and pro-
tracted customary law in which all principal members of the family
have to agree before a valid sale or conveyance could be made.
(v) By Section 7 of the Act, a "recognized head chief" is empowered to
sell and convey communal lands; this section provides that,
... where lands required for public purposes are
the property of a native community, the recog-
nized Head Chief of such community may sell
and convey the same for an estate in fee simple
(freehold title) notwithstanding any native law
or custom to the contrary.
Under native law and custom, the Chief is only a trustee of the com-
munal lands and has no rights to sell or dispose of it without the con-
sent of the principal members of the community , and the process of
getting these consents is prolonged and complex and often such
consents are not possible or forthcoming. More so when even such a
sale by a majority of the community including the Chief is not valid.
A unanimous consent is necessary for a valid sale. This provision,
therefore,empowering the recognized chief to validly sell and con-
vey communal land to the Government is designed to get over such
problems. The Act in addition defines a 'recognized Head Chief' as
"a Chief who is recognized by Government as holding
for the time being the highest rank in a native community
under native law and custom". As often happened, the
rightful Chief may refuse to sell and convey lands to the
Government and often, too, the Government recognized
any other Chief or indeed any other person, Chief or not,
but willing to sell and convey the required land to the
Government as the "Recognized Head Chief". 8
Thus, the necessity for obtaining the consent of the community or family
or of any individual to alienations by the Chief or by any other required individual
of communal lands is dispensed with in all cases of compulsory acquisition by the
Government. Government (public) acquisition dispenses with the consent of the prin-
cipal members or any other members, though providing that the compensation money
be distributed among all relevant interests involved or applied for their benefit in
such proportions and in such manner as the Minister shall approve. But the invoca-
tion of this section is rare because such sharing within the family group has not been
such a problem.
Similarly, the rule that the Chief must consent or be party to a disposition
of communal land may be dispensed with where such disposition is by the order of the
Court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction.
Where in spite of these powers, processes and procedures, possession of land
by the Government is still withheld by the land owners, the Act proscribes fines
of h 25 or imprisonment for three months, and in addition, provides that,
8Chiefs so appointed and recognized by the Government in this way were
commonly known as "Warrant Chiefs" because they acted on the strengths of the
'warrants' given them by the Government and not necessarily by virtue of choice or
support of their people or subjects.
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If any person hinders or obstructs any person duly authorized
by the Governor from entering upon and taking possession of
any lands in which the Governor may lawfully enter in
pursuance of this Ordinance, a Lieutenant-Govermor
may apply ex parte at any time to any Court for a
writ of possession, and such Court may thereupon upon
proof of the service and publication of the notices...
issue a writ of possession, addressed to the Sheriff,
under which any officer of the Sheriff or Police Officer,
may forthwith eject any person so witholding pos-
session.
But whereas in many cases, it is the community or a relatively large family
group that witholds possession, it implies that a battalion of Sherrif's officers or
police officers would have to be sent to eject a whole community or group. The
likely consequence is a breakdown of law and order, which any government, parti-
cularly a Colonial Government, tries hard to avoid. This means that if it gets this
far, the Government often tactically accepts the inevitable, and as in the Central
Lagos Acquisition and Slum Clearance Case* abandons or modifies the particular
acquisition projects to accommodate some of the concerns of the community.
That these provisions are made in the first place, however, shows that these
complex land tenure problems also defy the government's authorities.
These provisions are envisaged to enable the government to override the
problematic complications posed by multiple and at times intractable problems of
land ownership problems in the society. From the foregoing, therefore, it can be seen that
the Government had theoretically all the enabling laws to deal effectively with the tradi-
tional land tenure problems, particularly as they related to acquisition. But the effectiveness
of these enabling legal powers proved more potential than practical, as will be evident
from succeeding chapters.
*This scheme is examined in greater detail in Chapter 4.
=-80-
3.3 The Attitude of Colonial Administrators to the Land Tenure and Acquisition
Problems
In the exercise of statutory powers of land acquisition discussed above,
various Colonial Governors and Administrators of Nigeria differed in their philosophies,
attitudes and approaches to the land tenure question, and consequently varied in
their approaches to the land problem when it arose, particularly with regard to direct
Government land acquisitions for purely 'public purposes'. Among many of these
administrators, there existed great ambivalence about the proper way to handle this
tenure system. Many expressed the feeling that, given the complexity of the prob-
lem, and the deep-seated emotional attachment to land by Nigerians and the sig-
nificance of land to the individual, family, or community, or group, attempts at
full implementation of sweeping exproprietary legislation could be explosive and
spark off uncontrollable social unrest. Being foreigners, too, most of the admini-
strators did not fully understand the tenure system. Gradual evolution, therefore,
was generally advocated to be better suited to the situation, until more accurate
knowledge and understanding of the traditional land tenure phenomenon were avail-
able.
To obtain this accurate knowledge and understanding, various studies on
land tenure were undertaken by the Colonial Administration. One of these admini-
strators later explained why a great deal of importance and attention was accorded
these studies. He insisted that,
Without an accurate knowledge of existing forms of
tenure, it is difficult to conceive advancement of a
given society on any plane, economic, social,
or political. For lacking that, the Administration
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runs in blinkers. Political remedies may be
proposed which are entirely unrelated to
social or economic facts of the given society.
But until the results of those official studies, investigations, and commis-
sions became available, individual administrators acted according to their whims
and caprices in resolving given problem situations.
Lord Frederick Lugard 10 , partly because he believed in "indirect rule" 1 1 ,
favored a policy of "patient progress". In his political memoranda, he argued with
respect to this that it was,
.... preferable that the natural evolution of land
tenure should not be arbitrarily interfered with
either on the one hand by introducing foreign
principles and theories, not understood by
the people, or on the other hand arresting
progress in evolution by stereotyping by legis-
lation, primitive systems which were in a
transition stage. 1 2
Lugard, however, was opposed to Government's paying compensation or even rent
to local land owners for land acquired by the Government. "This anomaly must
stop," he ordered. "It may be that finances (Government finances) cannot pay the
9Sir Olaf Caroe writing in the Joumal of African Administration, Vol. 4,
1954, p. 157.
10Lord Frederick Lugard was the first Colonial Govemor of modem Nigeria,
from 1900 to 1919.
"Indirect rule" was a system of British Colonial Administration by which the
British Crown rules the Colonial Population through the local Chiefs. This policy
was conceived as a means of keeping down the cost of administration, as well as of
allowing people to keep their customs and traditions, so as to minimize institutional
disruptions that would result from a wholesale immediate imposition of British lows.
1 2 F. Lugard, "Political Memoranda", London, Memo X, 1918, p. 363.
bill, and it may be that other means of expropriation can be found" 13 , he added.
It vould seem that Lugard's guiding consideration here was the cost to the
Government involved in such payments. His "indirect rule" policy, after all, was
designed to keep the costs of administration down, and payment of land compensa-
tion would inevitably raise those costs. The Governor's ambivalence on the subject
was therefore understandable in this light. Land continued to be acquired by the
Government for public purposes without much compensation during most of Lugard's
administration. It seemed, however, that Lugard, in pursuing his policy, was
acting in contravention of the official British Colonial Government's policy regard-
ing dealings in native lands.
In 1921, for example, the British Colonial Office in London warned the
Nigerian Colonial Administration of reports reaching it that there were gross ir-
regularities in urban land administration. Winston Churchill,at that time the British
Colonial Secretary, reminded the Colonial Administration of Nigeria that it (the
Nigerian Colonial Government) was "not a monopolist landlord entitled to make
what profits it could out of its monopoly". 14
In a policy statement shortly after this exchange, Mr. S.M. Grier, the
Chief Secretary to Cliffords15 Government, explained the new administration's
13Conf. C45/1922 CSE, Lugard's minutes of February 12, 1913, quoted in
his memo: "Land Required by Government: Whether it should be Held under Lease,
or Obtained under the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance".
14C.S.O. 1/13, Churchill to Clifford, February 16, 1921.
15Sir Hugh Clifford succeeded Lord Frederick Lugard as the British Colonial
Governor of Nigeria in 1919.
-83-
policy as:
Where the Government does not employ the power it has
to acquire land under the Ordinance, but enters into a
private agreement with the owners, Government is as
much bound as would be any firm, to respect the
native law and custom about land. 16
Governor Hugh Clifford himself believed that it was necessary for Govern-
ment to have full control of urban lands in order to enforce orderly development.
But he insisted that,
The Government as far as possible should restrict their
acquisition to purposes which are of a bona fide public
character, and should not indulge in anything resembling
land grabbing, and land speculation. I cannot think
that it is right for example, for government to acquire
large areas in specially valuable situations, and
thereafter to lease plots to private persons without
allowing the local tribal authorities, or native
administrations any part of that rent accruing
therefrom. Government can very properly claim a
share in consideration of the improved value due to
expenditure of public money, but that it should
take the whole while paying a paper corn rent
or no rent at all...does not seem to me to be
equitable. 17
Implied in this statement by Governor Clifford was that adequate compensa-
tion should be paid to the owner on acquisition of his land. He didn't seem to quar-
rel with the Government's power of compulsory acquisition per se, only that "a share"
of the rent accruing be given to the owner by way of compensation. It is recalled
that Governor Clifford's predecessor in office, Lord Lugard, did not allow compensa-
16Minutes of S.M. Grier, 25/4/22. Conf. C45/1922, C.S.E.
7Minutes of Hugh Clifford, May 4, 1922, Conf. C45/1922.
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tion to owners whose lands were compulsorily acquired. Governor Clifford later
refused to sign the Town Plan of the Town of Umuahia, because the land in that
town was acquired in an irregular manner. 18
Generally, most Colonial Administrators acted with great caution in matters
relating to land administration, to the extent that even where judicial decisions
were on their (the administration's) side, they were not content with it until they
had further tested and confirmed the title in higher Courts. In one famous case in
Onitsha in the late 1920's, the Resident for the Province was not convinced by the
Administration's investigation team report and was not even convinced on the lower Court
decision on the particular case. In a comment on the report, the Resident observed
that,
I do not think that it is fully appreciated that the
judgment was good as against Obanye and his suc-
cessors only. It is extremely doubtful, if all or
perhaps any of this land really belonged to him.
In another connection, Obi Okosi and other Onitsha
Chiefs stated that land at Onitsha was properly
at the disposal of the representatives of the com-
munity, but that Obanye, being an important man
and a great trader, has assumed a position as re-
gards land to which he was not entitled, and had
succeeded in misleading the Royal Niger Company.
Then he stressed that,
I am certain that any claim made by Government under
this judgement would be strenuously opposed, and
before we build too much on what to me appears a
decidedly shaky title, I think that we should at least
18Nwaka, Geoffrey 1: Urban Development in Eastern Nigeria 1900-1952.
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, June 1975.
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test it further in Court. An opportunity for this would
appear to be offered under paragraph 2, p. 3. in the 19
case of those who still refuse to accept compensation. . .
Some other Colonial Administrators were, however, less sympathetic or
sensitive to the native land tenure problems, and applied the letters of the provisions
of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance, with all stringency, more so when, as
was later pointed out, "disputed and complicated claims, combined with congested
Cause Lists in the Courts to drag out, even compulsory acquisitions over many months
or even years." 20
Many Administrators exploited the ignorance of the people with the English
legal system and terminology, which were used in drafting Nigerian laws, including
the Nigerian Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance (Act). This was more so when the
Government started to use a combination of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance
and ordinary local agreements* concurrently. During the acquisition of lands, for
example, for the development of Port Harcourt -- one of Nigeria's major port cities --
the Government suspected that if a formal acquisition notice was published, African
lawyers would advise land owners to put high prices on their lands. It therefore
19Comment of the Resident for Onitsha Province on the Report of D.S. Cook
on Land Matters in Onitsha Province, (National Archives, Enugu, Nigeria OP/270/28).
20Annual Report of the Federal Land Dept., 1954 (Lagos, Nigeria), p. 10.
* The Administrators attempted to minimize use of compulsory acquisition powers
by trying to arrive at mutual agreements for sale with the land owners. This device was
aimed at neutralizing the effects and activities of indigenous lawyers who in compulsory
acquisition situations duly advised the land owners as to how to make claims and what
amounts to claim for their lands or even to refuse the lands being acquired at all. In-
evitably, the involvements of these lawyers raised directly and indirectly the costs of
compulsory acquisition for the Government, made the process more protracted, and
therefore more problematic. Thus the administrators'ordinary agreements in order to
shut out the lawyers. Without the lawyers, the administrators invariably undercompensa-
ted the landowners.
proceeded to acquire those lands informally, by local agreements with the people,
who hardly understood the terms of such agreements, much less their significance or
implications. This informal approach gave the government the opportunities of out-
maneuvering the natives. During the acquisition of township land for Port Harcourt
in 1913-1914, for example, Mr. Reginald Hargrove, the Government Lands ac-
quisition Officer, did not want to commit the Government to any specific size of
land needed to be acquired. He merely told the Chiefs that, "an enormously large
area was required", reasoning that,
.as the Chiefs had generally little idea of what a
breadth of 100 or 400 feet was, it was sufficient
merely to tell them that 'an enormously large
area of land would be required'. The Govern-
ment could then take what amount of land it re-
quired.21
In line with this policy of minimizing costs from land acquisition in parti-
cular, and costs of administration in general, the Government assessed compensation
to the owners of 60 houses demolished in Port Harcourt, in the process of land ac-
quisition at t 300 ($1000 approximately), each house being assessed at t 5 ($15)22,
which was even at that time considered a gross undervaluation for the houses and
lands involved.
The attitude and response of the local land owners to Government policy
in this regard was one of bitter disappointment, helpless resignation, and sometimes
2 1File No. Ow Conf. 22/14; Umprof, Hargrove to SSP 13/9/14 (cited in
Nwaka, G.I., op. cit.).
22
"Government v. Diobu over Crown Land, especially Commissioner of
Lands to CSG Lagos 28/12/40. (cited in Nwaka, op. cit.).
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violent outbursts. The people of Enugu Ngwo, for example, epitomized such dis-
satisfaction with the Government's apparently shabby attitudes and treatments of
the people, during acquisition of the lands for Enugu Township. In a petition to the
Governor, they protestingly and disappointingly said,
We understand that the Government pays some money
for land.. .How much does it pay, and from what year
did it commence to pay such? We know from ex-
perience that such amount must accumulate into a
high sum, and it is now high time for us to know
where it is kept. 23
These lands in question were apparently acquired without any compensation.
Of course, this is one out of many such petitions that were never heeded by the
Colonial Administration, but which it continued to be confronted with for many years.
The traditional land tenure system and its complexities were never quite
completely understood by the various British Colonial Administrations in Nigeria,
in spite of its intensive and extensive studies of the subject over those many years.
Neither could they find any definitive way of dealing with it. Each such admini-
stration, therefore, treated such arising case according to its prevailing whims of
that moment, while still making strenuous efforts to systematize the system, which
has so far defied solution to date. Rowling24 , who was for a long time the Nigerian
Federal Adviser on Lands, summed up the intricacies of the dilemma of the tradition-
al land tenure problem in Nigeria, and the process of change in it, as well as the
23Petition of Enugu Ngwo to the Governor, 15/21/41 (OP/1867/Vol.11).
24C.W. Rowling: "Land Tenure Supplement" (Journal of African Admini-
stration, October, 1952). The words 'we' and 'our' in the text refer to the E,1glish
or British people or legal concepts.
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potential zomplications that could be caused by unstudied imposition of foreign legal
concepts and standards on it. Addressing British Colonial Administrators, he summed
up the traditional land tenure system as one in which the,
.rights (of individuals) ramify into those of others,
and into fields we may not suspect. Nor will they
fit neatly into our own legal categories; indeed,
these may be wholly irrelevant. By dealing with
him and his rights in isolation we ignore those
ramifications, and may be, set in train, changes
we neither intend, nor desire, and they will
quite probably appear in a seemingly unrelated
context. We may also create unnecessary dif-
ficulties in the way of changes or controls which
we do desire, since we are likely to ignore weapons
which lie to hand. The traffic is moreover two-way:
while we mistake our methods, he may mistake our
intentions and will certainly not apply our ordin-
ances according to the "objects and reasons" we
publish in the Gazette. In short, our motives are
very little to the point: his interpretations of them
and the probable effect of our measures upon his
neighbours quite as much as himself are what matter.
No sovereign guide to either exists, but the more
detailed our knowledge of his tenure and social
concepts, the better our hope of leaving undone
those things we ought not to have done, and of
achieving success when doing those things which
we ought to do. (emphasis mine).
This point is central to the whole issue of public involvement in land matters
in most of Nigerian society. The statement suggests that gaps may exist (and often
do exist) between what legislation says and what is practical in the given context.
This is more so where age-old customs, practices, and values are involved. Legis-
lation, while it can serve as a general guide to actions and sometimes as a "motor"
for modemi zation and change, often may not be able to effectively legislate away
long-held customs and values in a relative ly short period of time.
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Evolution of the Scope of Public Purpose Definition with Independence
"iPublic purpose" or "public use" for which lands were compulsorily ac-
quired directly by the Government were initially limited to essential public ser-
vices only (genuine public purposes), such as roads, pavements, drainage, elec-
tricity, schools, and all government and institutional buildings, but did not include
residential housing, except for very high Government personnel, especially during
the colonial era.
These classes of purposes would seem to justify compulsory acquisition with
adequate compensation. The 'purposes' involved necessary and basic urban infra-
structure and utilities. Minimal redistribution of income was involved, and no direct
income transfers were directly involved. The benefits to society in acquisitions
for these purposes are generally accepted to far outweigh the costs to the individuals
concerned, or at least benefitted a large proportion of the people.
This restricted scope of 'public purpose', however, changed with revisions
of the various Town Planning Acts and widened in the 1950's (and more particularly,
after National Independence in 1960) into whatever the Government or its agency
could define as 'public purpose', including residential housing of all types and
even industrial and commercial estates. This expansion of the 'public purpose' scope
was, however, still justified on grounds that these activities were engaged in with a
view to providing and maintaining sanitary and healthy environment, and with a view
to creating jobs.
With Independence, too, national development programs and projects --
economic and social, gained 'public pu rpose' aura and importance. Acquisitions for these
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therefore were considered as acquisitions for public purpose. "Public purpose", has
therefore evolved from its restricted 'public good' and 'merit good' meaning during
the Colonial administration to practically anything that the Government can sub-
jectively define it to be. This has been particularly true since after Independence
in 1960.
With slight modifications, therefore, the Board after Independence was still
operating under its basic enabling legislation of the Colonial period. But it started
applying its powers more strictly and forcefully. The interpretation of the scope of
those powers were widened by subsequent amendments to the basic legislation and the
scope of operations of the Board grew and became more comprehensive.
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SUMMARY
The provisions and conditions for public compulsory acquisition of land were
examined in this Chapter. The Public Lands Acquisition Act of 1917 (which is the
main source of eminent domain powers in the country) made provisions for over-
coming all possible problems or complexities arising out of the peculiar traditional
land tenure system. These laws fully anticipated the problems and fully legally provided
for them.
The Chapter also discussed how the early British Colonial Administrators
dealt with the land tenure and acquisition problems, their often-times ambivalent
attitudes of sympathy and disgust toward the system -- attitudes that were at times
at variance with the official British Colonial Office which they represented. The
general lack of compensation in those early days was also reviewed.
The Chapter shows that in terms of theoretical legal provisions, the Gov-
ernment or its agencies had all the potential legal powers that could possibly be re-
quired in order to acquire land compulsorily or by agreement in the peculiar Nigerian
tenure situation. The Public Lands Acquisition Act took cognizance of the. nature
and characteristics of the traditional land tenure system, its complexities and problems,
and made legal provisions for neutralizing or minimizing their adverse impacts on
public acquisition of lands. The practical effectiveness or otherwise of those legal
enabling powers will be examined in succeeding Chapters.
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APPENDIX 3.1 A TYPICAL PUBLIC LANDS ACQUISITION NOTICE
PUBLIC LANDS ACQUISITION LAW
(CHAPTER 105)
LAND REQUIRED FOR THE SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BENDEL
STATE OF NIGERIA.
NOTICE is hereby given -that the following Land at
Benin City in Western Benin Division of Benin Pro-
vince, Bende State of Nigeria is required by the
Government for public purposes absolutely.
DESCRIPTION
PARCEL 'A'
All that parcel of land near Benin City Technical
High School at Ugbowo, Benin City in the Western Benin
Division, Benin Province, Bendel State of Nigeria
containing an area of approximately 112.5 acres (45.53
Hectare) the boundaries of which are described below-
Starting at a concrete pillar marked B 9436, the
co-ordinates of which are 865 328.06 feet (263751.99
metres) North, and 1172654.71 feet (357425.16 metres)
East of the National Origin, the boundary runs on an
approximate bearing of 70' 52' and an approximate
distance of 10.0 feet (3.05 metres) to peg A, a point on.
the right bank of lkpoba River; thence along the same
bank of the Ikpoba River in a generally Southernly direc-
tion for an approximate distance of 7140 feet (2176.27
metres) to peg B, thence the boundaries run in straight
lines the bearings and lengths which are as follows:-
Bearings
270'00'
180'00'
270'00'
0' 00'
90' 00'
00'00'
60'00'
329'00'
345'00
78'53'
78'52'
Lengths
532' (162.15 metres)
656' (199.95 metres)
1969' (600.15 metres)
1640' (499.87 metres)
985' (300.23 metres)
500' (152.40 metres)
370' (112.78 metres)
600' (182.88 metres)
1100' (355.28) metres)
326.9' (72.21 metres)
1304.1' (397.49 metres)
To
Peg C
Peg D
Peg E
PegF
Peg G
Peg H
Peg J
Peg K
Peg L
B 7262
B 9436
(The Starting Point)
All pegs are temporary points;
All property beacons are concrete pillars;
All bearings and length are approximate; and
All bearing are referred to National North.
PARCEL 'B'
All that parcel of land near Ekiuwa Market and Edoh
Camp, in Western Benin Division, Benin Province,
Bendel State of Nigeria containing an area of approxi-
mately 80.0 acres (32.38 Hectares) the boundaries of
which are described below-
Starting at a point marked Peg 1, on the left bank of
lkpoba River, which lies on an approximate bearing of
262' 16' and an approximate distance.of 10.0 ft. (3.05
metres) from asconcrete pillar marked E -470 the co-ordi-
nates of which are 865 417.02 feet (263779.11 metrms)-
North and 1172*767.88 feet (357459.65 metres) East of the
National Origin, the boundaries run in striaght lines, the
bearings and lengths of which are as follows:-
From
Peg 1
E 470.
E 469
Peg 2,
Peg 3
Peg 4
Peg 5
Bearings
82' 16'
82' 16'
100' 13'
153' 30'
Lengths
-10.0 ft. (3.05 metres)
539.20 ft. (164.35 metres)
171.0 ft. (52.12 metres)
5340 ft. (1627.63 metres)
270' 00' 810 ft. (246.89 metres)
180' 00' 650 ft. (198.12 metres)
270' 00' 770 ft. (234.70 metres)
To
E 4.ti
E 469
Peg 2
Peg 3
Peg 4
Peg 5
Peg 6
Thence the boundary runs along the left bank of the lkpo-
ba River in a Northernly direction for an approximate
distance of 7140 feet (2176.27 metres) to Peg I on the
same left bank of likpoba River.(The Starting point)
All Pegs are temporary points;
All property beacons are concrete pillars;
All bearings and length are approximate; and
All bearings are referred to National North.
2. Any person claiming to have any estate, Interest or
right in the said land is required within six weeks from the
date of the service of this notice to send to the commis-
sioner of Lands, Ministry of Lands and Housing, (Lands
Division) Bendel State of Nigeria, Benin Cty, a state.
ment of his estate, interest or right and of the evidence
thereof and of any claim in respect of such estate, interest
or right.
3. The Government is willing to treat on the acquist-
tion of the said Land.
4. Land in respect of which no statement is received
is liable to be dealth with as unoccupied land.
5. And notice is hereby given that the Government in-
tends to enter into possession of the said land at the ex-
piration of twenty-four hours from this date of the publica-
tion of this notice in the Bendel State of Nigeria Gazette.
6. Any person who shall wilfully hinder or obstruct the
Government or any person employed by the Government
from taking possession of the said land or any part there-
of is liable on conviction under the provisions of the Law
above-mentioned, to a fine of fifty Naira or to imprisonment
for three months.
7. A plan showing the site is available for Inspection
during office hours at the office of the Chief Lands Officer
Ministry of Lands and Housing, (Lands DivsIon)
Bendel State of Nigeria, Benin City.
8. By virtue of the provision of the Law and subject
thereto, no claim to any estate, Interest or right In
the land affected by the notice made after the expiration
of twelve months from the publication of this notice in
the Bendel State of Nigeria Gazette shall be enter-
tained by any public officer whose duty it is to receive
claims or by any Court.
DATED the 23rd day,of April, 1975.
(Sgd.J (S. J. Ofelkbre) M.F.R.
Acting Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Lands and Housing.
'ag. Is
From
Peg B
Peg C
Peg D
Peg E
Peg F
Peg G.
Peg H
Peg J
Peg K
Peg L
B 7262
.. .. .........
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Chapter Four
THE LAGOS EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT BOARD ([EDB) AND URBAN LAND
Chapter Two of this study had examined the nature and characteristics of
the traditional land tenure as a setting and background for examining the rationale
and framework of public involvement in urban land problems in Nigeria. It argued
that the traditional land tenure as it existed had some negative implications for ef-
ficient land-use planning and development, because the land ownership system and
pattern does not easily lend itself to rationalization of land use, and to the ef-
ficient provision of urban land and housing services. So also was its implications
for the efficient provision of urban infrastructural facilities and services, which in
its turn has great implications for urban environmental and sanitary quality. On
the other hand, it was pointed out that the distribution and accessibility to land
resources in this system was superior to that obtainable in a private market economy,
or in a public management system. In terms of social equity, therefore, this system
has something to recommend it.
Chapter Three examined the rationale for public intervention and the
instruments and mechanisms of such intervention. It reviewed the framework, fea-
tures, and objectives of this intervention, with special emphasis on the sweeping
legal powers with which the Government arms itself or its agencies in order to be
able to deal effectively with the problems and complexities of the traditional
land tenure.
This Chapter essentially profiles the Lagos Executive Development Board
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(LEDB) -- the subject of this critique. A deeper examination and analysis of one
agency will provide more concrete insights on which to base more general con-
clusions and sounder policy decisions or judgments for other similar agencies. The
origin, objectives and functions, and the processes of the Board will be examined, as
well as the effectiveness of its legal powers with respect to the resolution of the
traditional land tenure problems. The evidence on the practical effectiveness of
the enabling legal powers, is that in spite of these sweeping powers of compulsory
acquisition, the problems do not go away, because, as was aptly summed up by
1Rowling ,
... while we (the administrators) mistake our methods,
he (the native) may mistake our intentions, and will
certainly not apply our Ordinances according to the
'objects and reasons' we publish in the Gazette.
In short, our motives are very little to the point;
his interpretations of them and the probable effect
of our measures upon his neighbours quite as
much as himself, are what matter....
The reason for this situation was that the English legal system which was
imposed on Nigeria, was so different in its effects from that of the Nigerian cus-
tomary laws and regulations that the new system was not generally understood.
Even if it were, it was in many respects divergent or even contrary to the pre-
vailing customs and values in its effects and implications that a long period of ad-
justments was inevitable before such a radically new and different system could take
root and be internalized by the local populace. On the other hand, as has been
1C.W. Rowling: "Land Tenure Supplement", Journal of African Admini-
stration, October, 1952.
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discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the British Colonial Administrators themselves did not
fully understand the local customary laws or how much the superimposition of the
English legal system would affect the prevailing customary laws, nor what the wider
implications of the superimposition of the English legal system would be.
4.1 Background to the Origin and Functional Orientation of the LEDB.
The Lagos Executive Development Board was created in 1928, by means of
the Lagos Town Planning Ordinance Cap. 103 No. 45 of 1928. The immediate cir-
cumstances that occasioned its creation was the bubonic plague which had broken
out in Lagos in 1924, and which killed a large number of people in the city. Out-
breaks of this plague continued over a number of years, and the effects were felt
more in the 'native areas' than in the 'European Reservations'. Control of the
plague was made difficult owing to the existence of overcrowded and unsanitary
slums in the 'native areas'. The immediate objective of the Board then was to "rid
Lagos of the filth and unsanitary conditions". Such then was the circumstance and
urgency of the problem which led to the setting up of the LEDB. The initial con-
ception of the Board, therefore, was that of a strong sanitary and planning Auth-
ority, much more powerful than a Municipal Government in the normal sense, since
its instrument of creation provided that after the Board initiates a scheme and gets
it approved by the Governor in Council, "...the powers and duties exercisable and
devolving upon the Town Council or the Director of Public Works in such area or
part thereof, shall be transferred to and be vested in the Board". The work of the
Board started with a grant of I 200,000 from the Colonial Government, with a
promise of further funds when these were exhausted. By 1930, the work of th.
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Board was underway, but soon after, the revenue of the Colonial Government was
hit by the va rid-wide depression and no further funds were available for it until
the mid-1940's. The Second World War further interrupted work and both money
and manpower were channelled to the war effort. While the yO rk of the Board
continued, it was at a reduced pace until the end of the War.
It was then that various Colonial Government commissions and investiga-
tions were set up to study the different aspects of the developments and improve-
ments of Lagos and to make recommendations as to how and with what mechanisms
such developments and improvements could be realized. The findings and recom-
mendations of these various studies and commissions provided the focus and basic
operational framework with which the LEDB functioned for the succeeding twenty
years.
A brief review of the findings of these various commissions and studies
will help shed some light into the conditions that the LEDB had to deal with and
the direction of its orientation and priorities.
Lagos Housing Conditions 1946-1967
It had been pointed out that the immediate event that led to the creation
of the LEDB was the outbreak of the bubonic plague in Lagos in the 1924-1928 period.
The cause of these plague outbreaks were attributed to insanitary conditions, parti-
cularly insanitary housing conditions.
Table 4.1, for example, shows the result of a housing condition census con-
ducted in Lagos Island after the War, in 1946, which classified houses broadly into
four categories (A, B, C, and D), and accord.ing to Districts in the city.
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Table 4.1
Classification of Houses in Lagos Island According to Quality, May 1946
Type
District "A" "B" "C" "D" Total Vacant Plots
A 198 951 950 596 2,695 43
B 413 711 1099 525 2,748 301
C 87 906 662 675 2,330 43
D 229 422 526 723 1,900 184
Total 927 2990 3237 2519 9,673 571
% of Total 9.6 30.9 33.5 26.0 100.0 --
No. of Houses
Source: T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, Report with Recommendations on the Planning
and Development of Greater Lagos, June 1946 (Appendix E, p. 48).
The table shows that only 927 houses (9.0%) of the 10,244 houses in the
city at the time were classified as Type A - good all-round condition; 2,990 (29.2%)
were in Type B -- good all-round condition, but requiring major alterations to
bring them up to existing building standards. This means that 3,917 (38.2%) ("A"
+ "B") were in good conditions. Type C had 3,237 houses (31.6%) which were
unsanitary and dilapidated houses, and Type D with 2,519 (24.6%) of the houses
could be either way, but generally considered not good housing at the time.
Strictly speaking, it meant that only 9% of the houses in Lagos at the
time met the requirements or standards for good housing as set by and used in the
classification by the authorities.2
2The classification seems to have been mainly based on the structural conditions
of the houses and principally on the building materials used. Types C and D were clas-
sified as inadequate principally because of the materials used in the construction --
which did not necessarily follow. The other requirements for good housing used in-
cluded adequate ventilation, sanitary facilities, a maximum building plot, site coverage
of no more than 50% and no less than 10 feet of frontage. Full explanation of the clas-
sification used is shown in Appendix 4.2.
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In fact, the findings of the Lagos Housing Committee 3 almost at the aame
time reported that, "150,000 out of the total populaticn of 216,000 in Lagos at the
time, or nearly 70% of the population required rehousing."
This proportion of the population requiring rehousing was also based on the
standards obtainable in England (See Appendix 4.1) with which the Committee 3
members were more conversant, being mainly Englishmen. While the conditions of
housing were bad in Lagos at the time, it is possible that the standards prevailing in
England with which these judgments were made might not have been relevant or
realistic to the Nigerian situation, given the differences in climate between Nigeria
and England, differences in building form and structure, and the greater degree of open-
air living by Nigerians.
Also, as recently as 1967 the Lagos Executive Development Board conducted
another survey of the structural conditions of residential houses, preparatory to
drawing up a Master Plan for the metropolitan area. The structural conditions of the
buildings were classified into good, fair, and bad, and were based on the external
physical conditions of buildings. One survey was done for the city of Lagos, and
another was carried out for the metropolitan region as a whole. The results are as
shown in Table 4.2.
The table indicates that of a total of 56,359 houses in the city and its
metropolitan area, only 27.6% of them were in good structural condition, 22.4% in
fair condition, and as much as 50.0% were in bad condition.*
3 Report of the Lagos Housing Committee, 1945.
*Note that this is based on the external structural condition, visually as-
sessed. 'Bad' external structural condition may not necessarily be exactly synonymous
with bad housing.
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Table 4.2
Structural Conditions of Residential Buildings in Lagos, 1967
Good
% of
Total Fair
% of
Total Bad
% of
Total Total
City of Lagos 8,157 42.1 3,360 17.3 7,842 40.5 19,359
Metropolitan
H interland 7,400 20.0 9,250 25.0 20,350 55.0 37,000
Total 15,557 27.6 12,610 22.4 28,192 50.0 56,359
Source: Calculated and
Lagos, 1970.
tabulated from LEDB Draft Master Plan for
A rough comparison of the conditions in 1946 and 1967/70 (Table 4.3)
shows that although there had been some improvements, the situation was still apparently
bad with over 44% of the buildings still classified as bad in 1967/70.4
Table 4.3
Housing Conditions in Lagos, 1946 and 1967/70 Compared
Condition of Houses
1946
No.
1967/70*
No.
Good buildings 927 9.6 8,157 39.3
Fair buildings 2,990 30.9 3,360 16.2
Bad buildings 5,758 60.0 9,250 44.5
Totat 9,673 100.0 20,767 100.0
* Only the Lagos Island figures are used in the above comparison, because the
area has the requisite irf ormation for the two periods. The 1946 inquiry had
no figures for the metropolitan area, and so the metropolitan figures of
1967 (Table 4.2) is not included in the comparison).
It is pertinent to point out, however, that the criteria or standards of
classification in the two periods were not exactly the same. While the 1946 classi-
fication included both physical conditions of buildings and facilities in them, th-
1967/70 classification involved only the external physical conditions. The corpari-
sons are therefore only approximate.
% %
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The variations in the parameters of measurements notwithstanding, the relevant
point is that the housing and environmenta conditions which the Board was created to attend
to were immense, and as a consequence, the Board could not fully invoke or
exercise its powers to pull down and demolish unsanitary buildings because, "The
greatest percentage of buildings in Lagos are below standard and unsanitary, so that
the operation of these clauses will create untold hardships in the present financial
situation of the people."5 It is clear from the above tables that if the Board were
to exercise its pove r of pulling down and demolishing unsanitary buildings, it
would have been creating more problems than it was solving.
Other official reports implied that the poor sanitary conditions of Lagos
at the time were in many ways related to the land and living practices of the people,
and that for Lagos to be developed in a way that befitted the capital of a Great
British Colonial Dependency, something radical had to be done about the control
of the land.
A senior British Colonial Government officer who was commissioned to
investigate the condition in Lagos at the time lamented the fact that Lagos was a
bad showcase of British Colonial policy in these words:
In spite of the Marina, Broad Street, the Race Course,
and lkoyi, the real Lagos -- the higgledy-piggledy mass
of Yoruba slum houses -- has not changed greatly in
character or in appearance during the last half century.
The people are more tight packed and corrugated iron
partitions grow overnight in an attempt to give privacy
and to squeeze in some additional accommodation, but
fundamentally, Lagos remains a Yoruba village with
a village mentality. Emphasis has been laid on the
5 Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, (1967), p. 3.
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importance of Lagos as the capital of a vast and important
dependency, a town in which the observant eye will pick
to assess at a glance the results of British Colonial
policy since its inception. The observer in walking round
and wading through the streets and bye-ways of Lagos,
may well have in mind, the French town of Dakar or
the Belgian capital of Leopoldville. He is likely to
draw an unflattering conclusion, which though prob-
ably wrong, is nevertheless a weapon in the hands of our
detractors. It is neither desirable nor possible to con-
vert Lagos into an imitation of either of these places,
but it is Govemment's determination to plan a Lagos
of the future which will not be a disgrace to Nigeria.
In order to do this with any hope of success, not
only must the slums go, but with them must go the
whole outlook of the poeple of the slums, an outlook
which has in essence changed little with the years.
The Lagos Yoruba is attuned to the environment in
which he was born and has his being -- he requires
a room in which his family may sleep, and obtain
shelter from the rain, a suitable pitch for petty
trading, and an open space of some sort with a tree,
if possible, for gossip and entertainment. These needs
are catered for in the slums of Lagos, and cannot be
catered for to the same extent in any housing scheme
in Lagos acceptable to the modem and civilized eye. 6
If proof is needed, it is only necessary to walk around
the Idunmagbo housing scheme and observe the de-
termined effort which has been made to adapt a
modem type of house and its environs to traditional
Yoruba requirements"? (Emphasis mine)
The reasoning in the above statement could be re-stated as follows:
1.) Lagos is an unsanitary city -- a substantial part of it considered
as slums by the Colonial Administration.
2.) The British Colonial Administration wanted to build Lagos into a
model (showpiece) capital of its Colonial territories.
6 The speaker assumed the standards obtainable in England at the time
to be the 'civilized' standards, or 'civilized eye'.
7T. Hoskyns-Abrahall: Report with Recommendations on the Planning and De-
velopmert of Greater Lagos (Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1946, laid on the table of the
Nigeria- Legislative Council, 1946. (Government Printer, Lagos 1946).
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3.) In order to achieve this, the slums must be cleared, including
in some way the habits of the local inhabitants which were con-
sidered to be inherently slum-generating, presumably the quality
of housing notwithstanding. (in fact, one of the final recommenda-
tions of this report was that "Township regulations and by-laws
be more strictly enforced with a view to forcing out unwanted
people"), and
4.) By implication, the hands of the Government or its executive agency
has to be strengthened in order to achieve those goals.
This statement conveys the official think&ng and attitude about the environ-
mental and sanitary conditions of Lagos at the time, and while the implied statements
and criteria of judgments were British (because the official making these judgments
was British), it nevertheless, to a predominant extent, shaped and influenced the
nature, character, and functions of the LEDB for the next several decades.
The question of land and housing, their pattern of ownership and mode
of development were the central points around which the Board's functions revolved.
The way the people built and lived, and their general land development practices
and customs were perceived not to be conducive to rational and sanitary land de-
velopment practices and economic provision of services.
It was felt, therefore, that for the Board to be effective in its work, it
had to have effective control over urban land and its mode of development.
The feeling that the Board needed to exercise greater control over the
mode of land ownership was in large part strengthened by the recommendations of
these various official commissions, which in the main suggested to the Governor
of Nigeria at the time that it was necessary for the proper development of Lagos
that the LEDB hold title to the lands, in Lagos. The Report of the Lagos Town
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Planning Commission (1946) reported to the Governor that,
We are convinced that the town of Lagos will develop
rapidly once adequate residential and business areas
and municipal services are available and we should
anticipate that in a period of twenty years, assuming
rapid execution of the development plan, the pop-
ulation of Lagos will increase very substantially.
Having regard to the fact that land values and rents
in Lagos are very high, it is hoped that if the Lagos
Executive Development Board is permitted by
the Government of Nigeria to hold title to all
the swamp areas which are to be reclaimed, the
revenue may ultimately well compensate for the
interest on the capital expenditure. We wish
to emphasize, however, to Your Excellency
that we regard as a matter of fundamental im-
portance that the Lagos Executive Development
Board, should in the first instance, hold title
to all the land in Lagos which is to be reclaimed
under the scheme. Only in this way will the
increment from such land be available to the
general community of Lagos... and this will assure
that land held by the Lagos Executive Development
Board will belon to the people and to the rate
payers of Lagos.
The apparent emphasis of the Commission on reclamation of swamp lands in
Lagos was premised, not only on the relative shortage of land in the city of Lagos,
but also, and principally on the fact that acquisition of swamp lands were less likely
to evoke opposition and resistance by the owners than ordinary lands would. The
native owners were not likely to have the technology of reclaiming those lands
themselves, nor were they likely to afford the costs of such reclamations, and there-
fore would be more likely to be restrained in their resistance against the acquisition.
In fact, this path of least resistance was later to be adopted by the LEDB in many of
8 Report of the Lagos Town Planning Commission (1946), p. 8.
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its land acquisitions in the metropolitan area. wherever that alternative presented
itself. The authors of these Reports were obviously aware of the land acquisition problems
in Lagos.
In the opinion of the Report, three problems or lines of functions were en-
visaged for the LEDB, namely:
(a) Reclamation
(b) The immediate provision of residential areas; and
(c) Slum clearance on Lagos Island.
With regards to this last, and related to the other two functions, the Report warned
that,
Slum clearance cannot be effective in reducing
congestion unless persons displaced from crowded
areas can be provided with alternative sites on
which to live...
With the acceptance of this Report by the Government, the scope of the activities of the LEDB
started to expand in the areas of land management and housing activities. So did its
constitution and its relationships to other agencies.
4.2 The Constitution and Evolution of the Powers and Functions of the Board
and its Relationship to the Lagos City Council.
The LEDB was given very wide powers over the city of Lagos and its metro-
politan areas, and these powers had increased with subsequent amendments to the
original Act creating it, particularly that by Chapter 95 of the Laws of the Federation
of Nigeria and Lagos 1958 (more commonly known as the Lagos Planning Act of 1958).
This was after Nigeria became self-governing in 1957, but the basic concepts of the
Board remained unchanged from what they were originally, except that it
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broadened the scope of the Board's powers and functions, and the Board become a
little more actively used as an instrument of urban land development. This 1958 amend-
ment implicitly broadened the definition of 'public purpose' in the acquisition and use
of land, and it marked the beginning of the Board's entry into major and direct in-
dustrial/commercial developments in addition to residential developments and general
town planning. Under these Acts (1928 and 1958), the LEDB's powers and functions
among other things included:
(1) Power to initiate and execute Town Planning Schemes9 with
the general objective of securing proper sanitary conditions,
amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out
and use of land to be made in accordance with the provisions
of the Act;
(2) Power to designate and recommend that an area be declared a
Town Planning Scheme. This enables the Board to acquire lands in
such an area, and subject the area to planning and enforcement of
building and sanitary codes.
(3) Power under Part VII of the Act to acquire land, either for the
purpose of a scheme or otherwise, by agreement or compulsorily.
It also hadthe power to let, hire, lease, sell, exchange, or otherwise
dispose of any land vested in or acquired by it, ensuring that private developers or
individuals to whom it sells them, build according to approved plans and standards.
The Board could re-sell the lands back to the original owners of the land from whom
it acquired the lands in the first place, that is, after planning and servicing the land;
9
"Town Planning Scheme" or "Town Planning Areas" or simply "Planning
Schemes" connotes an area or areas where building plots and houses are or have to
be laid out in an approved pattern and with approved specifications; and where
all building codes and sanitary requirements have to be enforced. They are areas
that are designated for high quality living environments.
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or it could itself develop, build, maintain, manage, and control land and housing
and collect reasonable rents from them. It therefore had very wide options regarding
disposition of land that it acquired.
The Board is required to pay reasonable compensation for damages sus-
tained by individuals or groups by reason of the exercise of any of these powers
vested on it by the Act.
The general powers of the LEDB therefore included zoning, sub-division
controls, demolition, re-housing, redistribution of property (private or public,
buildings or roads), compulsory acquisition and disposal (through lease or sale) of
land, and payment of compensation. It had the authority (rarely used) to demand
that the Lagos City Council raise revenue for town planning.
In addition to these general powers, the Board was often given extra and
specific powers with respect to individual projects. These extra powers depended on
the problems or difficulties anticipated in the locality or in the scheme implementa-
tion (particularly with regard to land acquisition), as well as depending on the
Government's objectives and goals with respect to the given project. It follows from
this that while the general objectives and functions of the LEDB were outlined by
the Act creating it, the objective of each scheme was specified so that in detail the ob-
jectives and purposes of the Board varied from scheme to scheme.
As has already been pointed out, the LEDB in its latter days had expanded
the scope of its activities and operations into industrial and commercial projects --
particularly the building and development of industrial estates to provide facilities,
including machinery and equipment for private businesses, for manufacturinc, ware-
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housing research, and the development of shopping centers -- all of which were ex-
tensions of its original purposes. The rationale and the processes of this expansion
of scope and shift in emphasis is discussed in Section 4.5.
The Executive Organization of the Board comprised departments responsible
for Administration, Legal matters, Town Planning, Engineering, Architecture, Land
Surveys, Estate Management, Valuation and Finance. With such a comprehensive
constitution, the Board was almost a self-contained developer, completing all ar-
rangements necessary for it to carry out a project. With its architects and planners,
it prepares the necessary project designs, plans and specifications; completes analyses
necessary to determine project feasibility; makes arrangements for the acquisition
or leasing of the project sites, arranges the financing necessary to execute the
projects, and then enters into arrangements with the construction contractors for the
final execution of the projects.
Relation to Other Urban Agencies
By virtue of the nature of the functions and powers endowed on the Lagos
Executive Development Board by legislation, it was inevitable that conflicts would
arise between it and the Lagos Town Council, because most of its functions, parti-
cularly town planning functions and provision of urban services, were functions
traditionally performed by an urban council. In fact, in some other places, including
Britain itself, these powers and functions of the LEDB would be exercised by the
Municipal Council. The Colonial Government at the time, however, for reasons of
control and flexibility of actions, preferred to vest these functions almost exclusive-
ly on the LEDB as a semi-independent agency directly appointed by the Governor,
and that would also be directly responsible to the Governor.
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The Lagos Town Council was for one thing still very young, weak, and
undeveloped when the LEDB was created. Furthermore, at the time the future of the
Town Council was obscure and the alternative possibility of the government making use
of hereditary Chiefs rather than a Council, in the administrative machine was still
a very live issue with the Colonial Administration of the time.
Moreover, a Town Council which was likely to be popularly elected or
appointed on a representative basis was more likely to be responsive to and subject
to the wishes and pressures of their constituents. Such a Council then would not be
in a strong position to compulsorily acquire land in the area if the people opposed it.
As such an opposition was obviously expected to be the rule rather than the ex-
ception, the Town Council would obviously not be the instrument to use for the
purpose in view, less so by a Colonial Administration that put so much premium on
projecting an image of stability and peaceful coexistence with its Colonial subjects.
By the 1928 Act creating it, the Board consisted of five members -- three
ex-officio and two nominated. The ex-officio members included: (i) the Commissioner
of Lands who was chairman of the Board, (ii) the Deputy Director of the sanitary
service, and (iii) an Assistant Director of Public Works. The two nominated members
were appointed by the Governor. The Governor also reserved the power to: (a) ap-
point at any time additional members of the Board for such periods or for such purpose
as he would specify in the notice of appointment, and (b) vary the constitution of the
Board by the appointment of persons in the place of the regular members; or for such
purposes as it deems fit and desirable, any person or persons interested in the develop-
ment of Lagos. But in spite of these, there wias no Council representation on the Board.
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The LEDB was therefore made a body entirely independent of the Town
Council, and responsible directly to the Govemor only. When with time the Council
developed and grew, there were inevitable overlaps and conflicts between its func-
tions and those of the Board. The fact that the LEDB operated in the Township, with
major works in the center of the town, without any obligation to inform the Council
of what it was doing, was a source of major conflicts between the two bodies. Some-
times, for example, the Council unknowingly planned to spend large sums of money
on roads that the Board had decided to scrap. In fact, the LEDB's responsibility to
the Council was practically nil, and until the 1936 amendment to the Lagos Town
Planning Ordinance, the Board hardly admitted the existence of the Council. The
results were duplications of functions and activities and consequent waste of
money. So serious was the conflict between the Board and the Council that the
Hoskyns-Abrahall Report recommended the absorption of the LEDB by the Town
Council, so that the Board would become "as is proper for a fully fledged and re-
sponsible municipality, the planning section of the municipal body". Not only would
it be inadvisable to split important local government functions between two authorities,
it was argued, but the merger of the two would engender more civic spirit. If the
merger occurred, it was further argued, LEDB landswould not be the property of the
Crown, but of the municipality, and "the ownership of the land by the municipality
is in fact nearer traditional Yoruba land tenure -- the family head holding the land on
10
behalf of the family -- than any individual freehold ownership could be". The merger,
however, never took place, possibly because of the British Colonial administrative max-
im that, "the- municipality is not a suitable organisation for controlling the development
of a town, especially so where the expenditure of government grants is involved"1l, a
maxim said to be borne out by British Colonial administrative experience in India and Far East.
10T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit.
11Letter to Administrator of the Lcgos Colony from the Nigerian Land Department,
Lagos, January 13, 1932 (files of the Town Clerk's Office, Lagos City Council, Lagos).
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In fact, Section 35 (1) of the Act empowers the LEDB at any time after the
publication in the Gazette of a declaration by the Governor-In-Council that an area is
town planning area,
... to declare, by notice in the Gazette its intention of framing
and carrying out a scheme with respect to such area or a part
thereof or with respect to any street in such area, and there-
upon the powers and duties exercisable and devolving upon
the Council or the Director of Public Works in such area or
part thereof.. .shall be transferred to and be vested in the
Lagos Executive Development Board (my emphasis).
In 1946, however, the Report of the Lagos Town Planning Commission12
recommended that,
In order that the development of Lagos may be successful,
it is indispensable that there should be one Authority
responsible for all aspects of that development, and that
there should be represented on that Authority all the in-
terests which are concerned.
One of such interests and an obvious one was the City Council.
But then this 'centralization' of authority also meant an expansion of the
scope of the functions of the LEDB, still to the detriment of the City Council. This
expansion of scope took the form of the merging into the LEDB of the functions of
other agencies charged with various other urban activities -- namely the Lagos Housing
Committee, Drainage and Swamp Reclamation Board, Government Offices Siting
Committee, and the Lagos Town Council Development Committee.
1 2 This was a Commission appointed by the Governor of Nigeria in 1945/46
to "consider, report and make recommendations confidentially on the future develop-
ment of Greater Lagos in all its aspects, and make suggestions for the implementation
of these proposals including the financial considerations involved."
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The Commission had recommendd that,
... with the exception of the Lagos Town Council, the
Ports Advisory Board, and the proposed Mosquito Control
Board, all the bodies listed13 (in Section IX of Mr.
Abrahall's report) should be regarded as dissolved and
that the duties performed by all these bodies should be
transferred to the Lagos Executive Development Board,
and the Board should if necessary appoint sub-committees
to consider the various questions now being considered
by these Committees and Boards. We suggest that Your
Excellency should consider an Amendment to the
Ordinance to enable the Lagos Executive Development
Board to appoint such sub-committees under the
chairmanship of one of its members and that the
Board should be empowered to appoint members to such
sub-committees who are outside the membership of
the Board. All reports of such sub-committees should
in the first instance be submitted to the Lagos Ex-
ecutive Development Board who would report to
the Government. 14
With the acceptance of this recommendation and the absorption by the
LEDB of the functions of the above listed four bodies -- Housing, Drainage and
Swamp Reclamation, Government Offices Siting Committee, and the Lagos Town
Council Development Committee -- the functions of the LEDB inevitably expanded
very substantially.
On the basis of this Report and Recommendations,too, the constitution of the
LEDB was broadened. The Commission had suggested that the Authority (LEDB),
13These bodies listed in Section IX of Mr. Abrahall's report under reference
were: The Lagos Town Council, The Lagos Executive Development Board, Lagos
Drainage and Swamp Reclamation Board*, Lagos Ports Advisory Board, Lagos Housing
Committee*, Lagos Town Council Development Committee*, Government Offices
Siting Committee*, Mosquito Control Board. The asterisked ones are those whose
functions were absorbed by the LEDB.
14 Lagos Town Planning Commission 1946, p. 8.
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should be in the position of the Board of Directors
of a commercial concern and the Chairman for
such a Board should be the Commissioner of the
Colony who is the Officer responsible to Your
Excellency (the Governor) for Administration
within the Township of Lagos.
The enlarged Board consisted then of:
The Commissioner of the Colony - as Chairman
The Deputy Commissioner of the Colony -- as Deputy Chairman
The Assistant Director of Medical Services in charge of Health Affairs
The Deputy Director of Public Works
The Harbour Master
Two members nominated by the Lagos Town Council from among
their own members
The town clerk
- One nominee of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce
The entire membership, therefore, became ex-officio and represented all
major interests in Lagos, including the Town Council members. The case was especial-
ly strongly made for the Town Council to be represented in the Board. The Commis-
sion pointed out that,
The Authority most concerned with the development of
L agos is the Lagos Town Council, and it is in our view
indispensable that the Lagos Town Council should be
fully represented on the Lagos Executive Development
Board in order that a close liaison shall be established
between the Board and the Council, and that the
Board shall have the advantage of the advice of the
Council on all matters concerned in the develop-
ment of Lagos.
In addition, the Commission also recommended the appointment of a full
time Manager (in later years designated the "Chief Executive Officer") who should
be responsible for carrying out the executive instructions of the Board. The Commis-
sion also suggested that the qualifications required would be "experience not only of
practical town planning, but also of town planning which involved both swamp re-
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clamation and port development". It is also interesting that the Commission also made
suggestions as to how and where to find the type of "Manager" they had in mind, by
suggesting that,
. It might be possible to obtain such a man from the
staff of the Indian Government, the Singapore
Municipality, or some similar authority, and if it
proved impossible to find a suitable British sub-
ject for this job, we would ask Your Excellency
to give consideration to the employment of an
American who has had similar experience on the
Coast of Florida where conditions obtain which are
almost exactly parallel to those found in Lagos,
and where town planning and reclamation has
made immense strides during the past forty years.
Most of this Commission's recommendations were accepted and implemented,
and the LEDB by that became much more powerful relative to the Town Council.
The Colonial Government was persistently reluctant to give power over
urban development to the Municipal Council, in spite of the recommendations of some
of its own official commissions. This was partly a result of the high level of de-
velopment it envisaged for Lagos, and partly as a result of administrative, technical,
and perhaps political convenience.
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While accepting in principle, forexample, that it should be the aim of public urban land
and housing policy to entrust local authorities with building regulations, the management
of land and housing, including assistance to home owners, the development of housing
estates and construction of new housing; British Colonial policy did consistently
insist that, "This was not possible at the present time; partly because of the political
immaturity of a number of local authorities, and partly because they have neither the
technical nor the financial resources needed for efficient management and develop-
ment." For the present, therefore, the Colonial administration argued,
Central Government may well have to remain the
principal land and housing authority, acting either
through a special housing department (as in the
Gold Coast), the Public Works Department (as
Northern Rhodesia and Uganda), or a trust or com-
mission (as in Singapore and Lagos). 15
That trust or commission in Lagos was the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB).
Even in later years as the conflict between the LEDB and the Town Council
continued and intensified, the authorities re-emphasized the functions of the LEDB
as that of the generic provision of facilities and services, while the Council was
charged with the maintenance of such services and facilities. This meant in effect
that, "The LEDB dealt with sites and the Lagos Town Council dealt with structures..".16
15Colonial Office: Housing in British African Territories (A memorandum
forwarded under cover of a dispatch dated 3 November, 1953, from the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the British African Colonies. (Colonial
No. 303, HMSO 1954, paragraph 23, p. 14).
16Minutes of the Lagos Town Council, May 3, 1949, p. 17 (files of the
Town Clerk's Office, Lagos City Council). Cited in Baker, P.H., Urbanization and
Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 19'7-1967. (University of California Press,
1974, p. 184.
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The Board continued to be the sole executive authority for planning and de-
velopment in the metropolitan area, while the maintenance of its constructed roads,
drains and open spaces became the responsibility of the Lagos City Council.
With Independence in 1960, there occurred a fundamental shift in the con-
stitution of the Board. Firstly, membership of the Board was enlarged to thirty-one,
made up of 15 appointed members, 10 ex-officio members, and six members represent-
ing the Lagos City Council. Policy-making power of the Board shifted from the ex-
officio members to the appointed members from among whom the Chairman of the Board
was now appointed. Both appointed members and those representing the City Council
also represented their different political parties so that the proceedings and decisions
of the Board inevitably assumed political colorations.
With the exception of the enlargement of the membership of the Board and its
increasing political party affiliations and influences, the structure and functions of
the Board remained basically the same as before Independence. There was, however,
some expansion in the scope of its functions and it became notably much more aggres-
sive and comprehensive in land acquisition and development. A lot more emphasis
became placed on residential housing and industrial/commercial developments, as
contrasted with mere environmental health concerns that was its raison d'etre.
Although the Board had in principle "police" and "eminent domain" powers
over private individuals, the Town Council and a host of other local agencies, and
therefore theoretically had the potential of effecting any policies and programs that
it desired in the metropolitan area, the socio-economic milieu and land tenure con-
text within which it had to operate, coupled with serious financial limitations and problems,
as well as problems of administrative and management inefficiencies, adversely affected
the degree of its performance to a very large extent. The way some of these problems inhibited
the Board's operations are examined in the following sections, and in subsequent chapters.
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4.3 Application of Compulsory Acquisition Powers by the Board and the Problem
of Land Tenure
The overriding powers of the LEDB over practically everything and everybody
(except the central Government) including the City Council, would have seemed to
be able to resolve the land tenure question, or at least made the rationalization of
the land use and tenure problem much easier. This is more so considering the pro-
visions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance, which gives
blanket powers to the LEDB or to any other agency to take control of any land re-
quired for public purposes "notwithstanding any native law and custom to the con-
trary."17 But all too often, the possibilities of legal powers are for different from
the probabilities of the realisation of the intents and objectives of those powers. The
public legislative powers of the LEDB over urban land was not an exception to this.
Despite its sweeping powers of compulsory acquisition, the Board did not seem to
find it any easier acquiring lands than did any other individual or private developers.
In fact, it could be said that the Board found it more difficult than private individuals
or developers would. For one thing, its mode of acquisition was mainly by compul-
sion, and compulsion is more likely to be resisted. For another, the popular con-
ception of the Government or its agency is that of a body with limitless resources which could
afford to pay the 'cosh' pri ce. Consequently, hig her price demands are often made on it than would
17Chapter 3 has fuller discussion of these provisions.
18
it is possible that in the long-run, such desirable results would be achieved,
but that is only a possibility. Even then, most people do not make decisions on
the basis of long-run results.
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normally be made on private individuals. It was a public institution and not an
individual with "flesh and blood", and therefore the question of 'human considerations'
(which is a dominant part of the local culture) was clearly out of the question as far
as the Government or its agencies were concerned. And more still, the question of
what use such lands are put to and who gets them after they have been divested of
their owners is always a strong consideration on the part of the resisting land owners.
There wasn't much land owner confidence on the Board, that it was acting in their
interests or in the interests of the majority of the 'public'. The Board was perceived
as acting in the interests of the 'higher-ups'.
This perception is evident from the statements of Counsel to the Central
Lagos landowners at the Tribunal of Inquiry into the affairs of the LEDB. He argued
that,
What they (the LEDB) wanted to do is that they them-
selves wanted to acquire these plots. They are seeking
powers to be owners of the land. They said they were
coming to develop the place and now they are seeking
power to buy the area. It would pay the Board
better to dispossess any clients because the Board
would then become the big landlord. That was the
original intention of the Government. 19
It is possible that this is a misconception of the objectives and intentions of the Board,
but that was the perception of the land owners and that perception guided their re-
sistant attitudes and actions.
19Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, Verbatim Report, Day 2,
p. 75.
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One of the central themes of this thesis is that the simple exercise of public
legislative or legal powers as such do not necessarily solve the objective problems,
or by itself necessarily bring about the desired goals and objectives. Appropriate,
stable, and lasting changes in the land tenure, however rapidly and extensively
they are desired, would seem to come about essentially by evolutionary methods
and processes, carried out with the cooperation of the people rather than by auth-
oritarian methods imposed from above. Impositions from above are often more likely
to be resisted. Moreover, the mechanisms and instruments mostly used in this case
are foreign legal instruments with values which are completely divergent from the
prevailing local customary and traditional land tenure laws and values. This
would suggest the need for more gradual processes, so as to allow time for the neces-
sary transitions and transformations of values from the old system to the new -- a
major factor in the problems.
An examination of some of the instances of acquisition by the Board and the
processes employed will help elucidate further some of the points already made.
One of the most controversial of LEDB land acquisitions was the Central
Lagos Acquisition. This Acquisition highlighted many of the problems and conflicts
between the modem legal approaches and rationales by the Board (representing the
Government and bureaucracy) and traditional customary values and laws, as will
be discussed shortly.
In expanding the authority and scope of functions of the LEDB, and endowing
it with powers of compulsory acquisition and disposal of lands, the policy makers
(Government and bureaucracy) presumably acted as if:
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(I) Such powers would prevent the Government or the Board from being
held to ransom by the individual or group, especially when land was
needed for important public programs.
(ii) Long-held and age-old habits of people could be wiped out by a
stroke of legislation, and significant social and cultural resistances
easily overcome in a relatively short time;
(iii) Enough financial resources would be available to the LEDB to under-
take massive enough programs that would overcome the objective
problem (shortage of housing and unsanitary urban environment) or
make reasonable progress towards the solution of the urban land use
quality problem;
(iv) Management and administrative skills and integrity were abundant
and available enough to make the achievement of its goals and ob-
jectives fairly certain;
(v) Public control ensures the most desirable use and equitable distribution
of urban land resai rces to the benefit of the majority of people or the
'public.' That is, that the LEDB, having acquired such lands, would
use them in the best equitable way to benefit all groups in the society --
in effect, that accessibility to urban land resources and facilities would
be maximized under such public agency control. It assumed also that
what the Government or the LEDB considered a 'public purpose' or of
national importance would also be understood as such by the affected
land owners, who on that basis would be better disposed to make the
necessary sacrifices in the interest of the 'public' or the 'nation.'
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Tne weaknesses and failures of the Lagos Executive Development Board as
a public agency hinged on the shaky foundations of some of these assumptions, as
will be evident from our analysis and discussion below.
By far the most classic example of this is the Board's experience with the
Central Lagos Planning Scheme acquisitions, in which the LEDB attempted to ac-
quire a 70 acre built-up area in downtown Lagos for renewal, development, and
redevelopment purposes. This scheme was conceived in 1951 and approved in 1952
as a slum clearance scheme -- in line with the original purpose of the Board -- to
"rid Lagos of filth and unsanitary conditions." The enabling statute empowering
the Board to undertake this project specifically authorized and provided for the
Board's:
(a) Acquisition cf this area of land, and clearance of the whole or the
majority of buildings in the scheme area, unless there are on any
part of it buildings of substantial nature which can be rehabilitated;
(b) The realignment of and reconstruction of roads, the provision of
main services, drainage and lighting;
(c) The re-sale of land to the original owners as far as it is possible
to do so; and
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(d) A provision for the re-housing of the displaced.
In order to carry out the project effectively, and to forestall the anti-
cipated stubborn resistance against the land acquisitions by the land owners, the
21
Board was given extraordinarily wide powers by the enabling legislation , whereby
on the published vesting dates, all the legal estates and interests within the project
area become vested on the Board, and all other interests on the land automatically
cease to exist. It was specifically stipulated that it was not until the land and
properties become vested on the Board could any negotiations, including those for
compensations , with the owners begin.
But land and communal ownership of land in the society has such profound
sentimental and social values as an expression of group cohesion that it was un-
thinkable that such a provision could be implemented without any opposition from
the affected land owners, the apparent generosity of the terms notwithstanding.
By the decision to acquire these lands from the families who owned them,
the Board was going against the prevailing sentiments and values, and was aware
of its implications, though with faith in its legal powers, seemed to have under-
estimated the strength of the resistance that it was facing. The Government, through
the Board, had planned to use 22 acres of this land for development of commercial
21 The LEDB has general powers of compulsory land acquisitions -- derived
both from the Public Land Acquisition (1917) and the LagosTown Planning Act, under
which it generally operates. But for each major acquisition, it is conferred addi-
tional specific powers by the Government in order to be able to deal with the specific
problems anticipated from the given situation. The objectives of a given land ac-
quisition project may also necessitate more specific powers than the general ones
permit.
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buildings and also for such institutional buildings as Post Offices and police stations;
while only 20 acres had been reserved for residential developments, and the land
owners to be affected were aware of these facts. Such was the vehement, and often-
times violent, opposition and resistance by the owners that the Government was
forced to modify its plans. It issued a series of revised guidelines for the implementation
of the project -- all in a bid to placate the land owners. These guidelines included,
among other things, the provisions that:
1. All lands wherever possible will be reconveyed to the
original owners; this undertaking was re-stated to counter
rumors that the Government had reversed itself on that
point.
2. Where persons possess land holdings which are too small to
meet the required provision for rebuilding, they will be
offered priority of consideration for freehold plots in
other areas being developed by the Board and such plots
will be granted freehold.
3. Where land is held by a communal group, the land will be
reconveyed to them as a common family holding.
4. No person will be displaced unless alternative accommodation
is available elsewhere.
5. An independent committee will be formed to identify and
vouch for bona fide tenants in the area to be acquired and
cleared, so as to help facilitate the allocation to them of
accommodation in the rehousing estates at Surulere.
6. At all stages, the interest of displaced persons will be para-
mount.
7. If there are aged and infirm who cannot be accommodated by
their relatives at Surulere, then free accommodation will be
provided for them in the old People's Refuge at Yaba.
8. Free transport will be provided for the conveyance of persons
and their effects from the cleared area to Surulere, and on
their return in due course when the cleared area has been
rebuilt.
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9. The amount of land reserved for public purposes in the cleared
area will be kept to a minimum.
10. Certain buildings of approved standards and design have been
scheduled as being exempt from vesting under the scheme,
these will not be taken over, but remain in the hands of
their present owners.
11. Though no freehold grants can be made in the rehousing
estate -- for this will be used at other stages of the clearance
scheme -- persons displaced will be given first consideration
on application for land in other areas being developed by
the Board.
12. Funds will be available under the mortgage scheme to finance
building?2
It was not certain that the Government or the LEDB intended these guide-
lines and assurances to be followed or implemented, because some of the guidelines
appeared contradictory. The scheme was therefore. impractical in light of these
guidelines, and the financial formula under which the LEDB was required to function
was not such as could sustain these obligations. The provision that land should be
re-conveyed to their original owners after site preparation and servicing, for ex-
ample, was accompanied by an injunction that any piece of land which for what-
ever reasons could not be reconveyed to an original land owner must be retained by
the LEDB itself and never be offered for sale in the open market, where 'foreigners'
could get them. This provision was directed at disproving a widespread belief
among the land owners that the LEDB intended to permanently deprive owners of
22 From the text of a radio broadcast to the people of Lagos by the Federal
Minister of Lands, Mines and Power. Published also in the Nigerian Daily Times
(newspaper), September 30, 1955.
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their larc'; by selling such lands to foreigners from whom it could charge the highest
prices for the lands.
But this provision on the other hand somehow unintentionally debarred the
LEDB from exercising decisive control over its legally, though compulsorily, ac-
quired property, even after large sums of money had been paid out as compensation
to land owners. Besides, land owners were apparently unwittingly given the false
impression that most of them could get back their land after redevelopment, when in
fact it was the intention of the Board to rationalize land use so as to eliminate small
23
uneconomic holdings , and given the fact that the LEDB had already set aside 22
acres for commercial and other developments and only 43 acres were available for
reallocation, the number of plots to be available for re-allocation would in any
case be far less than originally existed. This means that the Board had to be ready
to cope with the problem of irate land owners to whom land would not be re-allocated
in the area. To increase the supply, the LEDB began to carve up plots into smaller
irregular strips with a frontage of 25-30 feet and a depth of 80-100 feet. This solu-
tion obviously defeated one of the purposes of slum clearance, for it made inevitable
the same old pattern of narrow, congested construction, and the developments taking
place and its environmental outcome bore little relation to the best that could be
achieved or was envisioned. In fact, the Chairman of the LEDB at the time later
admitted that, "I think that the original concept of the scheme was not correct" .24
23 Oberu Aribia: "The Politics of Rehousing", in Lagos Notes and Record,
Vol. V, August 1974.
24-Mr. Fadahunsi, Chairman of the LEDB, in answer to a question about the
objectives of the Land Acquisition, at the Tribunal of Inquiry in to the Affairs of the
LEDB, Verbatim Report of the Inquiry, Day 2, p. 76.
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Furthermore, the provision that all displaced persons must be found alter-
native accommodation created immense problems for the LEDB and its severely limited
financial resources. A large proportion of lands and houses which came under this
scheme were "family lands" and "family houses" communally owned by large numbers
of people who could not be dispossessed of their individual titles, even after their
prolonged absence from the area. This meant that displaced co-landlords, whether
currently present in Lagos or not, were equally entitled to rehousing and compensa-
tion. The unending trickling of claimants upset whatever financial calculations the
LEDB had made for rehousing displaced people, and this was a serious charge on its
resources. These are as a result of the nature of the traditional land tenure.
Thirdly, the promise to keep to a minimum land reserved for public purposes
greatly watered down the original intention of the LEDB to build a modem city
center (CBD) with a complex of shopping centers, entertainment houses, car parks
and ramps, and various other public facilities.
In spite of all these promises, and in spite of a series of compensation pay-
ments, ex-gratia awards (all amounting to some t 4.2 million ($12..8 million) and
rehousing programs, the opposition and resistance continued. The first part of the
implementation was undertaken amidst violent protests, and a section of the affected
population was removed for resettlement. But when the remaining population found
that very few of the first set of the population that was removed got any of their
plots of land back after the clearance and servicing by the LEDB, they staunchly
resisted their being moved and their lands acquired, not wanting to fall into the same
trap and ruffer the same fate as their brethren. And they effectively stalled and
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halted the implementation of the scheme. Thus, one of the main factors responsible
for the stalemate was the desire to assure the former owners their return to the land
taken from them, and the physical irrpossibility of satisfying the claims of all the
former owners was lost site of in the effort to satisfy their pressures -- which was
perceived as a political imperative at that time. To date (1976), of the 70 acres
designated for acquisition, only about 25 acres have effectively been acquired by
the LEDB, and only about 4 acres have been redeveloped. Thus the scheme remains
uncompleted after over 25 years of its inception. This, in spite of the wide-ranging
and overriding powers of the LEDB. This illustrates the gap between theoretical enabling legal
powers and their potentials.and fhe feasibility of translating these potentialities into ef-
fective actions and results. It also illustrates the fact that culturally and socially
held values and beliefs are no less resistant to legislative compulsion than the ordi-
nary economic and social pressures of modernization and change. It is possible to
argue that those difficulties were a result of the Government's half-way measure in
allowing itself into compromises with the landowners. It could have used force all
the way, and removed the people and achieved the original intent of the scheme.
The answer, however, is that the political and social costs would have been too
high, and it is the realization of the potentials of such costs that forced the Gov-
ernment into the apparent compromise in the first place. Even then, the effective-
ness of the use of force was not a certainty.
Baker (1974) observes of this particular project that,
More than any other public project, this scheme has
crystallised the social conflict between indigenous
landlords and traders who want to protect their
birth right and their livelihood, and non-indigenous
interests -- real estate speculators, merchants and
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Government officials -- whose concerns lie in the
development of land for economic profit and
national pride. 25
Evidence for such a conclusion will become clear from analysis in Chapters 6 and 7.
Other evidence abound with respect to the effective obstruction of the
legal powers of the State or those of its agencies by the traditional systems con-
straints. The activities of the LEDB had been stultified to a great extent by this
26particular problem. Surulere, for example,
... was declared a Town Planning area on 12th August 1929.
Proposals for effecting control were drawn up which
included the purchase of the necessary land for the
main arterial roads and sufficient land to permit of
buildings plots being laid out on each side of the
road; but no agreement with the owners could be
reached and the scheme was dropped temporarily.
Since then, investigations and negotiations have been
proceeding with a view to framing a town planning
scheme to include redistribution of holdings, but
the completion of such a scheme will take a con-
siderable time. 26a
It is an indication of the seriousness and complexity of land acquisition
problems, that this scheme, conceived and planned in 1929, could not get off
the ground until the middle to the late 1950's, more than twenty-five years after
it was originally planned to be executed. It is also remarkable that traditional forms
of land tenure have been retained for so long in the heart of the city of Lagos; in spite
of the degree of urbanization there over the past half century. But this only under-
scores the strength of fhe traditional system.
25Baker, Pauline H: Urbanization and Political Change; The Politics of
Lagos 1917-1967 (University of California Press, 1974), p. 100.
26 Surulere is one of the sections of Lagos, which the LEDB later developed
into a middle-class residential area.
2 6aW. E. Hunt, Chairman of the Lagos Executive Development Board in LEDB:
Annual Reports and Accounts for the Year 1933/34.
-128-
Enabling legislation and legal compulsions notwithstanding, the observation
seems to still hold that, "Land and all that appertaineth to land are matters of life
and death with the natives of West Africa.. .The shortest and easiest way to start a
conflagration in West Africa is to make an attempt at depriving the native of his
land or inherent rights thereto."27 This is much more so when it involves urban re-
newal or slum clearance that includes demolition of houses and displacement of
people. This fact is further underscored by Abrahall's assessment of the situation,
to the effect that,
When public feeling is stirred against acquisition, re-
clamation, leasehold in place of freehold, destruction
of slums, anything in which the interest of a vocal
minority are subordinated to the needs of the silent
majority, Government difficulties will be increased
many-fold, to such an extent, perhaps, that important
principles and important work have been abandoned. 27b
But his reference to the interest of a 'vocal minority' being subordinated to
the needs of the silent majority seems a deliberate official underplaying of the scope
of the problems and the facts of the situation.
While such land acquisition problems per se were major constraints on the
operations of the Board, much of it might have been partly off-set by inducive pay-
ments to the land owners as compensation. But the Board was never in a strong enough
financial position to try this out. The next section explores the sources of the Board's
financial weakness and its consequences for the performance and direction of priorities
and orientation of the Board in its later years.
2/
The Nigerian Democratic Party, statement reported in West Africa of April
10, 1927 (p. 415) in connection with Government attempts to ccquire Apapa Icnds in
Lagos and the Privy Council decision in favor of the Chief and native community.
27bT. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit., p. 34.
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4.4 - The Funding and Finances of the LEDB.
One of the implicit assumptions in the expansion of the powers and scope
of functions of the LEDB is that enough funds would be available to it, to enable it
to carry out comprehensive enough programs to make substantial impacts on the solu-
tion of the urban land and environmental problems in the city. This assumption proved
tenuous, however, as the Board's operational effectiveness was often seriously under-
mined by the frequent shortage of sufficient and ready capital and operating funds
from both public and private sources. It will be seen from Section 5. of Chapter
5 that, given the way the land owners perceived and calculated their costs (losses)
for compensation purposes, and given the number of cases involved, the Board was in
no financial position to meet the situation. That calculation, though theoretical,
is in essence a model of the Board's problem.
Although Table 4.4 on the capital expenditures and revenue incomes of the
Board shows consistently increasing capital expenditures, the revenue income for
each comparable year remained consistently small compared with the capital ex-
penditure (also see Chart 4.1), in fact at only 20.1% of the capital expenditure over
the 1929-1966 (36 year) period. This low proportion of revenue income relative to
capital expenditures, particularly. between 1957-58 and 1966 can be accounted for
by the very rapid expansion of activities during that period. This period marked the
onset of both self-government (1957) and Independence (1960) of the country, and
these events demanded the building and development of lots of housing and other
infrastructural facilities and services preparatory to the celebration of these events.
It wasas a result,a period during which the Federal Government made large grants
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and loan:, 'o the Board for those purposes -- development schemes (see also Table 4.6).
The generally weak revenue income situation is explained principally by three basic
factors:
(i) Its near-total dependence on Government financing for capital
projects and the Board's inability to internally generate other sub-
stantial revenue. This was a result in part of the mechanism or
formula of revenue generation authorized for the Board by the
Federal Government. Although the Board was a semi-autonomous
agency, its finances were closely controlled by the Gov-
ernment, and much of its revenue depended on the general develop-
ment expenses proceeds.
(ii) A result of general management incompetence, high overheads,
bureaucratic red tape, or levity of the agency's administration.
This is most apparent in the Board's laxity in collecting debts owed
to it. The Board's financial weakness could also be attributed to the
fact that the Board was sometimes obligated to undertake and at-
tend to social services projects that were by their very nature un-
profitable in cash terms. Installation of basic infrastructure and sub-
sidized low income housing development are examples, though in
such cases the Federal Government provided the funds or was
expected to reimburse the Board for such social expenditures.
(iii) The corresponding unenthusiastic and lax attitude of the general
populace to debts owed to the Government or its agencies. People
do not feel much pressure paying debts owed to the Government,
and the indebtedness to the Board by the public at any given time
was often substantial.
It has been said that the efficiency and effectiveness of direct public in-
tervention in the land market as part of urban land policy very much depends on the
financial and administrative strength of the relevant authority or agency charged with
such policy. 35 We have pointed out that the LEDB had serious limitations in respect to each
3"General Development Expenses" was a percentage levy on the cost of
capital works and land acquisition (6% on land acquisitions and building expenditures
and 15% on engineering and building construction expenditures). This constitutes a
major revenue source for the Board. (See p.
35 U.N.: Proceedings of the Se minar on the Supply, Development and Al-
location of Land for Housing and Related Purposes (Paris, France, 28 March-April 6,
1965, Vol. II, p. 196).
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Table 4.4
Capital Expenditure and the Revenue Income of the LEDB 1929-1966.
2
Capital
Expenditure (L)
3
Revenue
Income (t)
4
Revenue Income as
Percent of Capital Expenditure
1929/30-33
1944/45
1945/46
1946/47
1957/58
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62
1962/63
1963/64
1964/65
1965/66
102,500
5,089
13,040
1 3,180
1,750,000
1,541,775
2,611,152
2,768,001
1,544,602
1,094,468
2,250,000
2,421,361
983,097
200,000
17,402
9,700
10,310
465,367
492,029
282,953
295,850
224,737
196,514
437,380
344,186
489,685
(Gov.grant)
Total: t 17,098,265 approx. 3,441,122 20.1
Sources: 1929/30-1946/47 figures are from T. Hoskyns-Abrahall,
Report with Recommendations on the Planning and Develop-
ment of Greater Lagos, 1946, p. 27-8.
1957/58-1965/66 figures are from LEDB: Annual Reports and
Accounts, for the stipulated years.
l= $3.04.
* This item is actually a Government block seed grant and not re-
venue generated by the Board itself. It is also from the grant that
the capital expenditure was made. It should therefore be read in
this proper perspective.
1
Year
195.1*
342.0
74.4
78.2
26.6
32.0
10.8
9.8
14.5
18.0
19.4
14.2
49.8
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of these Frerequisites. We shall now proceed to discuss how and why this financial
weakness came about, and what effects it had on the operation and future orienta-
tion of the Board.
Being a quasi-Government agency, the LEDB was principally financed
from public funds -- Federal Government loans and grants.
The Board's most active years, particularly with respect to land acquisitions
and housing activities, then took place after the War, particularly from the mid-
1950's to the early 1970's. During this period, its annual capital expenditures
averaged t 1.5 million ($5.0 million).
Table 4.5 shows the approximate size and distribution of project types of
most of the Board's schemes during this period.
Table 4.5
Areal Size and Expenditure Size Distribution of LEDB Projects by Type up to 1966
Project Total Size No. of No. Bldg. Total
Type (in Acres) Housing~Units Plots Cost (t)
Land (building plots)
schemes 3,500 -- 7,000* 12,998,985
Housing & Rehousing
schemes 400* 6,500* -- 6,939,984
Industrial/Commercial
Schemes 950* -- -- 150,652
Solely Infrastructural
Projects -- -- -- 894,978
Board's Gross Expenditure over the period 20,984,599**
Total spent on public works & infrastructural developments (reclamation,
roads, drainage, sewage and electricity, etc.) 8,921,969
Source: Calculated from the various Board's documents and Annual Reports.
Indicates approximate figures. **This includes recurrent expenditures which are not
reflected in Table 4.4 (which reflected only capital
expenditures)
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It should be noted that the costs cited in Table 4.5 include compensa-
tion to land owners where applicable.
The table indicates that the Board during the period acquired some 5,000
acres of land. From this, it produced approximately 7,000 fully serviced building
plots* of various sizes, ranging from 40' x 60' to 2-acre sized plots; approximately
6,500 houses and/or housing units, and some four to five industrial estates, of about
950 acre combined size.
These involved a gross expenditure of approximately k 20,984,600. Of
this amount, approximately t 9.0 million, or 42.9% of the gross total was spent on
Public Works, and infrastructural developments, which items included reclamation,
roads, drainage, sewage, water and electricity. This total also included all the
infrastructural cost components of all the Board's land and housing schemes, as well
as for those in industrial and commercial estates. The high proportion of the gross
expenditure claimed by this item accords with the main objective for which the
Board was set up -- ".. . the general object of securing proper sanitary conditions,
amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out and use of the land." 36
A substantial proportion (t 4,265,002, or 47.8%) of this high amount spent on infra-
structural development, however, was accounted for by the various land reclamations
from the sea and the swamps that the Board had to undertake. In fact, one of the
*Building plot schemes are those schemes in which the Board acquired the
land, prepared and serviced the plots and then sold or leased to the public to build.
36 Ordinance to make Provision for the Planning, Improvement, and De-
velopment of Lagos (Lagos Town Planning Ordinance No. 45 of 1928), Part IV,
para. 1.
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most magnificent of the Board's achievements was in the area of reclamation, by which
tracts of unusable and unbuildable land were brought into use for both residential
and industrial/commercial developments. The more prominent of these reclamation
schemes included the reclamation of Victoria Island (1 ,600 acres), Ikoyi (500 acres,
approximately), parts of Apapa, Surulere and ljora. These areas are still the most
elegant parts of Lagos. Because of their swampy nature, there were no strong re-
sistances against their acquisition, so that the Board had less human problems and so
was able to plan and develop these areas as it wanted.
Building plots schemes in general claimed approximately t 13.0 million,
or 62% of the total inclusive of infrastructure. This high proportion is also accounted
for by the fact that most of the areas involved had to be partially reclaimed from
hitherto unusable swamp lands, involving some 3063 acres. And because of high cost
of reclamation and site development in such areas, their qualities were developed to
a very high amenity level in order to sell to people of high income who could afford
them, and help defray the high cost of the site preparations.
Housing and rehousing schemes accounted for t 6,939,984 or 33% of the gross
expenditures. The remaining went to industrial and commercial developments.
As has been pointed out, the LEDB was principally financed with Gov-
ernment loans and grants, but given the competing needs for public funds for other
development, this source was never adequate for the Board's needs. The Board also
had authority to borrow limited amounts of money from the commercial money market,
but subject to the approval of the Federal Government, through the relevant Fed-
eral Ministry (usually the Ministry of Lagos Affairs, or the Ministry of Lands when it
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existed), but such approvals for loans were ;eldom given, and when it was, the
amount of loan approved was very limited. The fact, however, remained inescapably
true that for an agency like the LEDB to be effective in achieving its goals and stated
purposes, it must have very large amounts of capital and have them on a regular.
yearly basis, then could it plan and produce more consistently and effectively. How-
ever, given the sources of capital funds, and the sources and nature of the formula
of the revenue incomes of the LEDB, and given the competing needs for public funds
for other development, there were always grave risks that the Board's plans and pur-
poses would be frustrated by public loan and grant fund shortages. The discussions
that follow below show the degree of dependence of the Board on public (Govern-
ment) funds and how this dependence affected the activities and effectiveness of
the Board.
Table 4.6 shows the major sources of the Board's finances and the relative
importance or proportion of each source for the years 1929/30 to 1965/66. It shows
that direct Government subventions in the form of loans and grants averaged over
60/6 of the Board's finances through most of the period. Quasi-Govemment or
Government guaranteed sources (CDC loans) accounted for about 18% on the average.
The Board's internally generated sources averaged about 26%. These were made up
mainly of the general development expenses (income from capital works), ground
(leasehold) rents, sale of building plots, housing rents, planning and building ap-
plication fees, and other miscellaneous fees. Direct commercial loans made up less
than 2% of the finances. In effect, direct and indirect Government sources (which
include the CDC and NBS) make up approximately 78% of the Board's funding over
the period.
Table 4.6
SOURCES OF LEDB CAPITAL FINANCING: PERCENT OF TOTAL CAPITAL FUNDS FROM EACH SOURCE
Source
Nigerian Govt. Loan
1929/30-
1945/46*
1955/
1956 1957 1958
25.0
1959
20.0
Year
1960
17.8
1961 1 1962 1 19631 1964 1965 1966
17.2 I 17.1 17.0 17.0 14.0 15.02638.298
Nigerian Govt. Grant -- 2.5 35.0 37.0 44.0 47.1 46.4 42.2 40.0 40.0 33.6 34.0
CDC Loan -- 49.8 26.5 23.6 18.9 14.2 11.6 10.0 9.4 10.0 7.5 8.0
Bank Loans -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 3.0
LEPB Sources (Sale of
Ldnd,-Houses & Loans 2.0 9.4
Repuid, etc. 12.5 13.4 17.0 20.7 23.6 28.4 31.7 31.9 41.6 40.0
Other (LTC, Capital
Gifts, etc.) -- -- -- -- 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
NBS Loans -- -- -- 0.8 0.4 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
SOURCE: Various Annual Reports of the LEDB
* T. Hoskyns-Abrahall: Report with Recommendations on the Planning and Development of Greater Lagos: Appendix B:
Report of Accounts by Cassleton Elliot & Company, May 9, 1946.
NBS: Nigerian Building Society
CDC: Colonial Development Corporation
.  1 17.1 17.0 17.0 14.0 15.0
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The most significant source of the Board's internally generated revenue
income was what was known as the General Development Expenses. This- was the
fixed percentage charge that the Board levied on all Capital Works and Land
acquisitions. That is to say, a percentage charge is imposed on the value of each
capital work undertaken by the Board on behalf of the Government or on behalf
of other agencies or authorities, or even private (third party) individuals, and the
income derived in this manner constituted the revenue income out of which the run-
ning expenses of the Board were met. This percentage charge was at the rate of 6%on the
cost of acquisition of land or buildings, and 15% on the costs of Civil Engineering
works and building construction. This means in effect that the Board adds 15% of
the total cost of any works or development it carries out to the total cost of such
works. If the total cost of the capital works of a project, for example, is N4 100,000,
the Board adds 15% of that cost (tN 15,000) to it as the General Development Ex-
penses, to arrive at t* 115,000, which is taken as the actual cost of the project.
The N 15,000 accrues to the Board as its internally generated revenue. The Board
depended so much on this revenue source because most of its established capital de-
velopments were relatively new and hadn't matured into generating much constant
revenue. Furthermore, the Board was required by the Federal Government to provide
certain social services which involved subsidized services, such as the rehousing
schemes at Surulere and certain low income housing schemes. The Board, therefore,
could not charge 'economic prices' for such services or facilities. Moreover, land
*Government schemes, as opposed to LEDB schemes, are projects which the
Government wants to directly undertake, finance, and control, but for which it de-
cides to use the services of the Board as construction agents or management consult-
ants. The General Development Expenses in such cases stand for the agent's or
consultant's fees.
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leases, which were part of the Board's operations, do not usually return capital
quickly enough to keep operations going.
Because the Board depended so heavily on these fixed percentage charges
as the major source of its revenues (it averaged approximately 77% of the Board's
total annual revenue during the 1957/58-1964/65 period (See Table 4.7, Row C)
from which to meet its yearly recurrent expenditures, it meant that the level of the
Board's expenditure on some categories of its activities were conditioned and con-
strained by the volume of capital works undertaken by the Board in a given year. The
tendency, or rather the practice, of the Board then was to ensure that in a given
year, enough capital projects were initiated, either for or by the Government, or
such works solicited from other third parties, so as to ensure some income for the
Board in the given year. To get such capital works projects, the Board usually had to
initiate and design some such projects, and then attempt to persuade the Government
to 'buy' and finance them. It wasn't often easy getting the Government to 'buy' such
projects. It was often easier when the initiative of a project came from the Govern-
ment itself. Because the amount of revenue from this source depended on or was de-
termined by the total cost of capital works or land acquisitions, there were suspicions
of a tendency on the part of the Board to make such works or acquisitions cost much higher
than would ordinarily be the case, so as to increase the revenue from this source. Even
then, this source remained inadequate.
The dependence of the Board on this General Development Expense, which
itself is dependent on the amount of capital projects performed for the Federal Gov-
ernment or other parties, leaves the Board in a very vulnerable financial position, as
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any shortage of such capital projects rende:s the Board financially and therefore
operationally inept. Furthermore, the nature of this source of revenue naturally
disinclined the Board from engaging in projects or fields that were not or did not in-
volve capital projects, or that had not the potential of yielding appreciable financial
returns. This is more so as the Board was generally required by its enabling Act to
operate commercially -- that is, to make profits. This often meant by-passing desirable
and needed public works and social projects that did not qualify for these recharge-
able surcharges.
The Board's dependence for its revenue income on capital projects under-
taken on behalf of the Federal Government or other parties is illustrated on Table
4.7, which depicts the fluctuating revenue fortunes of the Board from 1959/60 to
1964/65, and which was attributable to fluctuating availability of capital works on
which to charge general development expenses. During this period, capital projects
for the LEDB from the Federal Government dried up, leaving the Board in deficits
towards the second half of the period. There were surpluses in 1959/60, 1960/61,
and 1963/64 because there were substantial capital projects in hand from the Federal
Government, and therefore substantial revenues from the General Development Ex-
penses source. In the other three years, however, the reverse was the case, and
therefore the resulting deficits. The Board's revenue fortunes, therefore, essentially
swung with the amount of capital projects, which does not emanate from the Board it-
self, but from the Government and third parties.
The Board itself explained the above downward swing in its financial for-
tunes as being due to the fact that,
Table 4.7
LEDB Income from Capital Works (GDE*) and the Board's Running (Recurrent/Operating) Expenses
1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64
1959/60-1964/65 (t)
1964/65 1965/66
(a) Total Capital Ex-
penditure- (financed
by Federal Govt.
grants & loans)
(b) General Development
Expenses
(c) % of Board's Total
Annual Revenue+
(d) Net Operating or
Recurrent Ex-
penditure
(e) Net Surplus/
Defici t
2,611,150
233,610
82.6
186,514
+47,096
2,768,000
270,850
91.5
220,897
+49,953
1,544,600
157,510
70.0
245,160
- 87,650
1,094,470
114,390
58.2
239,140
-124,750
3,002,040
355,260
81.2
324,560
+ 30,700
2,421,360
264,060
76.7
983,098
144,790
29.6
359,430 418,841
- 95,370 -274,051
4c-rce: LEDB Tribunal of Inquiry, 1966, p. 117.
GDE - General Development Expenses
See Column 3 of Table 4.4
This is arrived at by subtracting (d) from (b)
*
+
**
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,.prior to 1962, enough capital works were forth-
coming from the Federal Government, but as from
that year, there had been a considerable scarcity
of such capital projects from Government sources.
This had created some difficulties for the Board
which more often than not finds itself with in-
adequate funds to run effectively the expanding
social aspects of its work in the estates and in
connection with some of the projects being
ordered by the Federal Government. 37
The Board further pointed out in this respect that,
Essential expansion and improved running standards
were usually out of reach to the Board owing to
the limitations imposed by the insufficiency of
the General Development Expenses.37b
in fact, the Board argues that it invariably managed to keep its actual total
Revenue Expenditure below the level of the budgeted total Revenue Expenditure, but
that the savings which could have accrued to it as a result of this financial manage-
ment had always been lost because of the Board's inability to earn the total estimated
General Development Expenses, due to insufficient execution of capital projects,*
thus underscoring the dependence on the General Development Expenses source for
operating expenditures. In a similar vein , the Tribunal of Inquiry that probed the
affairs of the Board in 1966/67 concluded that,
There is no doubt that the Board's dependence for its
income on capital projects undertaken on behalf of
the Government is a very vulnerable financial posi-
tion as the fluctuation in the number of such projects
37Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the LEDB 1966, p. 101.
37bIbid.
* Ibid.,
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in recent years has clearly shown. This is more so
in view of the expansion of the activities of the
Board in fields that do not yield appreciable fin-
ancial retums.37c
It has to be pointed out that ordinarily most public agencies, to varying
degrees experience financial problems. In this general sense, the experience of the
LEDB was not peculiar. The peculiarity of the Board's case arises from being tied to this
General Development Expenses formula rather than being provided for in the normal
annual Government budgetary process. The acuteness of the Board's financial prob-
lem was therefore greater as a result of this than the ordinary problem of financial in-
sufficiency as experienced by most other agencies. Also, unlike most other public
agencies whose capital and recurrent funds are provided for or appropriated in the
annual routine government budgetary process, the formula of the Board's funding was
"approved project-based", or rather more appropriately, the formula was "approved
capital-project-based". This meant that before the government made grants or loans
to the Board, there must have been a definite and specific capital project which the
Board had planned to execute and this capital project must have been approved by the
Government.
This manner of funding in spite of the Board's pressures for a change or modi-
fication of it, was further reaffirmed by the Commission that investigated the affairs
of the Board, which after recommending that the Government give subsatntial amounts
of revolving loan to the LEDB, insisted that,
37cbid., p. 117.
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... any such loan made to the Board should in the first
instance be granted on the basis of a major capital
project or projects acceptable to the Government and
whose economic viability has been clearly demon-
strated by way of a feasibility report. Accordingly,
the amount of loan would have to depend on the
estimated cost of the projects to which the loan is
tied in the first instance... .We do not, therefore,
envisage a situation in which the Board will first
be granted a loan of any magnitude and then allowed
to think of how to make use of it. Funds made
available in this way may easily be misused or
applied at the discretion of the Board to projects
that may be far down in the list of priorities
having regard to the present financial situation
of the country.38
These were fairly stringent conditions for funding, and it was not often
easy to have projects that could meet these criteria and pass the Government's
scrutiny.
The Government, too, di d not make loans or grants to the Board for re-
current or running (operating) expenses. The Board was expected to get money for
such expenses from the fees it was authorized to charge on its capital projects (gen-
eral development expenses) and from proceeds of its established commercial projects,
including rents on land leases, or housing rentals, and building and development ap-
plication fees, whose collection mechanisms were very weak. The 'project basis' of
the Board's funding was therefore another major source of its financial weakness.
38
Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, 1967, p. 103.
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Table 4.8
Sources and Amounts of Loans Secured by the LEDB up to 1966
Project or Scheme
Apapa Estate Project
Freehold Land Scheme No. 3
Freehold Land Scheme No. 4
Freehold Land Scheme No. 7
Surulere Light Industries
Freehold Housing Scheme No.
Freehold Housing Scheme No.
Freehold Housing Scheme No.
Freehold Housing Scheme No.
Freehold Housing Scheme No.
Surulere Shops & Flats
Amount of Loan (t)
1.25 million
0.6 million
196,000
50,000
60,000
55,000
50,000
60,000
50,000
500,000
50,000
50,000
2
4
4a
5
6
Source of Loan
Commonwealth Dev.Corp.
Federal Government
Bank.
Bank
Bank
Bank
Nigerian Bldg. Society
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Source: Report of the Tribunal of
(t 1 = $3.04)
Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB 1966, p. 6.
As had been pointed out, the Board's power to negotiate commercial loans,
and the amount of such loans that it could negotiate, was very limited. Such loans were
required to be guaranteed by the Federal Government, who was often not disposed
to give the Board a wide discretion or free rein as far as this was concerned, per-
haps in order to retain and ensure strict government financial control, or possibly be-
cause the Government had not adjudged the Board as being capable of handling larger
sums of money efficiently. The amount of non-government loans it was allowed to
take out at a time and that were guaranteed by the Government were often small and
very limited. From records, it is inferred that such loans were limited to around sixty
thousand pounds at a time or per project. Table 4.8 on the sources and amounts of loans
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by the LEDB indicates that most of the bank or commercial loans were limited to
about t 50,000. And these were mainly short-term loans, which required repayment
in relatively short periods of time, so as to maintain the credibility and credit-
worthiness to obtain further loans in the future. Also, as these loans were govern-
ment guaranteed, should the Board default the government would be liable to repay
the loans, and this would prejudice government's willingness to guarantee further
loans for the Board. And the Governmentnot overlooking the possibility of such a
default, keeps a tab on the amount of loan that the Board can take at any given time.
All these constraints had inhibiting effects on the scope of operations of the Board.
The use of such short-term commercial bank loans was the main explanation by the
Board of why it sold its freehold plots and houses on a commercial basis -- that is, to
those who could pay the prices demanded, arguing that the interest rates on such
loans were very high and the loans themselves were required to be repaid in a rela-
tively short period of time.
The other factors in the relatively weak financial position of the LEDB can
be attributed to the traditional inefficiency of public agencies, which has to do
with the integrity and devotion or otherwise, of the civil servants or bureaucrats,
and the corresponding level of public confidence in them. The LEDB, for example,
was unable to collect a substantial bulk of the rents due on its many projects and
facilities. This inability could be attributed to weaknesses in its management
mechanisms, to the incompetence of its personnel, to the corruptibility of its of-
ficials, to the reluctance of people to pay for Government-produced goods or to
exert themselves to pay for such debts promptly. Considerable sums of potential
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revenue due from rents on the Board's projects remained uncollected every year. In
1966, the uncollected revenues due from rents stood at t 124,000 (which was equi-
valent to 25.3% of its total revenue in that year -- see Table 4.4) with over 1500
persons defaulting in rent payments to the Board, many of them for several months in
a row. The principal cause of this was attributed to the "culpable indifference of
officials of the Board in handling the Board's financial affairs".39
Other Implications of the Board's Financial Weakness
Such was the financial weakness of the LEDB that in many of its land ac-
quisitions, it could not pay compensation promptly to land owners, as required by
law. This tended to confound the Board's difficulties with the land owners. Al-
though, for example, the notice for acquisition by the Board with respect to the
Central Lagos land acquisitions (Section 4.3) was published in 1951, and the var-
ious areas became vested in the Board from 1956-1961, yet up to 1966 (over six years
after the legal acquisitions) the LEDB was still not in a position to and had not
paid compensation to many of the owners; while the Board collected rents from
shops erected on the sites. The some such problem existed with the Abule-NIa/
Iganmu Development Scheme. In either case, the Board could not settle the com-
pensation involved in the acquisitions, because according to it, it "hadn't the
funds to do so". The result was that the owners of land in the affected areas were
severely handicapped and disadvantaged in dealing with their properties with regard
to selling, mortgaging or leasing such properties. Such non-payment or non-timely
39
Ibid., p. 119.
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payment of compensation after acquisition contributed to intensification of resistance
by land owners whose property was to be acquired by the Board. These problems of
non-payment were so rampant that the LEDB Inquiry Report* recommended that,
The LEDB should be prohibited from acquiring a property
without first making adequate provisions of funds for
the payment of compensation, and seeing to it that
cash is actually available to meet such payments.
Where however, the LEDB has acquired a property
without payment of compensation on the due date,
the LEDB should pay interest at 6% per annum, or
at the current bank rate whichever is higher.
On the other hand, even where the Board had acquired and paid for the
lands, they remained undeveloped for a long time owing to lack of sufficient funds.
This resulted in further losses to the LEDB as the little capital it had became tied
up in such lands. The problem of insufficient funds was all-pervading in the operations
of the Board.
Another implication of the financial weakness of the Board was that it
could not afford to embark on massive and comprehensive land acquisitions that
could achieve the effect that public urban land banks or land reserves are normally
associated with -- control of land values and control of land use. The alternative
was the isolated, uncoordinated and incremental pattern of acquisitions which
tended to raise land values and land prices around the adjoining areas to the Board's
schemes -- which were higher quality and amenity areas. As a result, when even-
tually the Board decided to acquire more land to expand a particular scheme, it
had to pay higher prices for such adjoining lands to its scheme -- higher prices
*Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affauis of the LEDB, 1967.
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brought about by its own policies. (See Chapter 5 for factors in the determination
of "Fair Market Value", p. 15, 16). This process was particularly obvious in the
Board's Surulere Land acquisitions. If the Board had the financial strength to do a
more comprehensive acquisition, it would not have had to be paying for higher
prices brought about by its own mechanisms.
The problem of insufficiency of funds affected the "goals -- effectiveness"
or purpose of the LEDB in another way. Because of the understandably less revenue
accruing from residential and social schemes, which did not very much help its
already weak financial situation, the Board embarked on a major shift of emphasis
to industrial and commercial projects, which was envisaged to command more ready
revenue incomes, and this meant a commensurate shift of emphasis away from the
residential and other social (including environmental) problems of the metropolitan
area which was the raison d'etre of the Board's creation. The LEDB explained
this shift as necessary for its continued existence and operation, stating that,
Because of the heavy competitive demand on
Government funds for its various National Eco-
nomic Development Plan projects, the Board
is no longer able to rely exclusively on
Government funds for the execution of all its
schemes, and it is therefore continually exploring
the possibility of long-term external or in-
ternal finance for its commercial development
projects, and from Finance Institutions with the
Federal Government providing the necessary
guarantees. To this end, the Board is endeavouring
to shift emphasis to planned commercial and
industrial development schemes which will not
only help to stabilise its finance but should also
enable it to plough back substantial surpluses
for promoting further development and thereby
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minimizing its reliance on Government funds for
the execution of its projects. 4 0 (emphasis mine)
-The process of this planned shift involved: (a) In the first instance, se-
Suring permission from the Federal Government to make such a shift; (b) Requesting
§pbstantial amounts of long-term revolving loans from the Federal Government in
prcier to make this expansion feasible; (c) Requesting authorization from the Federal
pvernment to issue Debenture stocks in the Lagos money market, with a view to
putting funds thus realized into such planned commercial ventures. The Board en-
vigoged to use proceeds from these ventures to pay the interest on the debentures and
still accumulate reasonable surplus. In the process of this came the administrative
changes in Nigeria (creation of states) in which Lagos State was created. As a
result, the LEDB came under the control of the Lagos State, rather than the Federal
Government, and thereby was automatically transformed into a state-wide agency
from being a metropolitan agency. With this transformation it was given many of the
powers it requested for expansion by the new Lagos State Government.
The implication of this expansion and change of emphasis is that the
preparation of residential building land became low in the priority of the Board,
and this meant that most of the lands to be acquired henceforth would be devoted
more to non-residential uses. Table 4.9 reflects this change in emphasis and dir-
ection, in which most pre-1970 projects were mainly residential; and while still
maintaining substantial residential developments, most post-1970 projects were in-
creasingly devoted to industrial and commercial land uses.
40Annual Reports and Accounts of the LEDB 1965/66, p. 35.
Table 4.9
LEDB: Trend and Scale of Allocation of Land to Use Types
Scheme or Project Year
Total Area
(in Acres) Residential
Land Uses (Acres)
Indust./Commer.
ldumagbo Scheme
Isalegangan Scheme
Oke Awo Scheme
Yaba Estate
Apapa Estate
Central Lagos Scheme
Surulere Scheme
Lagos Housing Scheme
Housing Schemes
Rehousing Scheme
Victoria Island Scheme
S.E. \koyi Scheme
S.W. Ikoyi Scheme
Ijora Industrial Estate
Metropolitan Housing Scheme
Ilupeju Estate Scheme
Iganmu Industrial Estate
Oshodi Scheme
Isolo Scheme
I lasamaja Scheme
Matori Scheme
Gbagada Scheme
Ogba Scheme
Shomolu Scheme
Amuwo-Odofin (New Town)
lponri Scheme
Sources: Tabulated from the
1931/32
1933
1933
1933/34
1950/53
1951
1956/58
1955
1958/63
1958
1957/58
1956/57
1959/60
1960/63
1964/65
1965
1966
1972
1972/73
1972/73
1973
1973
1972/73
1973/74
1971/72
10
9.3
7.5
700
1000
70
1463
56
400
120
1600
270
258
376
63
476
166
507
216
300
163
650
551
47.1
2460
87.6
various Annual Reports
10
9.3
7.5
700
678
43
1400
56
400
120
1300
270
258
63
140
140
28
120
200
160
32
819
23.4
of the LEDB/LSDPC.
I-.
Other Use
102
5
300
230
22
63
376
245
166
300
112
97
117
300
280
15
231
32.4
89
M--
167
76
45
46
150
111
1390
31.8
I I
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Notes - Table 4.9
(1) "Other Uses" include roads, recreation and open spaces, and other
urban infrastructural services that require space. Where no separate
figures are given for "Other Uses", the major land use allocations
include spaces for these infrastructural facilities.
(2) The post-1972 figures are for the Lagos State Development and Prop-
erties Company, Ltd. into which the LEDB and a few other agencies
were merged in 1972.
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-This was a radical departure from the purposes for which the Board was
preqted, which were mainly to attain certain acceptable residential and sanitary
(environmental) standards and goals. The shift of emphasis and direction away from
-the purely environmental (sanitary) and residential land activities obviously fostered
(urther deterioration in the housing condition and general urban environmental and
sanitory quality.
The commercial shift nevertheless seemed to have improved the Board's
-finangiol standing, in the sense that it could then of itself finance a relatively
higher proportion of its total annual expenditure than before (Table 4.10), even
though these were financed through small short-term, on-call loans from commercial
baqnks (See Table 4.8). Table 4.10 shows that during each of the first two years
(1960 and 1961), Government lons and grants made up over 75% of the total annual
expenditures of the Board. This dropped to 47% in the third year (1961/62), to 56%
gnd 57% respectively in the fourth and fifth years, and was 62% on the sixth year
(1964/65). Correspondingly, the Board's independent share of its annual expendi-
tures rose from 22% in 1959/60 to 24%, 53%, 44%, and 35% respectively during
1961 through 1965.
With the creation of the Lagos State in 1967, the Board underwent fur-
ther transformation from a Federal Urban Development and Planning Agency with
jurisdiction within the Federal Capital Territory of Lagos alone into a state-wide
urban development agency. This transformation gave the Board a new lease on
life by providing it with an expanded jurisdictional area for its operations. With
this change came also a revolution in its sources and scope of financing. It ac-
quired more authority from the new Lagos State Government to negotiate for more
Table 4.10
Government Sponsored Schemes and the Board's Sponsored Commercial Schemes as a
Executed by the LEDB 1959/60 -- 1964/65
Percentage of the Total Capital Works
1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 19 QA/A
(a) Scheme in which Federal Govt.*
has interest (loans & grants)
amount 2,037,064
(b) % of the Board's Total
Annual Expenditure 78%
2,106,897
75%
HI.
Ta) The Board's Independently
Financed Schemes
(Commercial)+
(b) % of the Board's Total
Annual Expenditure
574,087
22%
661,104
24%
825,677
53%
477,503
44%
1,295,222
43%
915,560
38%
Source: Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Lagos Executive
October 1960 to 31st December 1965. (Federal Ministry of Information,
DevelopmentBoard for the Period 1st,
Printing Division, Lagos, 1968).
* These are direct Federal Government capital projects, which are assigned to the Board to execute as an agent of the
Government. The Board earns its 6%-15% fee (General Development Expenses) from such projects or schemes.
+ The Board's commercial schemes are those projects usually directly or independently financed by the Board which earns
revenue through rents or other periodic charges.' Commercial' here is used in the sense that the particular project was
planned and intended to make profits or at least bring in income.
718,925
47%
616,966 1,706,813
56%
1,505,801
62%
1962/63 1963/64 1964/65
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copious loans than before, and from outside sources, too. The Board also continued
its industrial/commercial orientation which it deemed more profitable, and an easier
means of financing itself. Table 4.11, for example, shows the Board's scheduled
expenditures during the Four Year National Development Plan 1970-74. The Table
confirms the increased emphasis on purely industrial/commercial projects -- constitu-
ting over 50% of the Board's projected t 30.0 million development program during
that period. Item 7 on the Table (Amuo-Odofin New Town Development) with
2,460 acres of area was planned more than one-third industrial/commercial develop-
ment.
Secondly, the Table indicates some revolution in the Board's sources and
scope of financing. From an almost total dependence on Government and Government-
guaranteed sources, the Board had become independent in negotiating bank loans,
private loans, and had begun to derive substantial proceeds from its established
projects, which had by then become mature and revenue-yielding. And with orienta-
tion to industrial/commercial projects, more of the Board's projects became self-
financing. So it can be said that with its shift of orientation and emphasis to in-
dustrial/commercial development, and with the fortuitous event which transformed
it from a city-wide to a state-wide development agency, and had its funding seu rces
and capabilities improved, it can be said that the Board assumed a better financial
shape than hitherto. This in some way, too, meant reduced attention or no attention
at all to non-profit-making projects, including such social ones as low income de-
velopments.
As funding was one of the main instruments of control of the Board by the
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Table 4.11
LEDB: Spending Plan on the Development of Residential and Industrial Estates
Project or Scheme
Total Estimated
Expenditure (t) Method of Financing
1. Adeniran Ogunsanya
Shopping Centre
2. Adeola Odeku Shopping Ctr.
3. Ilupeju Commercial-Community
Residential Scheme
4. 1lupeju & Shomolu
Recreation Centre
5. Falomo Shopping Centre
6. Lagos Central Shopping
Precinct
7. Amuwo-Odofin New Town
Development
8. Victoria Island/Surulere
Housing Scheme
9. Iganmu Industrial Estate
Development
10. Victoria Island Estate
Development
11. Northern Foreshore, Adeniji-
Adele/Okesuna
12. South lganmu Industrial Estate
Central Lagos Planning
Scheme
385,000
300,000
860,000
50,000
720,000
9,000,000
10,000,000
2,000,000
100,000
400,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
500,000
Private loan term account;
guaranteed
Private loan term account,
guaranteed
Self-financing
Self-financing
Private loan long-term
account guaranteed
Private loan long-term
account guaranteed
Bank loan
Bank loan
Private long-term, bank
loan; short term
Private loan, short-term
Private loan, short-term
Proceeds of sale of land already
cleared & developed;
bank loan, short-term,
private long-term
29,315,000TOTAL
Source: Compiled from the Lagos State Government: Four Year Development
Plan 1970-74.
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Government, with its greater leverage for funds, the Board became less directly
controlled by the Government. With this, too, was a tendency to less responsiveness
to popular and social pressures. With its strengthened funding sources, it also meant
that the Board's potential impact on the physical landscape (note items 6 and 7 on
Table 4.11) was becoming more noticeable.
The shift of emphasis from residential to industrial/commercial projects
meant that less of the acquired lands would be devoted to residential plots. And land
owners cannot be given back industrial or commercial plots. The logical deduction
is that more resistance would be encountered in the process of compulsory acquisitions,
as the owner would not expect to get back lands that are acquired for such purposes.
Whereas, therefore, the primary initial objective of the creation of the
LEDB was sanitation to control the outbreak of epidemic or endemic diseases, the
emphasis in its latter years was on housing, industrial, and commercial development
activities. The Board itself was later to acknowledge that, "Housing schemes, re-
garded by most people as the main spine of the Board's activities were in fact by-
products largely brought about by the Rehousing Scheme at Surulere." 4 1 b As was
observed by Baker,
In its latter day form, the LEDB.. .incorporated as an
interim agency with limited functions, became an
ostensibly permanent structure with sweeping powers;
conceived as an urban renewal body to serve the
public, it evolved into an instrument serving higher
authority. Both in form and in function, the LEDB
little resembled in the sixties, the unobtrusive slum
clearance agency it was meant to be when it was
created four decades earlier. 4 1
4 1 Baker, Pauline H: Urbanization & Political Change: The Politics of
Lagos 1917-1967 (University of California Press, 1974), p. 184.
4 1bLEDB: What is the LEDB?, p. 19.
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While the peculiar land tenure and insufficiency of both capital and operating
funds constituted serious difficulties and problems for the Board -- problems that were
external to it, the more serious problems of management quality and skills, ad-
ministrative inefficiency and integrity were internal to the Board, and constituted
a real weak link in its chain of operations. The ways these affected the degree of
success of the Board and the people's perception of the Board will become apparent
from the analysis and discussions of the next three chapters.
SUMMARY
The chapter has attempted to profile the Lagos Executive Development
Board (LEDS). The circumstances which necessitated the establishment of the Board
were discussed, and the background of the housing and general environmental condi-
tions with which the Board had to deal with and which actually were the raison
d'etre of the Board's creation were presented.
It was noted that the British Colonial Administration in Nigeria at the time
wanted to develop Lagos into a prestigious "Capital city of a vast and important
dependency -- a town in which the observant eye will pick to assess at a glance the
results of British Colonial Policy since its inception".
The starting point was the clearance of existing slums, to which the bubonic
plague of 1924/25 was attributed. To achieve this objective, in order to achieve the
general objective of developing Lagos into an enviable capital, it was deemed
necessary that the agency for this development (the LEDB) should have great control
over the disposition of land and its. mode of development in the city. The Board
was therefore given enabling legal powers of compulsory acquisition of land for
these purposes, and also given overriding powers over most other government agencies
operating in the city, including the City Council. In time, the Board came to ab-
sorb the functions of these other agencies, the Lagos Town Planning Commission
having recommended that,
In order that the development of Lagos may be suc-
cessful, it is indispensable that there should be
one Authority responsible for all aspects of that
development, and that Were should be repre-
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sented on that body, all the interests which are
concerned.
But in spite of the lofty intentios of the Government, and in spite of
the overriding legal powers of compulsory acquisition, the Board was seriously
hindered by two formidable problems, namely:
1.) The traditional land tenure situation which made it difficult for the
Board to acquire much of the lands it needed in order to achieve the
goals of its creation, made its operations extraordinarily expensive
by increasing the Board's 'transaction costs'.
2.) The financial weakness of the Board, which prevented it from en-
gaging in as many and as large projects as it would have wanted to
undertake. It inhibited both its ability to directly construct and
develop housing and other facilities as well as its ability to pay
required compensation for pre-empted property or to meet its
general operating expenses and obligations.
The Chapter also traced the general evolution of the Board from a small,
semi-autonomous sanitary and urban planning agency to a giant, almost independent,
state urban development agency, as a result of various events in the history of the
country, and how its focus gradually shifted from a mainly social service institution
to a highly commercialized concern.
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Appendix 4.1
Housing Standards in England
(Used for judging Nigeria's (Lagos') Housing Standards, 1945)
The statutory standard in England aimed at sufficient sleeping accommoda-
tions in a house to secure proper sex separation and adequate floor area per person.
Overcrowding was then defined as the state existing when the number of persons
sleeping in the house either:
(a) Is such that two persons, ten years of age, or more, of
opposite sexes, and not living together as husband and
wife, must sleep in the same room; or
(b) In relation to the number and floor area of the rooms ex-
ceeds the permitted number as set out in Tables I and II.
For this purpose, no account is taken of children under one
year old, children over one and under ten being reckoned
as half a unit.
When a house consists of:
One room..................
Two rooms...................
Three rooms .................
Four rooms ..................
Five or more rooms....... ...
..... 2persons are permitted
...... 3 persons are permitted
........... 5 persons are permitted
.......... 72' persons are permitted
..a. ...... 10 with an additional 2 for
each room over five.
Where the floor area is:
10 sq. feet or more ....................
90 sq. feet or more ....................
70 sq. feet or more ....................
50 sq. feet or more ....................
Under 50 sq. feet ......................
Table I
Table I
2 persons
persons
1 person
2 person
Nil
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Appendix 4 2
Classification of Houses in Lagos Island (Table 4.1)
Explanation of Classification Categories
Type "A" indicates houses in good all-round condition which comply with the ex-
isting building regulations.
Type "B" indicates houses in gIld all-round condition, but requiring major alterations
to bring them up to the standards of existing building regulations.
Type "C" indicates houses constructed of mud and/or bricks which are insanitary
and/or dilapidated.
Type "D" indicates houses constructed of wood, bamboo, and/or corrugated iron
sheets, irrespective of their general conditions.
Vacant Plots are areas properly demarcated with boundary marks and which do not
contain any structures.
CHAPTER FIVE:
LEDB LAND ACQUISITIONS: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES
Chapter Five
LEDB LAND ACQUISITIONS: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES
The last chapter examined and discussed the objectives of the LEDB, and the
circumstances of its creation. It examined the Board's early history and the evolu-
tions in the scope of its functions; its relationships with other government and quasi-
government bodies; its legal powers of compulsory acquisition of lands and the effective-
ness of those powers in the face of traditional land tenure resistance. The chapter also
examined some of the Board's operations, and attempted an analysis of the sources
of the weaknesses on the effectiveness of the Board, which were noted to include:
(i) the nature and characteristics of the traditional culture-bound system of land
tenure (as earlier depicted in Chapter 2) with its traditional indisposition to
free market land transactions and resistance to the Board's taking; (ii) the funding
problems of the Board with all its ramifying implications for the Board's operations,
and (iii) the effects of the perception by the land owners as to what use such lands will
be put when pre-empted from them, or as to who would benefit from the taking.
This chapter examines the actual patterns and processes of land acquisitions
by the LEDB. While it is an extension of the last chapter, it concentrates on the
analysis of the rules and procedures governing the Board's land acquisitions, and to
what extent these help or hinder the operational effectiveness of the Board. It also
examines the question of compensation and their methods of assessments in the pro-
cess of acquisition; the equity of these processes and methods, and how far they af-
fect the effectiveness of the Board, and the confidence of the populace on it.
One of the main postulates of this study Is that the degree of success of public land
ownership and management depends on the form the public ownership and management
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takes and orn the conditions of the exercise of such authority in the process of i4 e
annogement; it also depends on the quality of the personnel involved in the public
4ministration.
This chapter begins the examination and evaluation of the conditions of the
exercise of public (LEDB) authority in the process of its land acquisitions, ownership and
maonagement, as it affects the success of the system. As a corollary, the chapter also re-
flects on the quality of the personnel in the public administration- and management of
surbon lands.
5.1 Modes of Land Acquisition
The Lagos Executive Development Board has general powers to acquire lands,
either by agreement or compulsorily. In addition to these general powers, the Board
is given specific powers (extraordinary powers) of acquisition where extraordinary dif-
fiulties are expected in the process of a given acquisition. The Board's most active
period of land acquisitions was during the 1950-1970 period, during which time about
ten thousand acres of land were acquired in Lagos and its environs. Three major modes
of acquisition have been used in this process:
(i) By Purchase: in which there is mutual agreement between the Board and the
land owners, over both the willingness to sell on the part of the land
owners, and on the price. Only about 700 acres (about 7%) of the area
involved in the series of acquisitions were by this mode.
(ii) By compulsory Acquisition: in which there is no agreement between the
Board and the land owner, either on the willingness to sell or on the
price, and the Board invokes its powers of compulsory acquisition, paying
adequate compensation as required by the law.
(iii) Reclamation: where either due to swamps or other natural causes, a
piece of land is not readily developable, or is only marginally so, the Board
decides to reclaim it, improve and bring it into the market for development.
An examination of LEDB land acquisition projects shows that a large propor-
tion of these involved some partial reclamation. This has been due to
two major factors:
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(a) The inherent physiographical nature of the Lagos region
which is essentially riverine and swampy, and the re-
stricted area of the region both geographically and poli-
tically. *
(b) The degree of potential resistance expected from owners of
such lands against their acquisition. As discussed before,
partly owing to the lack of the money and the technology
to develop them themselves, land owners were expected
to be less relentless in their resistance against LEDB
acquisitions of such swamp or other marginal lands.
Table 5.1 shows the trend and proportion of acquisitions by each of these
modes -- purchase, compulsory, and reclamation. It is pertinent to point out, how-
ever, that many overlaps exist in the mode of acquisitions, particularly between the
compulsory acquisition mode, and reclamation, or even purchase, as all 'taking' is
compulsory by definition.
*Lagos had expanded in area over the years, both by the reclamation of
swamp lands and by jurisdictional extensions of political boundaries. The following
Table shows the trends of these extensions:
Year Area in Square Miles
1871 1.55
1881 1.55
1891 1.55
1911 18.0
1921 20.17
1931 25.51
1950 27.0
1963 27.0
1972 40.0 approx.
The former Western Region Government whose jurisdictional area
was contiguous with the Federal Territory of Lagos, successfully continued to resist
Federal Government's attempts to extend the political boundaries of Lagos until
1967, when the Lagos State was created.
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Table 5.1
The Trend and Modes of LEDB Land Acquisitions 1931-1972
Scheme or Project Year
Total Area
(Acres)
Mode of
Comp.
Purchase Acq.
Acquisition
Reclamation
Oko-Awo
Idumagbo
Isalegangan
Yaba Estate
Apapa Estate
Central Lagos
Lagos Housing
Surulere
S.E. \koyi
Housing Schemes
Rehousing Schemes
Victoria Island
S.W. Ikoyi
ijora Industrial Est.
Metro. Housing
llupeju Estate
Iganmu Industrial Est.
Iponri
Amuwo-Odofin New
Town
Oshodi Scheme
Isolo
I lasamaja
1928/30
1931/32
1933
1933/34
1950/53
1951
1955
1956/58
1957
1958
1958
1958
1960
1960
1965
1965
1966
1966
1971/72
1972
1972
1972
7.5
10
9.3
700.0
1000.0
70.0
56.0
1463.0
270.0
400.0
120.0
1600.0
258.0
376.0
63.0
476.0
166.0
88.0
2460.0
507.0
216.0
300.0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Sources: Calculated and tabulated from the various Annual Reports and Accounts.
Note: The figures for any particular year are approximate, as the process of
acquisition flows from one year into another, and in many cases, a
single acquisition extended over many years.
There are also probabilities of some small double counting.
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Acquisitions by whatever mode, therefore, is not mutually exclusive. As
swamp lands are owned by individuals and families as well, the acquisition of such
lands often involved both processes of compulsory acquisition and reclamation. One
thing is clear from Table 5.1, however, and that is that most of the acquisitions
(over 90%) were compulsory, even those involving reclamation, which in the
socio-cultural climate of the context is not unexpected.
Relatively very small proportion was by purchase as such, even though the
context of the "sales" and "purchases" were compulsory by implication. The first
three projects on the table were carried out under the arrangement whereby the LEDB
returned 80% of the original land to the owners, after renewal and servicing. So
that these, though compulsory, could also be said to have been by agreement be-
tween the Board and the land owners. This arrangement was very profitable to the
land owners, and they were willing to release their lands to the Board under this
formula -- regarding the Board as "layer of the golden egg". However, the Board
did not find the formula profitable to itself and so, soon abandoned it after 1935.
It is inferred that opposition to its acquisitions hardened up once more, with this
change in policy, as evidenced by later events discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3).
Considering the nature of the land tenure and the attachment to it and the
significance of land in the society as depicted in Chapter 2, the disproportionate
number of compulsory acquisitions is not unexpected, as has already been discussed
in previous chapters.
One of the major features of LEDB's land acquisition activities was that ac-
quisitions were project-based. That is to say, lands were acquired for specific proj-
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octs, and lands were not acquired until and unless a project had been conceived and
designed. There were, therefore, no attempts at 'land banking'. The result was an
uncoordinated sporadic manner of land acquisition. This pattern was followed in
spite of the fact that its enabling legislation empowered it to acquire land for a
scheme or other purposes and well in advance of the time it actually needed the land.
But the land tenure situation and the consequent problems involved in the acquisitions
were such that the troubles were considered not worth taking unless it was really
necessary -- that is, unless an important project is planned. The result of the sporadic
pattem of acquisitions was that its activities were without the advantages often as-
sociated with advanced public purchases of urban land or urban land banks (control
of land prices and land values, or even rationalizing of land use development in the
city). Because of this pattem of acquisition, the decision as to what mode of ac-
quisition to employ in a given case depended on three main factors:
(i) The need or purpose or type of project for which a particular piece
of land is needed. If it were an urban renewal project, it involved
displacing people and activities, and most people to be affected
would not willingly sell or otherwise dispose of their land or houses
or their business activities. In such cases, the only option for the
Board was the compulsory acquisition mode. This was the case in the
Central Lagos Planning Scheme (1951), the Victoria Island acquisitions
(1958), and the Ikoyi acquisitions (1960) among others.
(ii) The location of the proposed project or scheme. A project that is
place- or area-specific does not offer flexibility for alternatives of
sites or location choices. In such cases, the locations are relatively
defined and land for them must then be acquired in the area even if
it entails compulsory acquisition and condemnation. But if the
project location is relatively foot-loose, that is, that it could be lo-
cated in any part of the city or metropolitan area and still serve its
purpose and its desired target group, then there is flexibility in
negotiating for altemative sites, and the options of acquisition by
purchase, compulsory, and reclamation would be open.
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/iii) if the costs of delays or expected delays to be occasioned by law
suits, compensations, and resettlement processes for a given site are
considered too high or higher than the costs in money and time of
reclaiming a hitherto unusable land (swamps and water-logged land,
etc.), then acquisition by reclamation is likely. In fact, it could
be conjectured that the relatively high proportion of acquisitions in-
volving part reclamation (Table 5.1) are explained by the difficulties
and delays involved in the compulsory acquisition of ready usable
lands or occupied land from their owners. Though reclamation is a
more expensive mode of land acquisition (in terms of money costs in-
volved), it is easier to handle in human terms, as resistance and delays
occasioned by them are minimal. It was not often likely that the
owners would in many cases have the financial resources to reclaim
their swamp lands themselves, and that naturally would restrain their
opposition to the acquisition of such lands.
However, in most of the cases, the LEDB assumed (and rightly so) that owners
would not willingly part with their lands, and proceeded from the start to acquire the
lands compulsorily. It did not therefore often go through the sequential process of
first trying to induce a willing sale before invoking its compulsory acquisition powers.
Even willing sale, as has been pointed out, required pro forma condemnation, anyway.
5.2 The Process of Land Acquisition
Before it acquires any land, the Board is required by law to publish a notice,
including at least one in the Official Government Gazette, stating: (a) the fact that
a scheme or project has been prepared for the given area; (b) the boundaries of the
area comprised in the scheme; (c) the place or places at which a copy of the scheme
or plans of the area, and a statement of the land which is proposed to acquire or
such particulars as the Authority may deem necessary, may be seen at reasonable hours;
(d) such a notice (together with the plans for the scheme) shall be deposited as desig-
noted in paragraph (c) above, for a period of fourteen days, during which period the
scheme and plans shall be ope> to the inspection of all persons interested. This is
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to insure that all those who might have an interest or estate in the lands to be ac-
quirea have good opportunity of access to such information, and therefore had the
opportunity to take steps to protect or safeguard such interests by applying for compen-
sotion due them; (e) the LEDB is also required within one mort h of the publication
of such notice to specifically bring to the notice of every affected owner of property
in the scheme area the fact that his or her property is affected and be required to
lodge with the Board a statement of his rights or interest, and of the evidence thereof,
and of any claim made by him in respect of such right or interest. This explicit pro-
vision is to ensure that people's property is not pre-empted without their knowledge.
The Board's notice is required to clearly warn that lands in respect of which no state-
ment is received are liable to be dealt with as unoccupied lands, in which case no
compensation would be awarded.I
Section 45 of the Ordinance 2 requires that:
The land to be acquired shall vest in the Board upon
service of a notice by the Board on the owner that
such land is required by the Board. All leases and
rights of occupancy under any tenancy in respect of
such land or building which are existing at the time
of the notification shall be deemed to be terminated
if not previously terminated by agreement at the
time of the service of the notice, but without pre-
judice to any leasees or occupiers rights in any
compensation payable under Section 41 or 49 of
the Ordinance.
Provisions had also been made in the enabling legislation to ensure that the
Board is not deliberately or unreasonably held up or obstructed by land owners, to the
IPublic Lands Acquisition Ordinance, 1917.
2 Lcagos Town Planning Act, Cap. 95 of 1958, Part VI, Section 45 (Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, Vol. Vill, 1958).
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effect of waiving for the Authority any requirements and conditions that would other-
wise ordinarily be entertained in other land transactions. But in spite of these pro-
visions, and in spite of the fact that many provisions are designed to ensure that the
Board gets the lands it requires, the evidence (as presented in Chapter 4) is that
there is a wide gap between the theoretical provisions of enabling laws and the
practical effectiveness of the implementation and realization of the intents of such
laws. The LEDB or any other Government agency still experiences
as much difficulty (if not more than) as ordinary private individuals in attempts to
acquire land in Lagos.
The Lagos Central Planning Scheme Acquisition and the Apapa Acquisitions,
among others, are some of the evidences of this.
Besides the problem of the people's resistance to a taking, the other major problems
in public land acquisition are the costs involved in the process and the problem of com-
pensation. The Second National Development Plan 3 confirmed, for example, that,
Although there is an enabling legislation for purposes
of compulsory acquisition of land for public use, the
compensation claimed and paid by Government hither-
to have generally been much higher than the true
opportunity cost of land. The historical upward
trend in land prices has been introduced mainly
through the activities of land speculators in the
urban areas, especially for government-sponsored
projects. Consequently, some of the projects
established on such land were over capitalised
right from the start thus prejudicing their economic
viability.
While this statement is of general application, however, substantial undervaluation and under-
compensation take place in LEDB land acquisition processes.
3 Federation of Nigeria: Second National Development Plan 1970-74 (p. 219).
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In fact, it is shown by the cases on Table 5.4 that the LEDB generally pays less than
4
what the particular piece of land is worth at market value. Although it is general-
ly true that land prices are jacked up by owners where the LEDB or any other public
agency is involved in an acquisition, it does not necessarily follow, as the above
Development Plan statement implies, that all the costs attributed to compensation in
Government accounting were paid to the land owners. That is to say, the high costs
to the Government did not necessarily mean equivalent high prices or revenues to
the land owners. A substantial portion of these "high costs" to the Government in
land acquisition processes actually went to the various "fees," high overheads, and
other 'extraneous' costs -- costs that are invariably attributed to compensation pro-
cesses and payments, but which do not necessarily accrue to the landowners, as such.
That land prices are raised high where public or LEDB acquisition is involved
is exemplified by the acquisition of land for the Lagos Island Master Plan, and the
comments of the Hoskyns-Abrahall Report in that respect. The Plan was prepared by the
LEDB in 1945, and cost t 4.0 million to implement. This amount only included land
acquisition, engineering works, water, and street lighting. Out of the t 4.0 million,
nearly t 2.75 million (69%) was for land acquisition alone (involving a net area of
about 8 square miles), and only a little over t 1 .0 million left for engineering works
and services over this period. The cost of this land was that high because of the
escalating of the land prices by owners and their agents for the simple reason that it
was a Government acquisition. The Hoskyns-Abrahall Report 5impugned to this effect
4 lt is also likely that the reverse could be true in some cases, depending on the
circumstances, and who the persons involved are, and sometimes on the personal in-
terests of the officials doing the valuation and negotiations on behalf of the Board (see
also next page, for example).
5 T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit., p. 20.
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that,
.the figure for land acquisition is capable of
considerable reduction. It seems quite wrong that a
plan for improving and modemizing Lagos for the
ultimate benefit of the people should be vitiated
because of the disproportionate sums to be paid in
compensation to landlords, many of whom have for
yedrs been making money by charging excessive
rents and have done little or nothing to improve
their property. In other words, it is surely axiomatic
that the needs of the community as a whole must
prevail over the interests of the minority: Lagos
must not remain in a slum simply because Govern-
ment cannot afford to buy out the slum lords.
But such has always been the hopes and nitentions of public policy -- hopes
that sometimes have little relation to the real world's situation in which the average
citizen's (including those of the Government's own servants) perception of the Gov-
emment is that of an infinitely rich entity, which also is the equal property of every
citizen. The prevailing attitude, then, is that of exacting whatever an individual
can from such on entity. Often all these amounts are not paid for the plots of land
per se. Lawyers', agents', and other extraneous fees often take a substantial pro-
portion of the so-called cost or price of the land. It could be hypothesized, on the
other hand, that many of these high prices or extraordinarily high compensation de-
mands on the part of the land owners are not made for the money per se, but rather
employed with a view to possible scaring away of the Government from the acquisi-
tion. This is further explored in Section 5.4. This notwithstanding, however, the
officials bargaining on behalf of the Government apparently often display the same
blase-attitudes towards Government's interests as do the land owners, and show no urge
to bargain as astutely as they would for their personal businesses. To many
such officials, Government business is nobody's business.
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At times, for example, some compensation assessments were unnecessarily
inflated on selfish consideration. There were such cases, for example, where com-
pensation was initially assessed at t 11 ,575, but for some unexplained reason, the
compensation was later revised upwards to t 21,000,6 an increase of about 82%
7
over the initial amount assessed. The LEDB Tribunal of Inquiry Report regretted
in this regard that, "It is a pity, however, that there were cases where the amount
involved was unnecessarily inflated (e.g., t 11 ,575 increased to t 21 ,000)."
The reverse of such a situation was also possible, depending on the circumstances.
The levity and lack of a sense of mission with which the Board officials treat
"Government" (public) business (Board operations) is further underscored by the
Report of the Tribunal, which observed that,
.. We have at the same time tried to point out those sources
of income which have either not been fully exploited or not
exploited at all. We consider that the failure of the Board
in this respect is attributable to the sluggishness or the
ineptitude of some of the officials of the Board who manifest
culpable indifference in their handling of the Board's financial
affairs. Surprisingly, these officers show very keen business
acumen in the execution of their own private affairs...
Their lapses in the conduct of the Board's financial affairs
can therefore be traceable to the fact that they give more
attention to their personal ventures than they give to those
of the Board. (emphasis mine)
6 Report of the LEDB Tribunal of Inquiry, pp. 119-120.
7
Ibid., p. 5.
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The point being made, therefore, is that the enabling legislation, although it forns
the basis of the Board's existence and operation, is often less effective in the critical areas
of facilitating land acquisition, because of the human and culture-bound factors at
play. These human (including management competence) factors are more powerful in
determining what actually happens in practice. This fact and the constraints of
the land tenure situation are not, however, peculiar to the LEDB,
but pervades the society as a whole, and plagues most other government agencies. All
Government agencies, for example, still complain of,
... disputed and complicated claims, w hich combine with
congested cause lists in the courts to drag out compulsory
acquisitions over many months or even years, while a
great deal of work may go into assessing the suitability
and cost of proposals which are later abandoned. 8
And in spite of the overriding legal enabling powers of compulsory acqui-
sition, the Government's review of all development programs in the 1970-1974 Development
Plan concluded that,
Virtually all public agencies have cited difficulties in
land acquisition as the most intractable factor which
delayed the implementation of their development
projects and schemes durin the Second National
Development Plan period.
Although a greater part of the delays referred to result from the inherent
nature of the land tenure (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4), and its traditional re-
luctance to sell or permanently part with land, a substantial proportion of the delays
arise also from compensation assessment disputes between the Board and the land
8Annual Report of the Federal Land Department, 1954.
9 Federation of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, Vol.
I, p. 37 (Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development,
Lagos, 1975).
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owners, even if the compensation disputes on the part of land owners might some,
times be pretexts for refusal to sell their lands. The next section examines the pro-
cesses, criteria, and problems of these compensation assessments.
5.3 Problems of Compensation Assessment and Payment.
Tracing the right title to land and all the interests on a plot of land, as
required by law, is a very expensive process. It has been pointed out that even a
public agency with powers of compulsory acquisition does not find the land acquisition
process any easier. In addition to overcoming the resistance of the people to the
acquisitions per se, it has also tolocate all members of all the families who have
interest on the land to be acquired and pay due compensation to each such member.
This is by no means an easy process. In the LEDB acquisition of land for the Lagos
Central Planning Scheme, for example, it was observed that,
By far the most difficult problem in connection with the
payment of compensation is the tracing of the rightful
owners of the land. Since the majority of the buildings
in the scheme area are on family land, the root of
title is normally Crown Grant made after the treaty. 10
Since then, the land has devolved through the customary rules of inheritance to
children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, none of whom can normally pro-
duce any evidence of title other than Original Crown Grants and a Statutory Declara-
11tion of interest made before the Commissioner for Oaths. Consequently, there are
11
"Planning Lagos: Central Scheme Progress", in Commerce in Nigeria,
Vol. 6, 1964, p. 29.
10The Treaty in reference is the so-called "Treaty of Cession" , by which the
reigning King (Docemo) of Lagos was purported to have ceded the Territory of Lagos
to the British Crown in 1861/62.
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serious problems of ascertaining who holds the genuine titles. In addition to this
particular scheme, the Lagos Executive Development Board has also undertaken many
other urban land acquisitions and housing schemes in the city and around it. Table
5.2 shows the number of claimants of interests in the title of the lands acquired in
each scheme.
For the 22 projects of 1,180 acres in areal size, 2,500 claims were made
and these have to be investigated and the genuineness of the titles and interests as-
certained before negotiations for compensation payments could be initiated. In
Table 5.2, joint claims by many people are recorded as one claim. Comparison
of the size of the area involved with the number of claimants shows a relatively very
small size of land per claimant, which can be ascribed to the family group pattern of
ownership. "In all cases of acquisition of land," reports the Federal Land Department,
"great difficulty is experienced in establishing the persons entitled to compensations,
and most of such cases have to be referred to the Supreme Court for decision." 1 2
The facts of this problem were further underscored by Reports of the LEDB which ex-
plained that, "Where clear title is readily available, compensation for land acquired
is paid instantly, but in the majority of cases where titles conflict, this is required to
be settled in court before the Board can make its compensation award.,,13 It is then
not surprising that the LEDB has to contend with numerous Court suits in connection
with those claiming interests in lands it acquired, or who are left out of a compensa-
tion paid. Many of the suits also result from outright unwillingness to sell or release land
12 Annual Report of the Federal Land and Survey Department, 1946/47, p. 1.
1 3
LEDB; Annual Reports and Accounts for the Year 1955/56, p. 22.,
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TABLE 5.2
Acquisitions and Claims for
Area
Compensation
in Acres No. of Claimants
1, Rehousing Scheme No. 1
2, Lagos Housing Scheme
3. Link Road Area
4, National Stadium
5. Mainland Hosp. Access Rd.
6, Rehousing Scheme No. 2
7, Rehousing Scheme No. 2
Phase 1 Ext.
8, Freehold Housing Scheme No.
9, Freehold Housing Scheme No.
5, Ext. 1
10, Freehold Housing Scheme No.
5, Ext. 2
11, Freehold Housing Scheme No.
5, Ext. 3
12, Low Density Housing Scheme
13, Light Ind. Sites
14. Animashaun Dev.
15, Randle Avenue Dev.
16. Metro. Housing Scheme
17, South Surulere (Phase 1)
18, South Surulere (Phase 11)
19. lganmu Ind. Estate
20. Freehold Housing (Iponri)
21. Shopping Site Odejayi Cresc.
22. Shopping Site Nathan St.
Scheme
108
56
78
117
282
431
49
94
52
138
17
272
107
5
236.60
2 +
21
83
45
11
109
352
25
190
155
+
19
16
12.0
10.56
63
180
165.60
107
1.508
1.0
+: Claims were still being received at the time the above record was compiled.
Source: Lagos Executive Development Board. Annual Reports and Account 1965-66.
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to the Government or to the Board, and are therefore suits attempting to restrain
the Board from acquisitions completely. Table 5.3 shows the trend of such Court
suits from 1957 to 1962.
Table 5.3
Suits Against LEDB Land Acquisitions 1957/58-1962/63*
No. Suits No. Settled
Year During Yr. During Yr. Balance
1957 426 334 92
1958 822 730 152
1959 472 351 121
1960 284 262 22
1961 290 168 122
1962 142 122 20
These averaged some 400 suits every year during the peak period of the Board's
land acquisitions. In the Lagos Central Planning Project, for example, a total
compensation of t 3,325,851 ($10,110,587) for the 70 acres of land had been paid
up to 1964. And all the claims had not been settled. This worked out at t 47,512
($144,440) per acre. These had not included resettlement and rehousing costs for the
displaced residents. Though this was a Central Business District area, and a built-up
area, too, this cost was not due so much to the high per unit cost of property as to
the number of claimants that had to be paid. The amount of compensation paid, for
example, varied from only a few pounds to t 70,000 per person or family. 30% of
the payments were amounts of less than t 1,000 ($3,040), while the majority of pay-
ments were around t 2,500 ($7,600).14
14
"Planning Lagos: Central Scheme Progress", op. cit., pp. 29-31.
* Source: Respective years of the Annual Reports of the Board.
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Besides, therefore, the cultural values attached to land and the consequent
reluctance to sell or permanently part with land, the next most serious factors that
cause the difficulties and delays in the Board's acquisition of lands is the determina-
tion of land ownerships and the assessment of compensation and/or the manner of the
Board's disposition or distribution of the land after it had acquired and serviced these
lands. Generally, the Board is required by law to pay adequate compensation for
any lands that it acquired. But the manner of assessment of "adequate" compensation
that satisfied both sides have been a bone of contention whenever the occasion arises.
The Board had had to encounter stiff opposition in acquisitions, particularly so where
the acquisition involves urban renewal -- which involves destruction and demolition
of people's homes, as in parts of the Lagos Central Planning Scheme. The Board over
the years had tried different arrangements to accommodate the opposition of those
people whose lands and possibly houses had to be acquired. Three different arrange-
ments have been tried as follows:
(1) In the early period of the Board (1928-1935) when it was more pre-
occupied with slum clearance projec ts, the Board in order to contain
the strong opposition of the people against its land acquisition, evolved
an arrangement whereby it offered back to the people affected, land
equivalent in area to 80% of their original holding. The remaining
20% was assumed to have been taken up by the infrastructural facilities
and services -- roads, drains, sewers, electricity, and water installations.
Moreover, it was calculated that the greatly increased value conse-
quent on the renewal and/or servicing, adequately compensated for the
lost 20% of the land. This arrangement was generally accepted by the
people, as with its introduction and use, it was reported that opposition
to LEDB acquisitions died rapidly. With the increased value of the
land due to the Board's servicing, the "Board was looked on as the layer
of the golden egg".
While this arrangement appeared satisfactory to the land owners, how-
ever, the Board was not satisfied with it, and so introduced another
policy to replace it.
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15
%2) The Principle of "Value for Value". Later on, when the Board felt
that opposition to its land acquisitions was dead and that the people
had begun to appreciate the benefits of quality environment, it intro-
duced the principle of "value for value". Under this arrangement, a
land owner could either sell his land our right to the Board, or in place
of cash or outright sale, he could receive freehold improved land to the
cash value of the unimproved land from which he had been parted. An
obvious problem here was that in some cases, the "equivalent value"
improved land was very small relative to the unimproved land that it
was being exchanged for, and sometimes not even large enough to
accommodate an acceptable plot. The risk to the land owners in this
arrangement was considered very high as the amount of land he would
get in return depended on the Board's improvement costs, which can be
quite high, and relatively indeterminate beforehand, that is, before
the improvements are completed. It also proved very complicated to
administer in practice. It was, for example, in part tried in the
Central Lagos Clearance Scheme and the S.W. Ikoyi Land Scheme,
but proved politically complicated. With the introduction of this
policy, opposition to the Board's land acquisition exercises intensified
once again. It proved completely unacceptable to the people because
it was apparently making "cheap land" very expensive, and at the
expense of the land owners.
(3) A modification of the Board's first arrangement (80% of the land back to
the owner) was tried in the middle to the early 1960's, particularly with
the Central Lagos Clearance Project. In this arrangement, the Board
agreed to sell back plots of land to the original owners at 120/o of the
cost of renewal, improvements and servicing. This strategy proved much
less effective, as with the cost of improvements obviously very high,
many of the original owners could not afford to buy back their land
at 120% of the improvements cost, and were therefore permanently
displaced and lost their lands. A subsequent study by the Board itself
established that only 34% of compensation paid out to various people
exceeded the amount of down payment required for a plot of land in
the redeveloped areas. 16 Property, for example, which "comprised a house
with twelve rooms and five trading shops and of concrete walls with
an area of 288 square yards was acquired by the Board for t 3010, while
a lesser area of 255 square yards was allocated to the original owner for
t 32121.17 While the reasons for this is understandable, the effects
15 See the Lagos Local Government Act, Cap. 93, Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria and Lagos (1958, Vol. IV., s. 160 (1).
16LEDB: A Review of the Lagos Central Planning Scheme (Mimeo, January 1959).
17
Association of Residents of Central Lagos (cited in Aribia, 0.: "Social
Aspects of Urban Rehousing in Lagos", Lagos Notes and Records, Vol. III, No. 2,
January 1972, p. 45.
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on the accessibility of urban land to the low income land owners in-
volved is very evident. Ir. contrast to the first type of arrangement
in which all cash costs were internalized by the LEDB, the land
owners had to bear all the costs in this third option, in addition to
the fact that in no way could any land owner hope to get back 100%
of his original land. On its part, the Board over-promised, but was in
no position to offer back land to all the original owners involved, given
what it had planned to do with the land cleared. It could be said,
however, that this third option of 120% cost re-ptrchase was peculiar
and specific to renewal or redevelopment projects and was not planned
to be applied to ordinary land acquisitions. What is important, however,
is the failure of the strategy and the reasons for that failure.
Each of these three arrangements tried was abandoned in each case, either
because it proved unacceptable to the Board, or because it proved unacceptable to
the people.
The Board, however, continued with the general compensation processes and
procedures as provided for in the Act creating it and in the Public Lands Acquisition
Ordinance. As has already been pointed out, the LEDB is required to pay compensa-
tion to the land owners that is equal to the "fair market value" of the land affected.
The general procedure is usually for the LEDB to make an offer of an amount of com-
pensation to the land owner, based upon an assessment made by its own Valuation
Officers. The law stipulates that, if for six weeks after the service of a notice under
the scheme, no objection to the offer made in such notice shall have been lodged
with the Board, the amount specified in such offer shall be paid forthwith to the
owner in full discharge of any claim for compensation. If the amount is accepted by
the land owner, the matter rests. The amount of compensation therefore depends in
the first instance upon agreement between the acquiring Authority (the LEDB) and
the persons entitled to the compensation (the land owners).
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If, however, the offer by the Board is not accepted by an owner, and agree-'
ment between them cannot be reached after a series of negotiations, recourse is had
to the Court by either party, often by means of a summons. The Court then deter-
mines what the equitable compensation should be, on the basis of the "fair market
value" of the land. This value is supposed to take into consideration "the value of
the land, estate, interest or profits which such land if sold in an open market by a
willing seller to a willing buyer, is expected to realise."18 This process does not
recognize any emotional or sentimental values placed on land, values which in this
particular context are valued higher than the "fair market value".
The role of the Court, however, is to determine in each case what this
"fair market value" is. Not unexpectedly, the interpretations and determinations
have differed with individual judges and individual cases. One Judge noted that,
"Compensation means something more than the 'fair market value'. It is basically
the value in money to the expropriated owner which will recompense him for what he
has lost." 19 But how to determine this value of what he has lost, especially the in-
tangible and psychic ones, remains the crux of the problem. In a society, too, in
which land transactions are not "commercialized", or "monetized" as such, this de-
termination is obviously a difficult one to make. The situation is not helped by the
activities of lawyers and professional valuers rendering unsolicited advice to affected
land owners, advice that invariably includes their own professional fees in the amount
of compensation demanded by the land owner.
18 Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance, 1917.
19Bennett, J. in Chairman, LEDB v. Olopinkwu. Justice Bennett was quoting
an English precedent and dictum. (cited in Umeh, J.A., "Compulsory Acquisition of
Land and Compensation in Nigeria" (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1973).
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Nevertheless, the Courts, in determining the amount of compensation to
award in any particular case, take into consideration a number of factors. These
include:
(1) The assessment made by LEDB Valuation Officers;
(2) The amount demanded by the land owners or the assessment made by the
Valuation Officers hired by the land owners;
(3) The assessment of the Court appointed Valuation experts, if any were
appointed. Often the Court appoints its own independent valuation
officers and compares the three sets of valuations in deciding on the
final compensation figure to award;
(4) The price paid by the owner for the land, if he ever bought it;
(5) The price at which the owner had sold land forming part of an area
compulsorily acquired (if there had been any such sales);
(6) The price at which land has sold generally in the locality;
(7) The rate at which compensation has been paid for lands acquired in the
locality;
(8) The value of any rent payable in respect of the land.
The weight attached to any of the above factors in determining the amount
of compensation depends on the particular circumstances and on the evidence before
the Court.
The weakness of these factors, however, in determining the "fair market value"
is that they mix basically contradictory concepts in measuring this value. It had been
pointed out that transactions in land are largely intra-group, and that the basis for
fixing prices for this intra-group transaction is not the "commercial market value".
Land in the society has special significance rooted in values that transcend immediate
economic considerations. Many interrelational transactions are consummated at below
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"market rates". The implication of this is that consideration of factors 4-6 above
does not reflect the "fair market value" of the land, but the non-market value on
which the intra-group transactions are based. If it also happens that a precedent
compensation paid in a given locality was on the basis of 4-6 above, it vould also
mean that a determination based on factor 7 above -- "the rate at which compensa-
tion has been paid for lands acquired in the locality", does not reflect the "fair
market value" either.
On the other hand, the assessment by professional valuation officers is
based on modem and purely commercial or economic factors and considerations as
(i) location in relation to access to economic activities and public facilities; (ii)
"good will" in the case of commercial land uses or locations; (iii) income foregone
by relocation including both social and money income; (iv) the costs and difficulties
of setting up in a different location,if displacement is involved. Given the impli-
cations of all these factors, the determination of the amount of compensation cannot
but be considered a subjective exercise after all.
The LEDB, however, has tried to streamline its compensation assessment rules
and conditions. These were aimed at tightening up some of the above factors and
conditions, and systematizing the mechanisms for its acquisition and compensation.
These streamlines include: 2 0
(1) That estimates of the value of such lands or interests be based upon the
"fair market value", as estimated at the time when the scheme for
acquisition was published, or if a later date shall have been appointed
in relation to that scheme at a later date, due regard be had to the
nature and conditions of the property, the probable duration of the
buildings in their existing state, and to the state of repair thereoF with-
out any additional allowance in respect of the acquisition beirioj
2 0 Lagos Town Planning Act, Chapter 95 (1958).
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compulsory. This clause is meant to ensure that increment in Ind
values as a result of its public acquisition does not go to the land
owner who supposedly had done nothing to earn such an increment
in value.
(2) Award no compensation on account of any building erected on,
improvements, additions or other things done to the land after the
publication of the scheme, unless such additions or improvements
were necessary for the maintenance of any building in a proper state
of repair. This provision obviously was designed to check specula-
tion and excessive claims by property owners and speculative buying
and development by speculators.
(3) Disregard so much of the increase or de crease in the value of which
arises from suchland falling within or near to the alignment of a
projected public street. This was to ensure that individuals did not
unnecessarily benefit or lose from rises in values consequent on
public investment location.
(4) Ignore such increase in the value of land as is due to any improve-
ments made by the owner or his predecessors in title within two
years before the publication of the scheme for acquisition, if it
is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the improvement was
made in contemplation or anticipation of proceedings for the acqui-
sition of the land being taken under the acquisition Ordinance.
(5) When part only of the land is taken, the Agency may award additional
compensation in respect of the depreciation of the remainder con-
sequent on the severance.
Most of these streamlining provisions were aimed at preventing speculations from the
Board's actions and unduly profiting from such actions by private speculators.
On the other hand, these streamlining-of-compensation determining rules
and conditions, led to the Board's generally undervaluing the compensation due for
acquired lands in a good many cases. While it makes some sense to ignore and dis-
count land values or prices arising from land speculation when assessing compensation pay-
ments, to assess a piece of land for far less than what the owner paid for it a number
of years back is to go to the other unfair extreme. Table 5.4, for example, shows
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the disparities between the valuation of the Board's officers in three given cases.and
what the owners had paid for such lands when they bought or leased same. And this
in many cases were many years after these lands were bought, which implies that
these lands must have appreciated in values.
Table 5.4
The Divergences Between LEDB Compensation Assessments and the True Value of the Land
Assessment Price paid by Owner for the Land
Case by LEDB When Bought Originally
Chairman, LEDB v. Olopinkwu21 1.5s 3.125s
Chairman, LEDB v. Soleye22  t 35.625 165.0
Chairman, LEDB v. Williams23  t 34.0 t 55.0
(All are in prices of land per square yard)
Still, the Board's valuations are that low -- in each case only about half the
price that was paid for the land by the owners. The margin of the differences are too
wide to be attributed to random effects or errors.
The Courts, however, often rejected the Board's valuations where no satis-
factory evidence was led to show how the valuations were arrived at, and often held
that, "The price at which the purchasers bought their lands must outweigh the opinion,
however experienced, of the Land Department as to its actual value", reasoning that,
2 1L.L.R. 25; (1958); 4. Federal Supreme Court 53 (1959).
22(1950) 19, Nigerian Law Review, 71.
23(1963) 1, All Nigerian Law Review 267.
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"Unless the owner had paid a high price due to over-anxiety, the price at which he
bought is a better guide of its market value, since willing sellers do not normally want
to sell at a price below what they paid."
The Courts, however, often stopped there -- at what the owner paid for the
land when he bought it, and overlooked whatever was the value of the land at the
material moment, that is, ignoring whatever might be the appreciation in the value
of the land between the time the land was bought and when these consideratiorn for
compensation were taking place -- that is, the actual "fair market value". And at
this, it was probable that what the land owner got was not the "fair market value"
of the land, as stipulated by the laws, and defined by Court precedents. The values,
even assuming the unlikely case of their not having appreciated over the given time
interval, are not likely to have depreciated either, and so any assessments below
the original purchase price may understandably not have been a "fair deal".
The LEDB Tribunal of Inquiry observed in this respect that, "The present
(LEDB)Valuers profess to be more meticulous but appear to be conservative" (emphasis
mine), and went on further to point out that,
There were complaints of the discourtesies meted out
to owners of property or their agents. It is essential
that the staff of the LEDB should regard the Board as
a 'purchaser' and should treat claimants (land owners)
as purchasers would treat vendors. It is sufficient
penalty that the property of a citizen is compulsorily
acquired, leading sometirres to his means of live-
lihood being stopped. Money cannot sometimes
adequately compensate for the value of his property.
The claimant must be treated with sympathy and
understanding, and at all times be made to feel
that a fair compensation was being bargained.
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The whole method of approach to claimants by the 24Estate Department of the LEDB needs to be revised.
(emphasis mine)
While, therefore, the processes and procedures for land acquisition and
compensation by the LEDB were clearly and systematically set out in the laws govern-
ing it, the practical effectiveness of these processes and procedures were impaired by
the difficulties of objectively applying and translating them into practice.
The undervaluations in the Board's assessments are very difficult to under-
stand. But various explanations are possible. One is that, "Valuation is basically
a subjective exercise, an imprecise science, and the fact that valuation officials are
influenced by many other extraneous factors, many of them unrelated to the land or its
value per se". Or it could be as had been observed by one Appeals Court Judge
that, ". .. from experience, it is almost always a case of the owner asking too much
25
rather than the valuer giving too little", but the reverse seems to have been the
case, in the instances cited in Table 5.4. There have been cases, on the other hand,
where (owing perhaps to some unexplained extraneous factors already referred to)
the assessed value of given plots of land get inexplicably inflated (re: t 11,575 in-
creased to L 21,000).26
24 Federal Republic of Nigeria: Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the
Affairs of the Lagos Executive Development Board, 1966, p. 5.
25 Nwabueze, op. cit., p. 231.
26It is therefore possible and likely that the Board sometimes pays less and
sometimes pays more, depending on the circumstances and who the persons are that it
is dealing with. But because it is those that are paid less than what they consider fair
or that get aggrieved and go to Court from whence these data become more easily
available. For those that get more or get what they deem their due, there are no
grievances and therefore no recourse to Courts, and their data and information re-
main in confidential files of the Board, and therefore are not available.
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The subjectivity of determination of .the amount of compensation paid in
many cases is evidenced by the remarks of the Judge in one such case to the effect
that, "In such a state of things, any amount fixed by the Court as payable by a
claimant must be arbitrary assessment". 27
It has been pointed out that the "fair market value" of land compulsorily
acquired is determined as of the date of the service on the owner of notice of intention
to acquire. No regard is had to any appreciation in value resulting from any improve-
ment or works resulting from any improvements or works constructed on the land after
that date. This is ostensibly to ensure that the increment in value as a result of such
a public exercise accrues to the "public" and not to the individual private owner
who supposedly had done nothing to merit and earn such increments. On the other
hand, it is possible to argue that with its implicit assumptions of the willing seller,
compulsory acquisition obscures the equity, satisfaction and aspiration connected
with ownership or interest by denying them the full money value in the assessment
rhetoric of "fair market value". Moreover, the Courts would usually only interpret
and apply the law, and therefore often would not allow anything above what the law
prescribes, which goes to imply that a claim to compensation to offset a redistributive
change in resource use, is usually dismissed simply by asserting that the particular
redistribution having been determined upon by the law, must necessarily be deemed
just. Even the Courts have held that, "The rental value should not be the basis of
computing compensation for property in an urban centre like Lagos because in such
congested places, the rents charged are out of proportion to the capital value of the
2 7 Chairman, LEDB v. Williams.
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property." 8
Furthermore, when land is acquired by the LEDB, its owner is compensated
according to the "fair market value" of the property (however determined by the
particular judge in any particular case), but neither are "tenants only" generd ly
entitled to anything, nor are owner-occupiers (in cases involving residential build-
ings) compensated for the disruptive effects of changing neighborhoods and sinking
new roots, or even in the case of uprooted businesses, for good will destroyed, or for
the cash outlay entailed in moving. No attempt is made to recognize by monetary
payment the sentimental or psychic injury, or the loss of valued society, or the
inconvenience and annoyance which a forced move or forced disposses sion may oc-
casion. It has been rightly observed in an analogous circumstance that,
A planner or public official accustomed to transferring
all responsibility for the fairness of his decisions to the
judiciary, will fail to take into account the significant
costs entailed in displacements or dislocations - that
being the demoralization cost, or sense of injustice
remaining after the court has exerted its inadequate
even if maximum effort to secure the payment of
"just compensation".29
But it is the duty of planners and public officials to take such costs into
account.
In determining the boundaries of a proposed public im-
provement, the head of a Federal Agency concerned
should take into account, human considerations,
including the economic and social effects of such de-
2 8 Butler, Lloyd, Acting C.J. in Chairman, LEDB v. Joye and Others
(1939) 15 N.L.R. 50.
2 9 Michelman, Frank I.: Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation Law" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 80,
No. 6, April 1967.
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termination on the owners and tenants of real property
in the area, in addition to engineering and other
factors. 30
In redevelopment programs particularly, relatively small numbers of people
get handed a distinctly disproportionate share of the cost of whatever social or
public purpose gain that is involved. And those dislocated or displaced are likely to
be the poor or mostly so. If, then, it is assumed that a proposed reallocation of re-
sources is "fair" (efficient) only if, after negotiated compensation has been offered
by those who stand to gain (in this case, the LEDB in the immediate period) from the
proposal to those who stand to lose by it (the land owners), the proposal can win
unanimous approval, then it could be inferred from the foregoing that the Board's
reallocations of resources through urban land have not met this criterion. Most of
the compensation cases arising out of the Board's land acquisitions end up with
judicial adjudication, which implies that the Board cannot without such judicial
intervention, make a "fair" reallocation of resources by offering compensation that
is acceptable to the land owners. The divergence of the owners' claims and the
Board's offers (Table 5.4) and the judicial awards that often come out to be higher
than the Board's offers attests to this.
The foregoing discussions indicate that generally the LEDB was not paying
adequate compensation to the land owners, at least as defined by the compulsory
acquisition law. But even if the Board were assessing compensation accurately, as
prescribed by the law, was the people's (land owners') perception of adequate com-
30 H.R. 13725, 89th Congress (U.S.A.) 2nd Session 101(a) (12) (1966).
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pensation the same as the law's definition? The evidence is that the two were very
divergent, and in a way underscores the point already made in the previous chapter
that as far as the land owners were concerned, the question of compensation was not
the fundamental issue. The fundamental issue was the total reluctance to sell or
permanently part with land -- that is, part of the local culture and custom. Assuming
compensation were the issue, we briefly examine in the next section what the land
owners consider an adequate compensation and the implications of that for the Board's
operations.
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5.4 People's (Land Owners') Perception of Adequate Compensation Versus Le-
gally Defined Adequate Compensation
It had been implied in Chapter 4 that one possible way of acquiring the lands
and property in question 'successfully' was by brute force -- that is, use of all neces-
sary force to remove the land owners and take control of the property. This , it was
noted would have been too politically and socially costly, if not suicidal, especially
with an elected government, as was the caseat that time. Thus the compromises which
ultimately didn't help much either.
Given, thenthat the use of the law and the use of 'brute force' were inef-
fective and politically expensive respectively, one other option was open: Buy them
out! -- or, in other words, "Make them offers they cannot refuse!" We have noted
that the Board paid inadequate compensation, sometimes not even as much as the law stipulates,
but what if it is decided to overwhelm the owners with generous payments. This
would involve paying the land owners such large amounts of money that would
practically off-set their feelings of loss and insecurity, sentimental or material.
311
Using Michelman 's 31concepts and framework (modified), this would involve the
3 1Michelman, Frank I.: op. cit., p. 1214. 'Efficiency gains' are defined
as the excess of benefits produced by a measure over losses inflicted by it, where
benefits are measured by the total number of dollars which prospective gainers would
be willing to pay to secure adoption, and losses are measured by the total number of dollars
which prospective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to adoption. 'De-
moralization costs' are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to off-
set disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers, specifically from the
realization that no compensation or not-enough is offered; and (2) the present capital-
ized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or
social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated or inadequately compensated
losers, their sympathizers, and other observes disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion. 'Settlement
costs' are measured by the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources which would
be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoraliza-
tion cost:. Included are the costs of settling not only the particular compensation
claims presented, but also those of all persons so affected by the measure in question
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Board's cifsetting the demoralization costs incurred by the land owners through giving
up their lands by radically increasing some aspects of its (the Board's) 'settlement
costs'. For the Board to offset the 'demoralization costs' to the land owners and to
itself suggests that the Board would reckon with and recognize in its considerations
for compensation assessments and payments the capitalized value of lost future pro-
duction and income, caused by the demoralization of uncompensated or inadequately
compensated losers (land owners), their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed
by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some
other occasion. For the Board to do this presumes that it considered the level of
'efficiency gains' from the schemes to be worth these costs, as calculated. That such
a trade-off was possible, however, is evidenced by the success of the Board's earlier
strategy of offering back to the affected land owners land equivalent in area of 80%
of their original holdings, while using the remaining 20% to off-set the costs of
infrastructural developments. The 'efficiency gains' envisioned by the Board in that
scheme included: (1) the elimination of slums and securing of a better sanitary urban
or similar measures as to have claims not obviously distinguishable by the available
settlement apparatus. 'Settlement costs' would also include: (a) the costs of
bargining to out-of-court settlements of all, some, or none of the claims occasioned
by that measure which seem indistinguishable from the claim recognized; (b) the
added (marginal) cost of operating the judicial system to settle those of the indis-
tinguishable claims not settled by agreement; and (c) the costs of disposition, whether
by agreement or by judgment, of all claims arising out of other measures, which
claims would never have been urged had not the claim in question been recognized,
reduced by any savings in the demoralization costs which those other measures would
have entailed had no such claims been recognized.
32
Ibid.
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enviror.rrent; (2) the building up of a more elegant and prestigious national capital
worthy of national pride.
In broad terms, therefore, the concepts contained in this framework --
efficiency gains, settlement costs, and demoralization costs in material and immaterial
terms -- can be said to be really what the problems were about, from the point of
view of each side in the conflict, the LEDB/Government and the land owners. The
Board considered the 'efficiency gains' to the public (society) to be greater than the
costs to the land owners of their displacement and dispossession, after the Board made
what it considered equitable compensation offers to the land owners. On their side,
the land owners considered the costs to themselves (tangible and intangible) of the
Board's intended action to be too high to bear. Assuming, therefore, (for the sake
of discussion) that the framework was acceptable to the land owners -- that is, that
they were ready to allow their emotional, cultural, and material values and attach-
ments to their lands and to their tradition to be 'bought out' by an 'off-set money
price', as they perceived it, would the Board still have considered the anticipated
'efficiency gains' to be worth the money costs? How much would this money cost be?
In other words, what is 'adequate compensation' in the perception of the land owners,
and how likely is it that the Board could meet it?
(a) The money cost to the land owners of the Board's contemplated action
(as the land owners perceived it) could be said to be tremendous, if
not overwhelming. This is deduced from the line of argument the
land owners advanced. Pointing out that they held freehold titles to
the lands in question, they argued that the Board acquiring the
lands meant dispossessing them entirely and forever. Their attorney
emphatically argued, for example, that,
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The position of my clients is that they would be
dispossessed entirely, so that if they are given,
say t 5,000 compensation, this amount would
soon fritter away. Whereas, if they leave these
plots to my clients to lease, they can be earn-
ing t 1,000 or t 5,000 per annum forever on
this land. This is better for them than the
Board acquiring it. 3 3
They further argued that even if they did not have money to develop
the lands to the quality standards that were acceptable to the Board,
... they could pass it on (lease) to a wealthy
Nigerian, or an Indian or anybody who can.
Say 'A' is earning t 1000 per annum on the
plot, it is better for him to earn that t 1000
per annum, and his children, and his children's
children to continue to earn that t 1000
per annum than for you (the Board) to dispossess
him altogether and constitute yourself the
owner, and the man (the real owner) having
no means of income forever. 3 3a
This line of perception of costs or loss or income-foregone is certainly
equivalent to outright reluctance to sale or to part permanently with
the lands in question. It had been hypothesized earlier that the ap-
parent concern for money income-foregoine notwithstanding, the
fundamental issue was the socio-religious abhorrence to permanent
disposal of land and that the impossible amounts of compensation
demands are used as an added ploy to ward off the attempted acquisitions
by the Board. But even assuming that compensation per se were the
point at issue, and the implied line of cost/loss calculation (perception)
by the landowners were to be accepted and adopted in calculating the
demoralization costs (perceived money income-foregone only) to the
land owners, it would mean that the Board had to pay these sums cal-
culated for at least three generations (about 100 years) ("Himself, his
children, and his children's children"-- i.e., present value of future
streams of income) in order that their 'demoralization costs' (as they
3 3 Chief Akinyede - Attorney representing the Central Lagos land owners at the
Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, 1966, cross-examining the Chairman
of the LEDB. (Verbatim Report of the Tribunal, Day 2, p. 74.)
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perceived it) might come near being off-set, and they becoming 35
agreeable to the acquisition. If, for example, 600 persons (families)
were to be compensated at, say t 1000 per annum for 100 years.
This would come to t 60,000,000, and this for only a 70-acre sized
urban land.
Given this implied perception of what they would lose by the Board's
acquisition, the 'settlement cost' to the Board would have been pro-
hibitive and unlikely to be acceptable to the Board. The Board's
anticipated efficiency gains from the scheme were not worth such
costs, and the logical decision rule is that no project ought to be
undertaken unless 'efficiency gains' exceed demoralization costs
plus settlement costs. 36 Any project that is undertaken also ought to
be organized in such a way as to maximize efficiency gains minus
the sum of demoralization and settlement costs. This decision rule also
presumes that the society can justifiably forego projects that appear
to be efficient when demoralization and/or settlement costs are con-
sidered too high. 37 The "buy out" alternative would therefore fail.
(b) Secondly, the Board's funding had been very tenuous and erratic from
the start, and could not have sustained such costs, as would have
been involved in the 'settlement costs' as conceived above. 38
In sum, it means that each of the three possible approaches -- use of the
law, use of 'brute force', and use of 'high financial inducements' -- would meet as
much difficulty as the others in attempting to acquire these urban lands. Use of
legal provisions would not do it because respect and obedience to the 'modem law'
35The Annual Report of the LEDB for 1959/60 (p. 20) reported that compensa-
tion had been agreed in 617 cases to date and that compensation amounting to
t 2,252,479 had been paid. But this wasn't the end of compensation cases, for in 1964
compensation paid had risen tot 3,325,851 (see Commerce in Nigeria, Vol. 6, 1964, p.
29), which means the number of compensation cases was still on the rise.
36As a modification to Michelman definitions, we take 'settlement costs' to include
'demoralization costs', but this latter does not presume inclusion of all components of
'settlement costs'.
37Tideman, Nicolaus T.: Land Use Control through Administered Compensation
(Discussion Paper No. 59, Program on Regional & Urban Economics, Harvard University,
February 1970.)
A more detailed examination of the funding mechanisms of the Board was
presented in Section 4 .5 of Chapter 4.
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(which is of foreign derivation) had not been fully understood and the seriousness of
disobeying it not fully internalized. The society involved is not yet a 'society of
laws' in the Anglo-Saxon framework or concept of laws. The local customary and
traditional laws still had deep roots and were more generally understood and
internalized.
Use of all-out 'brute force' was not practicable because that would have
caused such social and political turmoil that could have threatened the political
legitimacy of the Government and that of the individual decision-makers in the
Government -- a risk which for both social and selfish reasons elected officials, as
were then in office, would not have taken; and the 'high financial inducements'
option, or full off-setting of land owners' losses, was not feasible because neither the
Government nor the LEDB would have had the financial resources to meet what in the
perception of the land owners would be inducement enough to make them willingly
release their lands in return for such inducements.
It could be said that, while various other factors (perceived inadequacy of
compensation, loss of jobs or means of income, inertia, etc.) were also at play, a
substantial proportion of the explanation for this apparently 'no-choice solution'
(impasse) can be accounted for by the history and peculiarity of the land tenure sit-
uation in Lagos and the fairly unique significance of land to the whole life of the
people and the 'traditional' society. The demands for impossible amounts of compensa-
tion could have been a deliberate device to scare off the Board entirely from the ac-
quisitions per se, rather than a demand for adequate compensation as such.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the modes and processes of land acquisition by the
Lagos Executive Development Board, as well as its processes of compensation assess-
ments and payments. The rules governing compensation assessments were examined in
detail, and the conclusion was made that these rules notwithstanding, compensation
ossessments are largely subjective exercises in practice.
From the information available, it was found that in a good many cases,
the compensation that the Board assessed and paid was 'inadequate' even by the cri-
teria of the laws governing compensation assessments. It was also noted that a wi de
dlivergence existed between what the land owners considered to be 'adequate' compen-
sotion and what the LEDB enabling laws defined as 'adequate compensation'; the one,
In essence, perceived adequate compensation as the "present value of future streams
of income" (for an almost indefinite future), while the other defined it simply as the
'fair market value' of the land at the time of acquisition.
The Michelman framework and concepts of 'efficiency gains','demoraliza-
tion costs' and 'settlement costs' were applied to the compensation issue and it was
shown by calculation that the Board could never have afforded the 'settlement costs'
of the land acquisitions if the line of perception of demoralization costs by the land
owners were adopted for the compensation calculations.
This tended to strengthen the hypothesis that the demand for 'impossible'amounts of
compensation is basically a device to forestall the Board's acquisitions of lands per se.
Whatever the case, however, it was obvious that the conditions of ha ex-
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ercise cof LEDB (public) authority in land acquisitions was unacceptable to those
disadvantaged by the Board's activities, and this in various ways adversely affected
the degree of success of the Board.
CHAPTER SIX:
LEDB: LAND SUPPLY AND PRICE.
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Chapter Six
THE LEDB: LAND SUPPLY AND PRICE
Previous chapters have examined LEDB land acquisition activities -- the
rationale, the processes and the problems involved in them. Chapter 5 specifically
examined the processes and procedures of the Board's land acquisition exer-
cises, including the processes of compensation. Various problems of equity were
noted about these processes and procedures, and it was inferred that much of the
problems militating against the effectiveness of the Board basically arose from the
complexity of the land tenure situation and the general cultural reluctance to part
permanently with land. The demands for 'impossible' amounts of compensation may
be a pretext for furthering this general reluctance to sale of land and the apparent
under-compensation by the Board does not in any way help in off-setting this general
reluctant attitude or opposition to a taking by the Board.
One of the most important objectives of public urban land policy and one
of the main reasons why public land ownership and management are often advocated
is that of making land available in adequate quantities at the right times and places
and at reasonable prices to both public authorities and private individuals. Propo-
nents of public land ownership and management insist that it has the potentials of
facilitating and supporting a steady flow of land to all user groups, thereby reducing
land speculation and distortions in land pricing -- that is, controlling land values
and land prices.
It has been noted that the LEDB had authority under Part VII of the Act
creating it ho acquire land either by agreement or compulsorily and to let, hire,
sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any such land. It had the authority,
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if it chose, to develop, build, maintain, manage, and control such lands or housing
it built on them and to collect reasonable rent from these properties. The under-
lying rationale for this authority was to enable the Board to provide adequately
prepared and serviced building land thatwould be consonant with good quality
sanitary environment and to prevent the development or expansion of slum and other
unsanitary areas in the city -- the principal objective for which the Board was
created. The extent to which the Board achieved these purposes, including those
of controlling land values and land price rises is debatable.
In this chapter, then, it is intended to assess the performance of the Board
in this area -- how much land it supplied or provided and at what costs or prices,
as compared with what supplies that were available from other (non-public) sources.
The efficiency of its supplies or conditions of supplies is assessed and the Board's
costs or prices of land supplies and development are compared both with those in
the private sector and with the costs/prices of similar agencies or institutions in
other countries. This latter provides added perspective with which to assess the
impact and effectiveness of the LEDB in urban land problems and their management.
6.1 Land Supplies.
It was noted in the earlier chapters that the most active period of LEDB land
acquisition was between 1950 and 1972. It was therefore the period it supplied the
greatest amounts of building landI in the urban area. From the data that is avail-
1
Building (plots) land includes houses directly constructed by the Board.
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able in this respect, land supplied from the LEDB constituted a significant propor-
tion of building land available in Lagos each year (for the years in which informa-
tion is availoble)(Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Table 6.1 shows building land availab e
in Lagos each year from 1957 to 1966. Column 2 of the table shows the number of
building applications made to the Town Planning Department for permission to build.
Because any building to be put up in the city and its metropolitan area must submit
building plans and receive approval from the Town Planning Department, we assume
that the number of building applications submitted to the Department each year
(column 2) is a good proxy of the amount of building plots available for develop-
ment each year -- from all sectors, private and public. This means that between
3,000 and 4,000 building plots were available for development during the years
1957 to 1966 in all sectors of the urban land market. Column 7 (sum of columns
3, 4, and 6) is the share of the LEDB in urban land supplies, in each of the relevant
years. The percent share provided by the LEDB is shown in Column 8. It shows that
the Board supplied about 11% of total annual building plots available in the metro-
politan area, and the indication from the Table (though inconclusive) is that this
proportion was increasing with the years into the 1970's. Nevertheless, the Table
(6.2) shows by implication that more plots of land were available from the private
sector (private-communal mainly) than from LEDB sources. This was to be expected
because the bulk of the lands were still held in private family and communal owner-
ships. In terms of actual houses produced, disparities exist, especially within the
private sector, between the number of building applications registered and the
number of houses actually built and completed during the year. Best estimates show
that only about 25% of building applications approved in any particular year get
Appli-
City
1
Year
1957/58
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62
1962/63
1963/64
1964/65
1965/66
TABLE 6.1
in the Urban
4
No. of Plots
Sold by LEDB
2
No. Bldg.
cations in
3,400
3,671
3,854
3,923
3,530
3,988
2,315
2,217
1,173
The LEDB: Share
3
No. of Plots
Leased by LEDB
151
18
72
32
46
44
n.a.
Source: Calculated and Tabulated from the various Annual Reports & Accounts of the LEDB.
* For purposes of analysis, we also consider houses built (column 6) as plots of land because the houses are built on plots
of land and constitute supplies and additions to the stock of building land available to the urban area.
154
220
196
22
29
166
n.a.
n.a.n;a.
Total
+6)
Land Supply
5
Total
3 & 4
305
238
268
54
75
210
n.a.
356
n.a.
Market.
6
Freehold Houses
Sold by LEDB
75
178
181
282
297
604
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7
Gross
(3.+,4
380
416
449
336
372
814
n.a.
356
8
Percent of
Total (2)
11.2
11.3
11.6
8.6
10.5
20.4
n.a.
16.1
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completed during that year. An indication of this estimate is shown on Table 6.2,
which shows the annual building completion rates, ranging from 13% to 50%, but
with 25-26% yearly average.
Table 6.2
Lagos: Ratio of Building Completions to Building Applications
2 3
No. Building No. Completed Proportio
Applications Buildings Applicat
3,923 860 22.0
3,530 684 19.4
3,988 524 13.1
2,315 625 27.0
2,217 605 27.3
1,173 597 51.0
4
n of Building
ions Completed(%)
Source: Derived from Column 2 of Tables 6.1 and 6.3.
This relatively low completion ratio applies more to buildings in the pri-
vate sector than it does to the LEDB housing schemes.
Most LEDB housing starts are completed within the year they are started,
and from all indications (see Table 6.3), LEDB houses constitute a preponderant pro-
portion of the completed houses in the city each year since the Board started direct
house construction in 1957.
This proportion is anywhere between 30% and 80% of all completed houses
in the city each year -- a relatively high proportion in view of the fact that its
overall share in the annual land supplies is only about 11% (Table 6.1). However,
1
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
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Table 6.3
LEDB Produced
Year
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Houses as a Proportion of all
2
Total Houses
Completed in Lagos*
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
860
684
524
625
605
597
454
520
643
598
Houses Produced
3
Total Houses
duced by the
in Lagos 1957-1970
Pro-
LEDB
75
178
181
282
297
604
4
LEDB-Percent of
Completed Houses
34.5
88.3
Sources: Column 2:
Column 3:
Column 4:
Lagos City Council, November 1970
From the various LEDB Annual Reports & Accounts
Calculated from 2 and 3
* It is likely that completed houses from the private sector are under-registered and therefore under-
represented. A comparison of Table 6.2 (column 2) with Table 6.3 would tend to suggest
this. With the number of building applications submitted averaging 3,000 per year, it
is likely that more houses are completed in the private sector than are actually recorded
for that sector.
go
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it is to be expected that the LEDB made a more complete registration of completed
houses with the city Council than would or did the private communal sector-
which is usually apprehensive about official registration of which means incuring
taxes and charges of one type or another. It can therefore be inferred that the
actual number of completed houses from the private sector was under-registered,
and therefore under-represented, and this had inevitably exaggerated the share of
the LEDB.
Even then, although there were numerically more houses completed -annual-
ly, . , by the Board than were realized from the private sector, this did not
necessarily mean greater addition to the housing stock by the Board, given the
type and character of its housing developments - which were dominantly low-density,
single family detached bungalows, 2 as opposed to the mainly apartment and room-
ing type houses from the private sector. The claim by the Board, therefore, that,
Since 1955, when the Lagos Executive Development
Board built the first rudimentary low rent resettlement
blocks in Surulere to accommodate the low income
workers, and those evicted from the Central Lagos
and Olowogbowo areas, this Corporation has be-
come a 'non-profit making' landlord to nearly
30% of the population3 of Lagos State .... 4
can therefore hardly be sustained. The real impact of the contribution of the Board
in this regard was much less than the figures indicate, as the accommodation potential
2See Chapter 7.
3The population of Lagos State is between 2.5 million and 3.0 million.
4 Lagos State Development and Properties Corporation: Towards a Better
Environment.
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of its lands -and house designs was relatively low. There was large-scale waste of
land in the Board's developments as similar sized plots (50' x 100') built by the
private sector could decently provide accommodation for three to four typical 5
urban families, and for more if it were a storyed building. Except for about three
of its schemes that were designated as low income housing (The Lagos Housing
Scheme, the Rehousing Scheme, and the Metropolitan Housing Scheme), there were
ro LEDB plots or houses developed as multi-family apartment blocks. The ratio of
opartment buildings to bungalows was negligible, as will be shown in Chapter 7.
The Lease or conveyance agreements between the LEDB and the lessor or
buyer contained such restrictive clauses or injunctions as requiring the lessor "not
to assign, sub-let or otherwise part with the possession of the land" leased or con-
veyed; and "not to permit any person other than the lessee, his family, and domestic
servants -to reside upon the land" leased or conveyed, so that the houses to be built
had to be such as to be occupied by a single unitary family.
While the effectiveness of such restrictive clauses in limiting the number of
occupants of the plots and houses were uncertain, they certainly inhibited the build-
ing and development of multi-family apartments -- the type of development that
most people in the metropolitan area needed and could better afford, and which
makes an optimal use of the land that is available. Accommodation of more people
in a given space constitutes increases in the effective supply of urban land as much
as does release of undeveloped land in urban areas, and as much as reclamation.
5
-Average 'urban family ' size in Lagos is about 7. 'Urban family' in this
context is taken to mean a family whose traditional roots of origin are not in the
urban area -- i.e., a migrant family. The average size for Lagos indigenous fami-
lies is in the 10-20 range.
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The Board's supplies, because they catered principally for a small middle
to upper income section of the populationdid not make much impact on the land
and housing problem of the metropolis, principally because they were inaccessible
to most people who needed them (the mass of the low income group). The Board
itself explained that, "The Board.. .in pursuing this policy6 does so in order to meet
the continuous housing demand in Lagos for those persons who can never be con-
sidered for any future subsidized housing schemes" (emphasis mine), and these were
the burgeoning diplomatic, academic, foreign consultant and the middle-to-high
bureaucratic community who were all demanding luxury housing. The building plots
scheme for example was designed according to the Board, to ".. .provide developed
land for both middle-class and better aclss residential developments".7 Significant-
ly, the bulk of these beneficiary classes had not 'moved up' from the multi-one-
roomed and such lower quality dwellings, but rather were principally foreigners,
and the indigenous young educational, military, and commercial elite who had
been recruited directly into the middle and upper rungs of the social-economic
ladder. Contrary to the conventional 'conversion (filtering) process', they had
left no vacancies for the poorer classes to move into and occupy. "Had the bulk
of them moved up from below they would have created vacancies in housing at the
8lower levels", which would have helped make the impact of the LEDB supplies to
6Policy of building freehold houses.
7 LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts, 1957/58, p. 26.
8Oberu Aribia: "Social Aspects of Urban Rehousing in Lagos" (Lagos
Notes and Records, Vol. III, No. 2, January 1972.
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the market better felt.
Nevertheless, between 3,000 and 4,000 units were built and specifically
designated as low income housing (asterisked items on Table 6.4). The Rehousing
Schemes are not included in this because in these rehousing schemes, the Board was
only trying to rehouse people it had displaced. So it was not adding any new units
to the city's stock of housing by so doing, and then it could not rehouse all that
it had displaced.
A more detailed breakdown of LEDB projects involving land and housing
supplies is shown on Table 6.4. It covers most of the period of the Board's existence
from 1928 to 1972. It is'classified approximately into three forms of supplies:
(i) Land Schemes in which building plots (on which to build houses of a given
and approved specification) were prepared, serviced, and either leased or
sold to the public. The approximate arealI size of each project (in acres) and
the approximate number of building plots are given in the second and third
columns respectively. It is not suggested that the areal size of each project
was entirely devoted to building plots. Most projects divide up between building plots,
direct construction of houses, and sometimes industrial and comme rcial facili-
ties. But the number of plots shown against each project is as far as records
are available and accessible the approximate number of residential building
plots in the given scheme. The total number of such serviced plots was
about 7,533 during the period under review (1928-1972).
(ii) Housing and Rehousing Estates are the projects in which the LEDB acquired
TABLE 6.4: Composite Projects of the
3
No. Plots or
H/HU's*
4
Total Capital
Expenditure (t)
5
Total
Income (t)
6
Profit(+)
Loss(-)
7
Capital Cost/
Plot or H/HU*
jre-t arf E De-- i t- - -
8
Cost of Un-
serviced Plot
Freehold Land Schemes
Yaba Estate (1933/34)
Idumagbo Scheme (1931/32)
Isalegagan 1933
Oke Awo
Apapa Estate (1947/52)
Itire Road (Freehold Land
Scheme
Akangba Freehold Land
Scheme (No. 2)
Animashaun Freehold Land
Scheme (no.3)
W. Avenue Freehold Lan
Scheme (No. 4)
Freehold Land Scheme
(S.S/lere)(No.6):
Randle Avenue Freehold
Land Scheme No.7
S.W. lkoyi-Obalende
Dev. Scheme
S.E. Ikoyi
Victoria Is.Phase I
Victoria Is.Phase It
Victoria ls.Phase Il
Lagos Central Planning
Scheme
2nd Mainland Bridge
Property Acq.
698
100
9.3
7.5
770.0
132.0
53.0
57.0
11.01
170.0
270.0
600.0
500.0
500.0
70.0
28.0
1,122
750
800
275
76
186
128
900
274
1,000
179
972
51,243
134,500
2,075,718
442,442
157,975
148,396
150,570
88,793
48,527
794,371,
603,223
762,887
417,475
3,069,537
4,191,808
35,914
2,085,894
291,984
203,783
200,713
129,051
800
110,862
819,255
603,223
762,887
417,475
3,069,537
4,330,846
* Note: The abbreviation "H/H U's" stands for "Houses/Housing 
Units".
1
Proect
2
Area in
Acres
9
% of ser-
viced Plot
512
512
310
1,850+
+
+
15
75
56
7
0.8
12.0
28.0
1.3
621
197
540
1,981
478
380
883
2,201
758
+
+
0
0
0
0
147
86
23
1,191
30.8
22.6
2.6
54.1
+ 2,342 13,164
40 32 80.0
* ote: The abbreviation
Lagos Executive Development Board
Y
"H/HU's" stands for "Houses/Housing Units".
TABLE 6.4 (cont.)
1
Project,
B. Housing Schemes
2
Area
in Acres
3
No.Plots or
HAiU's
4
Total Capital
Expenditure (L
5
Total
Income (t)
6
Profit(+)
Loss (-)
7
Capital Cost/
Plot or H/HU
8
Cost of Un-
serviced Plot
9
% of ser-
viced Plots
Freehold Housing
Scheme No. I
Freehold H-using
Scheme No. 2
Freehold Housing
Scheme No.3
Freehold Housing 152.0
Scheme No.4
Freehold Housing
Scheme No. 4a
Freebold Housing
Scheme No. 5 236.60
Freehodo Housing
Scheme No. 6
*Lagos (workers')housing
Scheme (1955) 56.0
Surulere Rehousing
Estate No. 1
Surulere Rehouses
Estate No. 2
Surulere Rehou-sing
Estate No. 3 117.0
Surulere Rehousing
Estate No. 4
*Metropolitan Housing Scheme
104
24
143
37
29
24
1,368
913
628
173,038
71 ,013
346,121
140,763
82,030
64,588
1,155,184
642,055
700,399
179,256
74,939
360,215
148,424
95,866
74,275
1,147,600
+
+
+
+
1,664
2,959
2,420
3,805
2,829
2,691+
845
648,375
718,500
59
800 15,525 50,000 +
Jalupon Estate 63.0 1,638 136,176
Industrial/Commercial Schemes
Iganmu Industrial Est. 166.0 105
Surulere Lock-up
Shops & Flats 7,883 22,649
Ijora Site Devel. 376.0 34,634 34,634 0
ApapaShops & Flats 350.0 108,030 112,500
Total 4694o4 15,261
*Schemes designated as low cost or low income schemes SOURCE: Various Annual Reports and other documents of the LEDB
V.-
C(4
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land and directly built houses itself, then either sold or rented the houses out
to people. Most of the houses in the housing schemes were sold freehold to
the public. The Rehousing Scheme components of this were those housing
schemes which the Board built and used to re-house or re-settle some of the
20,000 people it had displaced in an urban renewal or slum clearance prol-
ect in central Lagos (item 14 on Table). Most of the houses were single-
family detached houses, and many were in rooming and apartment units. It
is, however, very difficult to disaggregate those that were in rooming and
apartment units from those that were single-family detached houses. It is,
therefore, difficult to say definitely how many houses and/or housing units
that were produced by the Board. This would, however, lie in the region of
5,000 to 7,500 houses and/or housing units.
(iii) Industrial/Commercial Schemes: In this, industrial and commercial estates
were built and serviced by the Board, and let out to industrialists, traders,
and businessmen. These were mainly let as leaseholds rather than as free-
holds.
6.2 Forms of Tenure in the Supply Process.
Two major forms of land allocation or disposal (tenure) were used by the
LEDB: the freehold tenure and the leasehold tenure.
(i) Freehold or Out-right Sale
In this, the ownership of a plot of building land was transferred permanently
from the Board to the buyer on payment of the Board's stipulated prices. For very
obvious reasons (security and permanence in perpetuity), people preferred freehold
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titles to land, and often whether they have freehold or leasehold titles to a piece
of land affects the quality of development that is undertaken on the given plot.
Generally, freehold tenure has very obvious advantages. It provides the
best form of security for credit, and the sense of absolute ownership is a powerful
incentive to development. It has been claimed 9 , for example, that when Arthur
Young declared that, "the magic of property turns sand into gold", that he had
freehold property in view. This was further underscored by Young's subsequent assertion that,
"Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock and he will turn it into a garden.
Give him a nine years' lease of a garden, and he will turn it into a desert."
Freehold also provides opportunities for large profits when the value of land
has substantially increased. It confers freedom from control by landlords whether
they are private individuals or Governments. It also confers social and political
status as ownership of land constituted an electoral qualification in the earlier
political histories of many countries.
But it is often considered a short-sighted policy for a public urban land
management agency to dispose of land in a very highly urbanized or urbanizing
area on a freehold basis. The need for renewal or replanning could be very potent
in such areas within a relatively short span of time.
Freehold disposal system means that the public agency would have to buy
back such lands when the time comes for renewal, at which time the price (wi th
9 Meek, C.K.: Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (Frank Cass & Co.,
Ltd., 1968, p. 243.)
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the develcpments on it) might have become overwhelming. Granting freehold tenure
by such a public agency as the LEDB would also potentially limit the ability of the
agency to exercise control and enforce articles of its own covenants with grantees of
such land in respect of proper land-use planning or abuse of public instruments. When
there was a widespread scandalous transfer of LEDB lands, for example,in spite of the
existence of covenants not to do so, theBoard could not enforce such covenants on the
grounds that,
.. .as the interest conveyed was a fee simple absolute,
the Board has no means of enforcing any covenants not ob-
served for the benefit of the building scheme as a whole,
such as covenants to develop or to control transfers.10a
Freehold mode of disposing public lands would therefore tend to defeat some of the
assumed advantages of public land ownership and management, particularly with re-
spect to control of land-use and control of land prices.
While the Nigerian Colonial Government policy at the time was ordinarily against
granting freeholds, socio-cultural reasons initially, and later financial reasons, compel-
led the LEDB to adopt the freehold tenure in disposing of lands under its control. During
the mid-1 930's and early 1940's, plots were leased to members of the 'public' for build-
ing, but it was said that,"The response was so poore, and the need for expansion in view
of the plague so great that permission was reluctantly obtained from the Secretary of
State to offer freeholds. Since that time, plots have been disposed of without difficulty." 10
The principle of selling land freehold was, therefore, adopted by the LEDB from its
early beginnings and was dictated by the prevailing attitudes of the people to such tenure
and the prevailing circumstance at the time. The Hoskyns-Abrahall Report 10 observed
that, "It will take time and propaganda to convert the Lagosian from his conviction that
to build a house, he must have the freehold of the plot on which it is build." While
acknowledging that such was a natural desire, the Report suggested that it should be resisted.
l0aTribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB.
10T. Hoskyns-Abrahall: Report with Recommendations on the Planning and
Devehlpmert of Greater Lagos, June 1946.
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"The work of the Lagos Executive Development Board
(LEDB)would be made a good deal easier and opposition reduced if an exception were
made to the rule that neither Government nor the Board will offer freeholds." The
objection of this Report to freehold mode of disposal was, however, based on other
reasons than the usual ones of avoiding the expense to the public purse of buying back
freehold land and property from owners, if ever an urban renewal becomes necessary
in the future. Its opposition to freehold tenure was based on the potential dangers
of such lands falling into the hands of money lenders whose activities were prevailing
in Lagos at the time. Observed the Report,
Eighty-three percent of all money lenders in Nigeria
live in Lagos. Security for advances must in very
many cases be afforded by houses and land, both of
which I believe in an alarming number of cases
eventually become the property of the money
lenders. Many of them are 'non-natives', and
are as a class not likely to make the best type
of landlord. 1
British Colonial policy in this regard not only in Nigeria but also in most of
its Colonial territories, was against any extension of freeholds and this policy was
said to be based on "weighty political arguments". It was noted that the Dependencies
were not culturally homogeneous, but rather made up of different ethnic groups.
That,
The local Colonial Government is the only Authority
which can protect the rights of the various component
sections and at the same time promote their integra-
tion. But it would prejudice its ability to do this
llT. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit., p. 33.
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if if were. o grant or contif et rant extensive rights
in freehod more especialy if th grants were mad-e
to one section or society and not to another. 1 2
The questionable premise of this assertion notwithstanding, it nevertheless conveys
one of the bases of opposition to freeholds by Nigeria's Colonial administration.
Another objection to the freehold tenure, especially in the Nigerian in-
heritance structure, is that.in the absence of specificand effectively enforced laws
against partition, there is the danger of excessive fractioning or fragmentation, so
that what is left of a holding may not be able to support a standard house. This was
one of the major problems encountered in the Central Lagos Planning Acquisition
Scheme discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.3). This danger is increasing with the
increasing population and the corresponding decreases in available land.
Although freehold plots are sold for a lump sum which recovers the capital
costs immediately, the public agency that sells land freehold nevertheless loses the
large increases in land values which take place in the fast-growing urban area, and
which increases in value are reaped by the various owners of freehold plots or titles.
One of the assumed advantages of public land ownership and management is that it
facilitates the recapture by the public of the unearned increments ("plus values")
resulting from the rise in land values which is a result of public investments or de-
cisions or due to the general growth of the community. This recapture of "plus values"
may not be achieved in a freehold disposal of public lands, because freehold is a
"once and for all" transaction.
Another objection against freehold tenure as a mode of disposition of public
lands is that it is discriminating in its beneficiary incidence. It favours the group
12
Meek, C.K., op. cit., p. 245.
-219-
of persons o ho can make heavy down payments or are credit-worthy enough to ob-
tain a mortgage or have income enough to make savings that can enable them to
pay lump sums of money on freehold. It was pointed out in Chapter Two and fuller
discussed in Chapter Seven that housing finance or mortgage markets hardly exist in
Nigeria and the little there are, are restricted to a very small segment of the popula-
tion -- senior civil servants and people employed in other "formal sector" firms.
Table 6.45, for example, shows the sources of existing housing finance
schemes in Nigeria (as of 1966)* and the structure of their beneficiaries. It can be
seen that these housing finance schemes serve mainly the high and middle income
groups who contitute less than 25% of the population. The remaining 75% of the
population had very limited housing finance available to them. -- limited subsidy schemes
and the Roof-Loan Scheme, whose scale of operation was very low and still restricted to
"formal sector employees". The commercial banks, for reasons already referred to in
Chapter Two, do not grant loans for residential housing developments. Disposition of
public lands by freehold tenure is therefore tantamount to excluding over 75% of the
population that are not likely to have the financial resources to pay for a freehold.
In addition to deferring to the people's natural preference for the freehold
tenure, as earlier pointed out, the Board's use of the freehold tenure to dispose of its
lands could also be explained by other reasons:
(1) The Board's urban land and housing policy emphasized 'home ownership'
as a desirable policy. The rationale seemed to be that people have
greater stake at and incentive to keep their homes up in sanitary condi-
tions when they have freehold tenure of their property. Reference was
*lt remains basically the same to date.
SOURCES OF EXISTING HOUSING FINANCE
High Income Group
iciary/Source (about 1-5% of pop.)
overnment (rental) X
Table 6.45
IN NIGERIA (1966) AND
Middle Income Group
(15-25% of Pop.)
X
THE STRUCTURE OF
Low Income Group
(35-40% of Pop.)
BENEFICIARIES
Very Low Income Group Scale of
(25-30% of Pop.) Program
X
(subsidy) Moderate
2. Private Companies and Industries
(Hire Purchase)
3. Savings & Loan Societies
4. Roof-Loan Scheme
X
X
X
X
X
Source: Report of the International Conference on Housing Finance and Housing Techniques
Held in, Lagos, Nigeria, 1966.
(Abstracted from Table X of Asenuga, John M.O.,: "Housing Policy for Nigeria",
M. Arelbi. Ihesis,, Gradute Schooh of Desig,,, koivad University, Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
Benef
1. G
x
Low
Low
Low
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,oways made to the 'life-long' desire of Nigerians to own homes of their
9wn, vnd the Board's policies were directed at satisfying these owner-
ship desires through freehold land disposals. According to the Board,
land schemes continued to be undertaken,
,.,with the object of ensuring continuity of sale of
'freehold building plots to the public. Not only does
the Board wish to continue to encourage the pur-
chose of freehold plots for building by the general
public generally, but also to ensure in its planning
control restriction of undeveloped land, that
positive action can be taken with such persons by
the offer of alternative land upon which building
can be readily permitted. 13
(2) The second very important explanation, and perhaps the main reason for
The Board's long retention of use of the freehold tenure is the fact that,
even at market rates of rent leases ordinarily do not return capital or
revenues quickly enough to sustain such an agency's operations. More-
over, one of the main financing sources for most of the Board's land and
housing customers was the Nigerian Building Society. The Society pre-
ferred financing freeholds rather than leaseholds. This was understandable
business practice that would enable the Society to easily take over the
property in cases of default by their customars, so as to recover the
Society's money. The Board, realizing that this Society was the major
funding sponsor for those buying the Board's lands, and from which it
was consequently assured of a more ready flow of cash, provided the
13
LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts, 1959/60.
-222-
tenure (freehold) that was acceptable to the financing agency.
The Board commenced its freehold housing scheme
in 1957/58 envisaging large-scale estate develop-
ment and building of houses for sale to the public,
whereby houses could be purchased either out-right
or by installments in accordance with normal
Building Society practice, with the assistance of
the Nigerian Building Society, or in the case of
Government staff, with the assistance of the
Government Housing Scheme...
explains the Board. 14
At other times, however, whether the Board disposed of any particular lands
by freeholds or leaseholds depended on direct orders from the federal Government.
This was the case particularly in projects that were designated direct Government
projects with the Board acting only as agents of the Government. In the Southwest
Ikoyi/Obalende Development Scheme, for example, Government directive was that,
The allocation of plots be apportioned between three
categories, namely, freehold disposal to owners dis-
placed under the current slum clearance operations
in central Lagos and leasehold disposals first to Gov-
ernment Officers, and secondly to general public. 15
The result was that most of the lands that the Board acquired, prepared, and/or
developed for residential use were given out as freeholds (plots of land or houses). As
pointed out before, the Board's most productive years in terms of residential land and
housing were the 1950-1972 period and over 80% of its allocations during this period
were of freehold tenure. Table 6.4 shows some of these freehold allocations both in
building plots and in housing.
14Ibid., p. 30.
15 Ibid., p. 33.
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The other form of land disposal by the Board was by:
(ii) Leaseholds
By this form of teinure, the use of a plot of land is granted by the Board to the pro-
spective lessee for a stipulated number of years, on payment of the stipulated premium
and annual rent. This is the mode of disposal that has often been favoured because of
its flexibility and particularly because it would enable such land to revert to the
Board or to any such agency at the expiration of the lease period which varies be-
tween 30 and 99 years, generally. If at such time urban renewal becomes necessary,
or public purpose demands that the land be put to a more important use, then the
difficulties, complexities, and expenses of re-acquisition would be obviated, as
title to the land would automatically revert to the Board, who in anticipation of re-
newal would refuse to renew such leases. The cost of tHi s to the public agency and
to the public purse would be minimal and the shocks of displacement to the owners
would be less traumatic as this would have been anticipated for a reasonable time.
Another strong argument, often advanced in support of the leasehold tenure,
is that as land values rise, leases can be re-negotiated to recapture, theoretically
forever, the increased values of land resulting from urbanization and/or inflation.
To achieve this, periodic rent revision clauses every ten to fifteen years are written
into most public lease agreements in Nigeria. In this way, the lessees expect it
and consequently, less pressures or resistances are experienced when the time comes
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for the reviews. This periodic rent review in leaseholds and the residual right to
re-acquire the property at the end of the lease period also permit the public body
to bring land uses into conformity with modem needs of the city.
A third form of allocation or disposal is renting, in which the Board rents
out housing units or industrial plots and collects monthly or annual rents. It differs
slightly from the leasehold form by the fact that the Board retains continuous manage-
ment and maintenance responsibility for such land, housing, and property. Closely
related to this is the Rent Purchase Agreement, in which land is given out on short-
term leases of about 7-12 year terms, or 15 yearly at the longest.
The leasehold mode of land disposal has hithe rto been dominantly used
for industrial and commercial land allocations, but increasingly with residential
plot allocations.
A particular advantage of the leasehold system is that the price of the
leasehold plots can be received as an annual land rent over the period of the lease.
This reduces the capital cost of housing and can extend the opportunities for home
ownership to the low and moderate income people, as the price (rent) is generally
very much lower than freehold prices, and are paid over an extended period. It
has, however, been argued on the other hand that the leasehold tenure impairs a leaseholder's
ability to obtain financing on a proposed building, since creditors consider leaseholds
a much less desirable asset as collateral than if the structure were on owned land
(freeholds). 16
16 Doebele, W.A., op. cit., p. 80.
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-EDB, however, seemed to have recognized the greater advantages of the
leasehold system since the late 1960's, and have increased its use as a mode of land
disposals.
Impact of the Board on the Cost/Price of Urban 1.and
One of the main rationales of public management of urban land in Nigeria
is to counter the constraints of the traditional land tenure system by making urban
land more available to the private sector for development according to planned
specifications. By maintaining substantial supplies of urban land to the market, too,
the price of urban land would be held within reasonable limits.
It has also been asserted that, "The most important element in the cost of a
house is the price paid for the land", and that, "Efforts to reduce the cost of housing
must undoubtedly start with reductions in the cost of building plots. This is an element
of cost which is dominated almost exclusively by the laws of supply and demand and
it can only be influenced by an active policy of bringing more land into use for
housing." 17 Supply expanding policies, it is said, control land prices more 'naturally'
than trying to control such prices artificially by laws and edicts. This is certainly true
where such supply expanding policies are well applied.
Land prices vary considerably depending on factors of general availability
and by particular location, size, terrain, characteristics and soil quality, frontage,
accessibility and access to facilities, 'prestige' value, freedom from blight and other
17
Koenigsberger, Otto, et al.: Metropolitan Lagos, (New York. Report
of U.N. Technical Assistance Mission to Study the Urban Problems of Metropolitan
Lagos, Nigeria, 1964.)
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factors. Land prices, for example,vary fro n i 30 to t 350 for a 50' x 100' plot on
17
the outskirts of Lagos, and according to the distances from the nearest developed
part of town to over t 30,000 for similar sized plots in the Lagos Central Business
District. The extent to which these factors precisely determine the cost/price of
the plot of land admittedly are very difficult to accurately pin down. This is be-
cause the factors that influence land prices are myriad -- consisting of both economic,
social, political, physical, geographical, and even cultural factors. Many of the
factors are so incipient and vary from time to time as well as from place to place
(even over very short and ostensibly insiginficant distances) that it is really difficult
and pretentious to attribute to any one real determinant factor.
They are all the more so in the Lagos context with which we are
dealing. There, in addition to the usual factors of location, space or size, and the
various social quality and amenity variables, certain cultural and legal factors
further complicate the picture, so much so that rational economic comparisons of
prices of land in the traditional or customary transactions context with prices of
land sold by the public agency (the LEDB) may not be a very useful exercise.
A brief review of those hard-to-quantify factors in urban land prices
determination would be in order at this juncture.
6.3 Problems in Objective Land Price Determination
The factors that create problems in objectively determining the actual
price of land in the context and in the use of land price data for analytical purposes
include the following:
1 7 Ibid., p. 166.
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(a.) 'Non-Market' Pricing
It was explained in the introductory chapter (Chapter 2) that sale of land
outside the 'group' is not looked on with approval. In fact, in earlier times it was
an anathema. It was also explained in the Chapter that sale or lease or exchange
of land within the 'group' was permissible.
This transfer within the group does not take a 'pure market' transactions
context in which the seller tries to extract from the buyer the highest value of the
land as price. As had been pointed out, most land in Lagos is still 'family land',
and their prices are influenced by the relationship of the buyer or leasee to the sel-
ler or lessor.18 Relations or good friends are not expected to extract or bring to
bear the full force of the market on their fellow relations. As most land transactions
are intra-group transactions, the implications of this feature is that prices of land
on the basis of such intra-group transactions would not reflect the 'market' prices
for land and it is therefore difficult to generalize with for purposes of the desired
comparisons.
(b.) Falsification of Actual Prices
Generally, people are reluctant to disclose the prices at which they sell
or buy land, so that even interviewing sellers or buyers of land does not produce
accurate prices for land. Sellers generally tend to under-declare their sale price,
while buyers tend to inflate and exaggerate the price they paid, depending on the
purpose in view.
1 8 Interview with the Chief Registrar of Titles, Lagos State Land Registry,
January 29, 1976.
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Most of our data on price of land under both the private and public sources
of land are derived from the Registration of Titles and Deeds at the Lagos Land
Registry. It is, however, known to be common practice by buyers and sellers in
the private and traditional transactions market to collude to minimize the stamp duty
and other fees they have to pay to register their title. This they do by declaring
less than the transaction's value or price. Stamp duty is taxation on land and it
increases with cost of land. It is usually charged at 6% of the value of the lease or
sale, and about 2% of the improvements premium. The amount of each increases
with the value (cost or price) of the land. These duties are in addition to the
standardized and fixed charges for the preparation of deeds, registration of deeds
and survey fees. The registration fee also increases with the cost (price) of the plot
of land being registered. -The fee schedule for conveyances ,assignment and charges
Is represented in Table 6.5.
Although they increase at a decreasing rate, they could constitute a sub-
stantial burden if the cost or price of the land for registration is high. Generally,
every effort is made by people to minimize such extra costs.
The implication of this practice is that the prices of land reflected in the
Register of Titles and Deeds on 'private' or traditional transactions may be erroneous
and may not reflect the actual prices paid in respect of such lands. Calculations
and comparisons based on them, therefore, could be misleading, and therefore should
be taken with caution.
(c.) Designation of "Title Areas": Effects on Land Prices
Land in Lagos is informally legally divided into two categories: 'title areas'
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TABLE 6.5
Fee Payable Under Titles for Conveyances, Assignments, and Transfers
Section I
(First Registrationb (t)
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
1,700
1,800
1,900
2,000
2,100
2,200
2,300
2,400
2,500
2,600
2,700
2,800
Section II
(Other Charges) (t)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
3.25
3.5
3.75
4.0
4.2
4.375
4.5
4.625
4.75
4.875
5.0
5.125
5.25
5.375
5.5
5.625
5.75
6.0
6.125
6.25
6.375
6.5
Source: Lagos Land Registry
Value (t)
1.0
1.25
1.75
2.0
2.25
2.25
2.375
2.5
2.625
2.75
2.875
3.0
3.125
3.25
3.375
3.5
3.625
3.75
3.875
4.125
4.25
4.375
4.5
4.625
4,75
4.875
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and 'non-titie areas'.
The 'Title Areas' are areas of the city and its metropolis where, if there
is an application for registration of plots of land in those areas, the Land Registry
conducts an investigation to establish the genuineness of the titles being applied for
registration before registering them. It ensures that the same parcel or plot of land
had not been previously registered by another ostensible owners. In short, in 'title
areas', the Registry assures the genuineness of title before registering such title.
Title Areas in Lagos include all of Lagos Island (except Maroko), Victoria
Island, Ikoyi, and all of Lagos Mainland embracing Ebute-Metta East and West, Apapa,
Surulere, Yaba, Yaba Estates, Onike, Iwayale, Abule-ljesha, Abule Oja, and any
areas added to the list from time to time. The title areas approximate areas that
have been properly surveyed and demarcated into recognized plots and probably
mostly already registered. They are areas that have in one way or another come
under the influence of the code enforcement areas and planning controls of the LEDB.
Non-Title Areas are areas where the genuineness of titles is not investiga-
ted or guaranteed by the Land Registry or any other public agency. R egistration of
titles from such areas is simply considered as a depository of deeds only.
The implication for land prices of this designation of Title and Non-Title
areas is that prices in the title areas would tend to be relatively higher than those
in the non-title areas, as the security of the titles there are ensured, and a pro-
spective buyer knows relatively for sure what he or she is paying for. On the
other hand, in non-title areas the security of the titles is in no way assured, and
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therefore involves a greater risk. Prices of land in such areas are consequently
lower than those for parcels in the title areas.
Absolute price differences among 'private-traditional' and 'private real
estate firm' and 'public' land therefore may not tell us much under these circumstances.
One thing certain is that if the costs of site preparation and servicing of LEDB lands
are commercially reflected in their prices, they would naturally be relatively more
expensive than the private-traditional lands. This would reflect their higher quality
and amenity levels, and their greater security. If the preparation and servicing costs
are 'not fully' reflected, it would mean that such land is being subsidized and there-
fore does not reflect their actual costs and prices. That LEDB plots of land, therefore,
should, because of their higher amenity and quality levels, command higher prices
than private and traditional plots of land is all too obvious . The interesting thing
about land cost in the public sector (LEDB) and in the private sector, therefore, is
not so much their differences, or why they differ; rather, the point of interest is on
how much the difference and whether or not the degree of this difference could be
reduced while still maintaining acceptable standards of land and housing services.
6.4 Sector Price Comparisons
One of the most reliable* sources of land prices in the private sector is what
the LEDB pays for the lands it acquires. These are reliable only in the sense that what
is recorded is what is paid for land, and therefore there is no falsification of prices
to evade fees and duties, as is the case with the private sector prices. These were
*The word 'reliable' here as applied to land prices does not imply 'demand
and supply' prices or the objective land price levels, as these are difficult to determine.
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supposedly based on the 'fair market' value of such land and notwithstanding the
weaknesses and problems in the determination of this value and the chances that
4hey may be on the low side of the 'fair market' value, they are the best (unfalsified)
4ata javailable, given factors discussed earlier as making it difficult to obtain the
eal -prices of land in the private sector, particularly in the traditional transactions
market.
Table 6.6 shows these prices which the LEDB paid for land in some sample
pocquisitions. It also shows what the LEDB sold such land after preparation and ser-
vicing. Column 2 shows the size of each piece of land, column 3, the price (cost)
jpf -the land, and column 4, the price/cost per unit (square yard) of the land. Col-
umn 5 then shows the price at which the LEDB sold such lands after preparation and
servicing. As can be seen from Column 4, the prices per unit (square yard) of land
varied greatly, from 0.1 shillings to over 8.0 shillings per square yard, depending
on -the location of the piece of land, the nature of the piece of land (whether
swampy or dry, etc.), and on the relative time period of the acquisition or purchase
which takes the effects of inflation into account. In light of the experience of the
processes and problems in LEDB determination of the prices it pays for compulsorily
acquired lands, as depicted in Chapter 5, it would be fair to infer that most of the
prices represented in Column 4 are generally lower than the prices in the 'private
communal' land market.
The Board's leaseholds are priced at least ten times that of the traditional
leaseholds. From the Table, Column 5 shows that the LEDB sells at about five to
six times the price at which it 'bought' such land. It would follow, then, that if
it is assumed that buyers in the private-traditional market buy land at the prices
TABLE 6.6
Comparative Prices of Land: LEDB and the Private Market
Size in Price of
Scheme
I- Apapa Estate (Leasehold
Land Scheme)
2. Freehold Land Scheme Est.
Itire Road 1
3. Freehold Land Scheme
Akangba Estate 2
4.Freehold Land Scheme Anima-
schaun Estate No.3
5- Freehold Land Scheme
Western Ave. No. 4
6. Freehold Land Scheme No. 6
7. Freehold Land Scheme Randle
Avenue No. 7
8. Victoria Island*
9. S.E. Ikoyi**
10' S.W. Ikoyi/Obalende Dev.**
11. Rehousing Estate No. 1
2. Rehousing Estate No. 2
13. Rehousing Estate No. 3
14 Rehousing Estate No. 4
Acres Raw Land (t)
1,000
132
16,650
53,680
44,813
1,865
53
57
11
1,600
270
258
57,577
27,350
11,003
134,461
326,457+
20,092
20,952
66,684 -
Price per Sq. Yd.
(in shillings) -
0.07
1.68
3.5
4.2
4.13
0.35
5.0
0.32
Sale Price by
LEDB (per sq. yd.)
0.7
1 .5 leasehold
1 .0 industrial
12.5
15.0
20.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
3.1
117
c)
CI
Table 6.6 (cont )
Scheme
Freehold H. Scheme 1
Freehold H. Scheme 2
Freehold H. Scheme 3
Freehold H. Scheme 4
Frehold H. Scheme 4a
Freehold H. Scheme 5
Freehold H. Scheme 6
Metro. Housing Scheme 1966
Lagos Housing Scheme 1955
Size in
Acres
152
Price of
Raw Land
22,990
7,537
47,330
13,163
8,925
311,939
4,054
127,607
55,170
236.60
15.
16.
17.
18.
19..
20.
21.
22.
23.
Price Per Sq.
Yd. in Shillings
5.5
5.5
8.36
4.07
* Costs of compensation, removal, and resettlement of villagers are taken as the cost of the land in the absence of a
separate figure as cost of land
+ Cost of reclamation
** Crown Land and therefore Government land which need not be paid for.
63.0
56
Sale Price
by LEDB
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that the LEDB acquires them, then the sale price of LEDB lands is five to six times
higher (more expensive) than prices of land in traditional land markets. 19 The
Board, however, sells fully-serviced land,so what this implies is that the cost of
the preparation -and servicing of a plot of land is four to five times the cost of the
land itself. -This is proportionately very high, and has serious implications for ac-
cessibility of land resources to a majority of the urban population.
'The basis for fixing the 'fair market value' for land acquired from the
people and the problems of the process as has been referred to earlier, were fully
examined in _Chapter 5. We shall proceed to briefly examine the bases for LEDB
settingof the prices for its own lands.
6.5 Land Prices Determination in LEDB Schemes
.The Lagos Town Planning Act (Cap. 95 of the Laws of Nigeria) under which
the Board operates stipulates that,
In determining the rate to be fixed for leasing or
selling, the Board shall take into account the costs
of all works, development and overhead ex-
penses for the land being leased or sold. 20
This means that the price of the Board's plots of land is determined by the
price ot which the Board acquired the land, plus the cost of development and ser-
19 The second part of the Table (Nos. 11-23) are the schemes where the LEDB
acquired the land (at the prices shown) but built houses for sale on them so that there
is no way of separating the cost/price of land from the price of the house.
2 0 Lagos Town Planning Act, Part VI, Cl. 28(3).
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vicing, plus of course whatever profits the Board wants to make on the project, or
what it calls the "General Development Expenses". This principle was affirmed by
the Board in its Surulere Freehold Land Schemes (Nos. 2-7 on Table 6.9) where it
pointed out that,
The selling price ranges from 20s to 25s per square yard
depending on the cost of acquisition and development.
And with the development cost on the increase, it is
possible that the Board may have to charge more in
the future. 2 1
Land reclamation, where it is involved, adds some t 4,000 to the cost of land per
acre, so that the price of the Board's lands also varied from place to place, as well
22
as from scheme to scheme. Column 7 of Table 6.4 shows the capital cost per plot
of land or per house in most LEDB schemes. By this pricing principle, therefore, these
figures, plus the projected profit, would approximately be the cost of the Board's
lands, at each of the relevant locations or schemes.
Another factor in determination of land price in LEDB schemes was the pro-
posed land-use and planned land use intensity in the scheme. The Board charged the
highest prices for industrial/commercial land use; and within residential land use, the
price was almost twice higher for low-density residential than for high density
residential.
In the Apapa Estate Scheme (which was disposed of as leaseholds), for ex-
ample:
Industrial/Commercial plots were leased at t 350-400 per acre, per annum.
Low density residential plots were leased at t 120-170 per acre per annum.
and High density residential plots were leased at t 75 per acre per annum.
21
LEDB: What is the LEDB?, p. 18.
22 Koenigsberger, op. cit., p. 39. This figure of t4,000 addition to the cost of land
per acre was in respect of Victoria~i land and was likely to vary from scheme to scheme depending
on the degree of reclamation.
-237-
This is quite understandable, considering the higher returns to lessees of industrial/
commercial land and policy of the Government to capture some of such returns.
High density residential costs are much less than the low density because more
people make use of a given unit of land and there is economy of agglomeration in
the provision of services which is less so in a low density residential.
Intended beneficiary target groups and Government policy in respect of
such target groups also determined the price of LEDB lands. At times, the allocation
of plots and their prices were subject to change on the decision of Federal Govern-
ment, so that these policies and pricing varied from time to time. Land for the
low income and public servants is often subsidized by the Government. The LEDB
prices such lands or housing at or below costs. But otherwise such plots are sold at
prices that would at least recover the costs of their acquisitions and servicing.
In spite of its public character, however (but in tune with its authorized
pricing principle), the Board's prices were also influenced by the pressure of demand
for land, and by the general inflationary situation. Table 6.7 in part reflects this
factor. It shows substantial increases from year to year in the prices of land sold by
the Board. Column 4 (using 1959-60 prices as the base) shows that the price of a
unit of LEDB land more than tripled within the decade. These rapid increases mainly
reflect the inflationary pressures of the period which the Board could not control by
itself as inflation is an economy-wide phenomenon. This fact also suggests that LEDB
did not or could not control or keep down land prices (due to speculation and much
22 Koenigsberger, op. cit., p. 39. This figure of t4,000 addition to the
cost of land per acre was in respect of Victoria Island and -was likely to vary from
scheme to scheme depending on the degree of reclamation.
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Table 6.7
increases in Prices of LEDB
1
Year
1959/60
1960/61
1961-1964
1964-1965
1965/1966
1966-1970
1970-
Land Sold to the Public
2
Price of LEDB Land Per
Sq.Yd.(in shillings)
12.5
15.0
20.0
25.0
27.0
30.0
40.0
1959-1970
3
Percent
Increase
20.0
33.3
25.0
8.0
11.1
33.3
4
Price Change with 1959-
1960 = 100
100.0
120.0
160.0
200.0
216.0
240.0
320.0
Source: Computed from Land Price Information Obtained from the Estate Department of the LEDB.
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less to those due to inflation), as the literature on public urban land management
agencies would imply, they do, although the relatively higher quality level of the
Board's plots has always been pointed to as a justification for higher prices and the
rapid increases from year to year could be explained-as being due to cost increases
caused by inflation of the costs involved in its site preparation and servicing and
accordingly reflected in its land prices. The problem here, however, is where such
cost increases leave the question of accessibility of land resources to people if such
costs keep rising, and keep being reflected in the Board's land prices, and if this
must be so, what difference, then, is it from the private or traditional system?
The Board may not have been in a position to control inflation (which was an economy-
wide phenomenon). It is, however, possible that its standards and quality of land
preparation were "too sophisticated" and "over-designed" for the majority of the
people concerned. It might have been possible to have simpler preparations and de-
signs without adversely affecting necessary quality of the environment.
The results of very high increases in land costs, either in public lands or
in private ones, is that new dwellings in many cases become too expensive for
people with ordinary incomes, because either the rents or the down payments have
been too high. A Report, for example, on one of the Board's schemes in Surulere,
stated that,
The cost of develqment of this site was rather high, and
consequently the rents on the plots were too high for the
class of persons for which the plots were meant. As a
result, most of the persons to whom these plots were
allocated had not been able to pay for them.....23,
23Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, 1966, p. 116.
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thus undeiscoring the fact that a rise in the proportion af total building costs taken
up by outlays on land is a grave development. Even if in some cases special public
subsidies are used to off-set the impacts of these high costs, the subsidies themselves
represent a charge on public budgets, a solution which should be considered only as
a social necessity,as public budgets come out of tax burdens.
Table 6.8 shows the generalized land prices for the Lagos metropolitan
area. Three reasonable comparisons that can be made are in reference to these
generalized prices . The generalizations can be made as follows: (1) Land prices
vary with the three major sources of land -- the traditional land market, the LEDB,
and the private real estate firms in the ratio of 1:2:5. The highest prices for land
(very much higher than the generalized prices) is found in the private real estate
land market. This is the market controlled principally by the very few real estate
firms that exist in the city. It operates along modem commercial legalistic lines,
and it deals principally in freeholds. Whereas private plots transacted freehold
by the traditional co-ethnics cost about $6.00 per square metre, those sold by the
real estate firms cost about $15.00 per square meter. 24 The land prices here are
40% to 75% higher than the generalized land prices, in spite of the fact that they
are raw unserviced land. The scope of this 'market' is, however, very small and
relatively negligible. The patrons are "mainly private commercial firms or companies,
and the 'stronger' elements which includes other Nigerians of non-Yoruba group".
These are the groups that otherwise would find it very difficult buying or leasing
land from the traditional land market. In a sample of 87 sale transactions in land
Calculated from Registration Records, Lagos Land Registry, February 2,
1976.
T THE DIFFERENT 'MARKETS' (in shillings per square yard)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Price of LEDB Private Traditional*
Neighborhood DCBD Land Price Market Market
Marina, Broad St. 0 2,000
Idu Mota 0 100
Olowogbowo 0 500
Onikan 1 200 --
Obalende 1.5 17
Ikoyi S.W. 2.0 35
Victoria Island 3 42
Iddo-Ijora 1 17 --
Apapa 2 21
Ebute Metta 3 25
Surulere 4 25 30.0 34.0
Ajegunke 5 16 30.0 20.0
c' Mushkin 6 16 100.0 44.3
Isolo 7 11 100.0 37.5
Oshodi 9 14
Ikeja 11 17 24.8
Alagba 13
Ojo 14 2
Gbogbo 12 2
lkorodu 20-25 2 87.0
Shomolu 7 15 30.0 17.7
Omole 14 2 40.0 12.0
Bariga 5 15 100.0 20.8
1lasamaja (Mishin) 6 16 90.0
Akangba 4 25 40.0 33.7
Ikate 4 25 30.0 8.0
Bariga 5 15 30.0 13.9-
* 'Traditional' market here means the 'not completely monetised' markets -- markets transacted within the traditional
value context -- not 'rational economic'.
Source: Column 3 is from Draft Master Plan for Lagos (1971); columns 4-6 are calculated and compiled from data obtained from Deeds and
Titles Registrations files, Lagos State Land Registry.
TABLE 6.8: LAND PRICES IN
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in Lagos metropolitan area in 1975, only 8 (9.2%) were by real estate firms. 2 5
Land prices in this market vary less from location to location or from person to
person than would land prices in the traditional land market. Its prices averaged
100s ($15)per square yard in 1975. The prices in this 'market' are followed by the
Board's prices which lie above the generalized prices but below the 'private real
estate market price' in spite of its relatively higher quality. The customers in this
market are, of course, generally the Government itself, its agencies, civil ser-
vants, and then the general public, in that order. Other pricing factors in this
market, as has been pointed out, were the direct and indirect subsidy considerations
involved in most public and semi-public undertakings. ~The Board controlled under
20% of the Lagos metropolitan lands, and the average prices of its land is 4 0s to 50s
per square yard. Like the private (real estate firm) land market, its prices vary less
from place to place or from person to person than do prices in the traditional market.
The third and lowest prices are found in the 'private (traditional) communal
market' and these are generally below the generalized prices, but vry more widely
from place to place and from transaction to transaction than either the LEDB prices
or private market (real estate firms) prices. This is due to the peculiar nature of
the transactions within the traditional culture. As had been pointed out, most
transactions in land are intra-group and inter-relational. Given the subjective
considerations and treatment that follow the transactions, they are consummated at
less than the pure commercial market prices. The degree of personal relationship be-
tween the buyer and the seller often greatly influences the price asked for and paid.
2 5 Ibid.
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The price here ranged from 0.2 s to 90s per sc uare yard (1975). With respect to
leaseholds, the annual rent in the traditional transactions market is as low.as 5% of
the rent charged in LEDB leaseholds.26 In freeholds, too, the proportion and rela-
tive disparity between the two sources is almost similar, with the LEDB prices gen-
erally much higher than the "private traditional/communal land" prices. But, as
has been pointed out, the relatively higher prices of the LEDB follow from the
higher quality of its lands. Section A of Table 6.9 shows that site development (col-
umn 7) (land preparation and servicing) constitutes on the average about 50% of the
total cost of serviced land, and the cost of raw land averaged 17-20% of serviced
building plots of land. In schemes where reclamations are involved, the cost of
reclamation (Column 6) can claim between 30 and 50% of the cost of aplotofbuilding
land depending on the degree of reclamation involved in the scheme. "The value of
LEDB reclaimed land is increased approximately threefold -- that which was bought
at 7 shillings per square yard will sell for 20 shillings, that costing 10 shillings, for
30 shillings, and so on." 2 7 The cost of land preparation, then, constitutes a
serious problem in public land supply and availability in Lagos -- in fact, a more
serious problem, price and accessibility-wise than the bare land supply itself. Al-
though the evidence is not very conclusive, indications are that the cost of land
preparation and servicing have risen more rapidly than has the cost for raw land ac-
quisition. 28
2 6 From data obtained from the Lagos Land Registry, Jan. 2, 1976.
2 7 T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit.
2 8 This section is based on the data and information contained in the Lagos
Land Registry with respect to these three modes, and the problems with this data have
been discussed on p.2 2 6-30 of this chapter.
Table 6.9
Relative Cost Proportions of Land Development Elements in LEDB Schemes
Elements as % of Total Cost of Each Scheme
1
Project or Scheme
2
Size
3
Cost of Raw
(acres) Land (in t)
4
Total Cost of Land
& Development (t)
A. Building Plots Scheme I
1. Apapa Estate
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1,000
Itire Rd. Freehold
Akangba Freehold
Animashaun Freehold
W. Avenue
Freehold L.S. #6
Randle Avenue #7
8. S.W. Ikoyi-
Obalende Dev.
9. S.E. Ikoyi
10. Victoria Island
Phase I
11.- Victoria Island
Phase II
12. Victoria Island
Phase I 1I
13. Lagos Central Ping.
B. Housing Schemes
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Freehold No. I
Freehold No. 2
Freehold No. 3
Freehold No. 4
Freehold No. 4a
Freehold No. 5
132
53
275
57
n .a.
1i1
16,650
53,680
44,813
1,865
57,577
27,350
11,003
258 20,092
270 326,457
5,950:
1,600 17,986
110,525
70 2,356,236
22,990
7,573
152.0 47,331
13,163
8,926
234 311,939
2,075,718
442,441
157,975
148,396
150,570
88,793
48,527
794,371,
603,223
762,887
417,475
3,069,537
4,191,809
173,038
71,014
346,121
140,763
82,030
3,413,092
5
Raw
Land
0.8
12.0
28.0
12.6
38.2
30.8,
22.7
2.5
0.8
4.3
3.6
56.2
13.3
10.7
13.7
9.4
10.9
9.1
6
Reclam-
ation
38.4
34.0
54.1
34.6
38.9
80.0
7
Site De-
velopment
49.7
78.0
62.0
73.8
46.0
60.4
55.5
51.0
38.6
53.0
44.0
4.0
11.3
14.6
9.1
8
Erection
of Houses
76.4
78.7
76.5
62.0
75.7
68.0
9
Gen. Develop-
ment Expenses .
11.0
10.0
9.5
24.9
15.8
8.8
22.0
12.6
7.3
11.6
12.7
12.8
6.2
10.2
10.6
9.8
14.1
13.4
13.7
--
--
--
--an
Table 6.9 (cont.)
Elements as % of Total Cost of Each
3
Cost of Raw
Land (in 6)
4
Total Cost of Land
& Develooment (t)
5
Raw
Land
6
Reclam-
ation
7
Site De-
velopment
8
Erection
of Houses
9
Gen. Develop-
ment Expenses
re o (i b
B. Housing Schemes (cont.)
20. Freehold No. 6 n.a.
21. Lagos Housing 1955 56
22. Surulere Rehousing
Estate No. 1
23. Surulere Rehousing
Estate No. 2 117
24. Surulere Rehousing
Estate No. 4
25. Metropolitan Housing 63
4,054
55,170
20,952
66,684
13,500
127,607
64,588
1,155,184
642,055
700,399
15,525
136,176
C. Industrial/Commercial Schemes
26. Iganmu Industrial
27. Surulere Shops
& Flats
28. ljora Site Dev.
10590.8
518.3 39,417
6.3
4.8
3.3
9.5
19.1
14.9
12.3
87.0
0.693.7
n.a.
6.5
67.5
65.8
71.2
66.0
13.0
--
86.6
77.8
87.0
26.2
10.3
10.5
12.3
5.7
13.5
15.7
13.1
1
P r Scheme
2
Size
(nrrs)
Scheme
166
n.a.
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Section B of the same Table (6.9) shows that the erection of houses (C'lumn
8) alone makes up about 70% of most LEDB's housing schemes and raw land constituted
9-10% of a fully developed house in the Board's scheme, Site development make
up some 12-20% of a fully developed house.
6.6 Comparison of LEDB Land and Housing Costs with Those of Other Public
Land Management Agencies (in Other Countries)
Although LEDB building plots and houses are considered expensive by local
standards, and this expensiveness is a result of the costs of land servicing and site
development, comparison of the different proportions of the cost elements in land
development by LEDB and other agencies in other countries shows that the proportions
in the LEDB schemes compare favourably with those of other countries, if not better.
Table 6.10, for example, shows the weight of land in housing costs in European
countries and in the U.S. during the same period that the LEDB schemes were under-
taken. Although proportions can be very different from actual cash costs, and
therefore deceptive, yet the proportions give a very useful idea of the relative cost
weights of the elements or inputs that go into land development and that very definitely
affects people's accessibility to shelter in the urban environment. The significant
point to note is the difference in the land cost proportions between single and multi-
family housing. The proportion of land cost in multi-family or apartment housing is
in the range of 3-8% (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Nigeria (LEDB)). For single
family housing (which in our context is synonymous with middle and higher income
housing) it is often in the range of 10-20%. This implies that the use of land in-
volved in apartment or multi-family structures minimizes per unit cost of land as
more units of housing could be built on a given unit of land, although it has been
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Table 6.10
THE WEIGHT OF LAND IN HOUSING COSTS
Land as Percent of Housing Cost
Nigeria (LEDB) 1959-66
Norway (1962)
Denmark (1962/63)
Sweden (1962)
Spain (1965)
France (1965)
U.S. (1962)
Israel (1965)
9-10% for single-family housing
4-5% for apartment or multi-family housing
8%
10-12% for single-family houses in suburbs
3-5% for apartment housing
6.3% for multi-family dwellings
10-15% for single-family housing
15-20%
20%
17.5%
35% for privately owned lands
9-13% for publicly owned land
Source: The figure for Nigeria is derived from Table 6.9. The European,
U.S., and Israeli figures are from U.N. Proceedings of the
Seminar on the Supply, Development and Allocation of Land for
Housing and Related Purposes (Paris, France, 28 March - 6 April,
1965), Vol. II, p. 216.
CountryCountrv
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generally accepted that higher densities provide lower costs only when land is very
29
expensive. Apartment houses, however, permit greater economy in the use of
land than detached single family dwellings,30 -- offering "greater economy of land,
of street and utility improvements and of construction materials because of fewer
end walls, etc.". Further comparison of LEDB raw land costs with same such costs
in other developing countries (Table 6.11) shows the proportion of raw land costs for
an LEDB low income housing compare favourably with same from other developing
countries' maior cities -- 5% for LEDB and 10-12% for cities in other developing
countries; but land servicing for LEDB low-income housing developments are
comparatively on the high side (15%) as compared with an average of about 6% for
other developing countries. The basic construction costs are all within the same
range in all the countries represented in Table 6.10.
But on moderate income housing, while the proportion of basic construction
costs again remains in the same range in all the categories, the LEDB shows higher
raw land cost proportions and very much higher proportion of land servicing costs.
One of the reasons for the increasing unit infrastructure costs may be the tendency
to provide services incompatible with the general level of development and income
levels in the society. Taking the LEDB freehold building plots schemes alone, site
preparation accounts for 50-70% of the cost (see Table 6.9).
29 Stone, P.A.: "The Economics of Housing & Urban Development" (Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 122, Part IV (1959), pp. 418-483.
30Colean, Miles L.: "The Factual Finding", American Housing: Problems
and Prospects, N.Y.: Twentieth Century Fund, 1944, pp. 52-56.
Ludlow, W.H.: "Urban Densities and-their Costs: An Exploration into the
Economics of Population Densities and Urban Patterns", in Urban Redevelopment:
Problems and Practices , ed. by Coleman Woodbury, University of Chicago Press,
1953.
TABLE 6.11: COST OF BASIC CONSTRUCTION, LAND SERVICING AND
COST FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING IN
RAW LAND AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
SELECTED CITIES (1)
HOUSING
Housing
City Type
Basic
Construc
Low-income Housing
Land
tion Servicing2
Raw
Land
Basic
Construct
Moderate-income Housing
Land
ion Servicing
Mexico City
Hong Kong3
Nairobi
Bogota
Seoul 3
Ahmedabad
Madras
Single family
Multi family
Multi family
Single family
Single family
Multi family
Multi family
Single family
Multi family
Single family
Multi family
1With individual toilet and services
21ncludes utilities and land development
Percentages do not add up to 100 because administrative costs have not been included
4 Located at the periphery of the city
5 Located inside the city
Sources: C. Araud et al., Studies on Employment in the Mexican Housing Industry (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1973); Hong Kong Housing Authority; National Housing Corporation, Kenya; DANE and Caja de la
Viviendo Popular, Bogota; Korea Housing Corporation; Gujarat Housing Commission; and Tamil Nadu HousingBoard.
Raw
Land
44 .94
79.9
68.1
64.5
69.5
91.5
84.1
48.1,
76.9
37 44
15.2
9.3
6.3
21.5
12.2
3.8
n.a.
n.a.
8.6
23.0
12.4
45.
45.8 4
13.84
29.4
14.04
18.34
4.7
7.3 4
28.9
10.74
58.8
80.1
78.5
95.6
71.4
68.7
77.5
80.4
3.8
4.7
n.a.
n.a.
9.1
1.9
15.0
8.4
8.0
n.a.
6. 1.
12.44
2.5
6.94
22.95
14.5
13.55
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By far, then, the most important factor in the price of LEDB building plots
is the cost of site preparation. But usually, one would expect raw land costs to have
a far stronger effect on the cost of developed plots than do the costs of preparation
and servicing, because unlike cost of most municipal services, which are only
weakly related to lot or plot size, raw land costs are proportional to area, 32, i e
dependent on lot size or net residential density than on either the costs of municipal
services or other lot improvements.
The relatively very high proportion of site preparation and servicing costs
on the cost/price of LEDB freehold plots, therefore, reflects rises in the unit cost of
developments, and much more certainly, reflects increases in the Board's perceived required
standards -- which apparently is out of tune with the level of development of the
society, having regard to income levels. The natural concern, therefore, about the
high costs of developed (serviced) plots is that these higher costs, insofar as they
are reflected in the prices of these plots, might be depriving large numbers of people
of good accommodation through their inability to afford such plots or houses that
reflect these costs.
In most other countries, much of land policy is concerned with 'controlling'
and keeping down the price of land. This kad not been the direct objective of the
LEDB. Rather, it can be said that the Board hadbeen an agent of land price increases
through substantial expenditures on land preparation and servicing which served to
raise its land prices, and also through the external effects of these, other lands in the
proximity of its projects became higher valued
32 In such a study in the San Francisco-Oakland Bay area of the U.S., Sherman
Maisel found that 63% of the price of a typical lot in 1963 (around the same time as LEDB
schemes under review), was accounted for by raw land costs and that increases in the cost
of raw land accounted for 52% of the increase in the cost of developed lots betv een 1950
and 1962 (Maisel, 1963, Table 4, p. 226).
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SUMMARY
While the bulk of the land in Lagos remained in private communal hands,
the Board certainly controlled a substantial proportion of urban lands in the metro-
politan area. It accounted for about 11% of the annual land supplies to the urban
land market, but the impacts of these supplies were limited by the character and
type of the developments, as well as by the conditions which the LEDB required of
the prospective beneficiaries. The costs of the Board's plots of land were generally
high, owing largely to the very high site preparation costs incurred. It had been
suggested that the LEDB site preparation costs could be reduced by about 10-15%
through improved design and mass manufacture or production of component parts- 3 3
the improved design under reference would involve simpler rather than more sophisticated
land equipment or standards. The Board probably accounted for some 30-80%* of
all houses completed in the city of Lagos during each year between 1960 and 1970,
but again, the impact of these on the housing problems were hardly felt because
the character and type of the housing were for such a restricted and limited clientele
for whom the problem did not exist in the first place. They were generally single-
family detached or semi-detached houses, which involved uneconomical use of land.
In a way, the Board's acquisition of lands could be considered a withdrawal of land
from the general residential land market, given the very limited impact of such lands
on the existing urban land and housing problems when used for single-family develop-
ments.
33
Otto Koenigsberger, et al., op. cit., p. 162.
*It has been suggested that this proportion is that high because of possible
under-registration or non-registration of completed houses by large segments o the
private sector, which has the effect of exaggerating the proportion accounted for
by the Board.
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With respect to land prices, comparisons are very difficult, as much is
unknown in the private communal sector. However, indicct ions are that land prices
are lowest in this sector, higher in the public sector (LEDB plots) for reasons of
quality, amenity, and security and highest in the small private sector real estate
market because in this market, foreigners and other Nigerian 'strangers' who for
social, cultural, or political reasons are excluded from the private-traditional/com-
munal market and from the LEDB market, find their only market. The clients of this
market have very little if any choice, which explains the high price level. Prices
here are more than double the LEDB prices and many times over those in the private/
traditional-communal market. Urban land supply does not only have to do with the
magnitude of physical output or availability of urban land. It also has to do with,
more importantly, the accessibility of these to urban residents.
From the character and type of LEDB land supplies, and from the criteria
and conditions for beneficiary allocation, the LEDB supplies were as constrained in
scope , if not more, than were the traditional communal sources which it was meant
to improve upon. Its building plots were, however, obviously of higher quality
and amenity levels. But permanent improvements in quality are obtained only after
the problem of quantity has been largely solved -- that is, when the production of
new houses has caught up with the needs of a growing urban population - which
suggests the use of 'conservative therapy' rather than 'radical surgery'*, as a more
permanent and effective approach.
*Patrick Geddes on India, 1928. 'Conservative therapy' refers to small,
gradual or incremental but sure improvements in housing quality and one at a time,
taking into consideration the incomes of the person or persons involved, and their
cultural disposition to appreciate and maintain the given quality. 'Radical surgery'
refers to sudden changes in the living conditions of a people, by the imposition of a
high standard to which such people are not used to and may not be able to maintain,
given their income levels and training.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CHARACTER OF LEDB LAND AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS
AND THE CRITERIA AND PROCESSES OF THEIR ALLOCATIONS:
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESSIBILITY AMONG INCOME GROUPS
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Chapter 7
CHARACTER OF LEDB LAND & HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CRITERIA AND
PROCESSES OF THEIR ALLOCATIONS: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR AC-
CESSIBILITY AMONG INCOME GROUPS
The last chapter assessed the impact of LEDB sources on the urban land and
housing market in Lagos. It noted that that source accounted for about 10-11% of ,
annual land and housing supply during the relevant periods, and that the bulk of the
land still remains in communal hands. The chapter also noted that Vh ile the prices
for LEDB land and housing were higher than the "traditional" land market prices,
they were lower than the prices for land in the "commercial real estate market" of the
city. The relatively higher price of LEDB land and housing over the "traditional"
land market prices was understandable on grounds of their better quality servicing and
development, and it was noted that site preparation costs made up on the average a
considerable 50-70% of LEDB land costs/prices, as the Board is authorized to reflect
all these costs on its leasehold and sale prices of the property concerned. "In deter-
mining the rate to be fixed for leasing or selling," states the enabling Lagos Planning
Act (Cap. 95), " the Board shall take into account the costs of all works, develop-
ment and overhead expenses for the land being leased or sold." This explains the
Board's pricing principle except in cases where Government subsidies are as a matter
of policy applied.
It was explained that the yet small commercial real estate market caters
mainly to 'strangers' (who might be non-Lagos Nigerians) and commercial firms who
otherwise find it very difficult to obtain land because of the customary or traditional
land tenure constraints, and therefore have to pay higher to overcome those constraints
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through the few real estate firms. It is recalled that among the many advantages said
to be inherent in public land ownership and management are that it facilitates easier
access to land and housing by all segments of the society's population, and that it
increases the efficiency of land use and development. In this chapter, it is intended
to examine the distributional aspects of the Board's land resources, and the efficiency
or otherwise of this distribution, as well as the efficiency or otherwise of the Board's
modes or forms of land development practices.
The way in which urban land and housing markets and Government interven-
tions in them have determined housing alternatives for urban residents in general, and
the urban poor in particular, is analyzed and discussed. The character of the Board's
outputs of land and housing is examined along with the criteria and processes of al-
location of the Board's plots and houses to beneficiaries. The implications of the
allocation criteria and processes (which define who benefits from LEDB lands and
housing) on the distributional accessibility of the Board's land resources among in-
come groups, and its impacts on the resolution of the urban land and housing problem
is also analyzed. The implications of the Board's pattern of beneficiary distribution
on the pattern of urban land wealth distribution and the general income distribution
structure is also discussed.
It is concluded that the Board's beneficiary distribution of its land resources was
significantly regressive and the forms of development involved significant inefficiencies
in the use of urban land.
7.1 Criteria and Processes of Beneficiary Allocation
Generally, one or all of three factors would define who (what type of people)
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benefits from LEDB schemes in general , or from any particular scheme-
(1) The Board's or Government's policy objective in a given scheme:
Certain schemes were designated for certain classes or groups of people -
low income, workers, middle and high income, resettlements, senior civil servants,
as may be the case. Whether the actual distribution orallocation strictly goes to the
intended beneficiary group and how much is another matter. A not surprising ex-
perience is that there is always a wide gap between the official stated objective and
the actual application of those objectives, particularly with respect to low income
housing beneficiaries.:
Table 7.1 shows some of LEDB residential schemes (both housing schemes and
building plots schemes). Sometimes the objectives of a given scheme or project are
not explicitly stated with respect to the intended beneficiary group, but they be-
come clear from the statements and actions of the Board as each scheme progresses
and becomes completed. The objectives of each scheme given in Column 4 of Table
7.1 are taken from the various LEDB publications, particularly various Annual Reports.
A careful examination of these, along with the acreages involved in each, gives a
fairly good idea of beneficiary distribution among income groups. Taking the schemes
and their stated objectives broadly, 3,768 acres (92.4%) (Apapa, Victoria Island,
S.E. and S.W. Ikoyi, and Freehold Housing and Land Schemes, numbers 5-9 on
Table 7.1) were addressed to the middle and high income groups (variously referred
to in LEDB publications as "middle class and better class", "persons who can never
be considered for any future subsidized schemes", "the high income","Senior Civil
Servants". This group constitutes between 5-10% of the urban population ance has
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TABLE 7.1: LEDB: Target Beneficiary Groups
Scheme or
Project
Apapa Estate
Legos Central Planning Sch.
Surulere Rehousing Scheme
Lagos Housing Scheme
Metropolitan Housing Scheme
Land (building plots) Scheme
Freehold Housing Sch.
Surulere
S.E. Ikoyi
S.W. Ikoyi
Victoria Island
Size in
Acres
650
70
120
56
63
600
390
270
258
1,600
Type of
Scheme
leasehold
building
plots
slum
clearance
rehousing
scheme
workers
housing
workers
housing
freehold
building plots
freehold
housing
building
plots
building
plots
building
plots scheme
in Public Urban Land Projects
Goal of Land or Housing Allocation
(or Beneficiary Target Group)
Sundry persons
as
Return or reconvey,. much of the land as pos-
sible to the original ownersafter slum clear-
ance & redevelopment*
To provide accomodation for persons displaced
under the Lagos Central Planning Scheme (above,
Intended to accommodate low income group
workers* (p. 22)
Intended to accommodate low income group
workers* (p. 22)
Sale of freehold building plots to the general
public to be purchased by anybody who can pay
for the land (p. 24) and can develop it
within a reasonable time.
To meet the continuous housing demand in Lagos
for those persons who can never be considered
for any future subsidized schemes.* (p. 25)
Provided the much needed opportunity for the
people in the civil service and those in the
public sector to buy homes of their own",*
"For better class housing development"* (p. 26).
"The scheme provides developed land for both
middle class and better class residential develop-
ment"* (p. 26).
"Primarily to Senior civil servants" ***(p. 87).
For the high income and high soc ial status per-
sons, mostly residences for diplomats, oil exec-
utives and other industrialists.**
LEDB: Annual Reports and Account 1957/58.
** Lagos State Development and Property Corporation:
Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of
Towards a Better Environment
the LEDB, p. 87.
-257-
devoted to ik some 92% of the land and housing resources of the Board.
The remaining 310 acres (7.5%) was addressed to the low income, though
strictly speaking the displaced people from the Lagos Central Planning Scheme were
not all of low income, nor were all of those who secured accommodations in the
schemes designated as low income. Even then, as has been rightly pointed out by
Aribia, "The problem with low income housing schemes is that they often cater for
employees of governments and sometimes industry, while leaving out those sections of
the population who though equally poor, are self-employed as petty traders, way- side
mechanics and such other occupations."
(2) The second factor that influenced the beneficiary distribution of the
Board's land and housing resources was the criteria of allocation for such resources.
While this factor i's closely related to the first (stated objective for the scheme),
they could differ, in actual application or implementation. The criterion of allo-
cation defines what category of persons that should benefit from a given scheme and
ostensibly all persons not within that category would not benefit from the scheme.
This, however, only proved a theoretical guiding principle, as the criteria were often
"more honoured in the breach than in the observance." Some proportion of S.W.
Ikoyi Land and Housing Scheme, for example, was stipulated to be allocated to the
people affected (displaced) by the Central Lagos.Slum Clearance scheme, but in
practice, eleven of the 24 houses were allocated to persons who were not affected by
the slum clearance scheme,2 and the 243 plots previously marked for this purpose were
1Oberu Aribiah: "Social Aspects of Urban Rehousing in Lagos" (Lagos Notes
and Records, Vol. ill, No. 2, Jan. 1972, pp. 41-42).
2Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the LEDB, Apperd'x
VB, p. 248).
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withdrawn and re-allocated to Senior Civil Servants.
Specific provisions for the poor were made in some of the housing schemes by
designating some of the Board's schemes as low cost housing schemes. One of these
officially designated low cost houses for the low income was the Lagos Housing
scheme (1955) which had about 1,368 low cost houses. The insufficiency of supplies
of houses in this category and the consequent subjectivity in the choice of beneficiaries
in this scheme (as in most scarce commodities), provides a good illustration of how
easy it is to sidetrack objective criteria during the pressures of implementation, and
thus the sources of the divergences between intended policy goals, and their final
outcome in practice.
The criteria of tenancy in these subsidized low income houses as laid down
by the Government and the Board, included the conditions that the prospective tenant
applicants have:
(i) Incomes not exceeding 300 (about $1 ,000) per annum. This income
was presumably considered the upper edge of the low income group
at that period;
(ii) At least five years continuous employment in the city. This vo uld ex-
clude the unemployed and recent migrants, and was possibly meant
to discourage the migration of the unemployed into the city to ex-
acerbate the already bad situation;
(iii) Not less than 10 years' residency in the city of Lagos at the time of
application. It is likely that significant public housing (as this could
encourage further migration into the city) and ostensibly public policy
would not want to do anything to encourage this trend. Thus, condi-
tions (ii) and (iii) were ostensibly designed to discourage rapid migra-
tion into the city -- a policy of doubtful effectiveness, as migrants
did not depend on such housing for migration decisions, and such
houses at any rate were too few to influence such movements;
(iv) Size of family in relation to existing living conditions of the aoplicant.
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The larger the size of the family, the better an applicant's chances
of getting into this low cost housing scheme; and
(v) Implicitlyassumed or understood is that the applicant must be a
'worker', which in that context means a Government worker (civil
servant) or at least 'formal' sector worker, as opposed to the self-
employed or 'informal' sector worker, who, by implication, is not
eligible.
As in most of the designated low income housing schemes, however, appli-
cations were over-subscribed. Some 4,400 applications were received for the avail-
able 1,368 houses. This meant that more of the resources were wanted than were
available at the privileged prices or conditions. Faced with this, the LEDB adopted
a "points" system of priority, and the priority awards were then determined by: (i)
the length of continuous employment in the city; (ii) the length of residence in the
city; and (iii) size of family in relation to the existing living conditions of the appli-
cant, The up-shot was that the income limit criterion was side-tracked, presumably
because too many people qualified under that criterion; but then, many more people
become theoretically eligible under the revised three criteria used in the "points"
rating system. Other people, not of the low income category, could fit into the
latter three rating and awarding criteria, including people with middle and moderate
income means; and even the methods of determining the veracity and authenticity
of those claiming to meet these criteria remained very open to question. Because
low income designated housing was generally highly subsidized by means of capital
grants from the Government to the Board, there was always heated competition to
get into them, by even the middle income persons, and with the objective income
criterion dispensed with, or at best relegated to background, subjective criteria
and the personal interests of those doing the allocations prevailed. The result was
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that many of those who ultimately benefited from the so-called low cost houses of-
ficially set aside for the low income people, were in actual fact not of the low
income. The Surulere Rehousing Scheme (No. 3 on Table 7.1), for example, was
meant to rehouse at subsidized rent, people who had been displaced by the Central
Lagos Slum Clearance Scheme (No. 2 on Table 7.1), but the Board allocated many
of those houses to persons not affected by the displacements, on the pretext that,
"these tenants would pay economic rents."3 Using the pretext of securing economic
rents, some officials of the Board helped into these houses, their friends and relations
who, to confuse the public, are charged so-called "economic rent' of t4.8 for a
two-roomed house, instead of the subsidized rent of t2.5 per month, for the first
few months, but are reduced to the subsidized rent later on,4 even though these il-
legal tenants might be of the middle income group. Likewise, some lands in the Lagos
Central Planning Scheme were not reconveyed to their original owners as laid down
by the law governing the scheme, but were rather sold to other people by the Board
because, according to the Board, the original "... owners were not prepared to pay
the re-purchase price of these plots". Thus, the old truth applies, that scarcity,
competition, and discrimination are inseparable, and where they exist, new elements
(criteria) are introduced for discriminating among the compe ting claimants. The
result in such cases is that the officially stated goals are ignored and lost.
(3) The third set of factors that determine the beneficiary distribution con-
figuration of the Board's land and houses is the Board's conditions for allocation and
the terms of the covenant that the prospective beneficiary is expected to fulfill.
3Ibid., p. 160.
4lbid.
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After land for residential schemes has been acquired, surveyed, and mapped, the
building plots are demarcated, prepared, and serviced with the necessary facilities.
Then public notices are published inviting members of the 'public' who are interested
to apply for allocation of the plots.
Ostensibly, any member of the public can apply and be allocated a plot,
but in practice the conditions and criteria of allocation definitely exclude by impli-
cation certain economic groups from getting land.
The prospective applicant is required to fill out an application form in which
among other things he is required to state:
(i) What size of building plots he is applying for;
(ii) What type of building he wants to put up on the land and whether he
could build houses of a particular val ue if requested to do so by the
Board;
(iii) The particular plot or location of plot in scheme area that he wants;
(iv) Within what time he would be able to develcp the land;
(v) His income and sources of finance for the proposed building;
(vi) His occupation, etc.
Generally, in selecting applicants to purchase or be allocated plots of
land or houses in schemes that are not specifically designated 'low income' or sub-
sidized as such, the Board is principally guided by ability to pay for the plots or
houses and ability to develop the land within a reasonable time. The rationale for
this has been that some of these schemes had been financed from short-term loans
from the commercial banks which have to be repaid within very short periods of time,
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and that th- best means of ensuring re-payments of the loans within the stipulated
periods was to sell the plots of land or houses to those who can pay for them so that
these costs could be quickly recovered.
The conditions for being allocated a plot by the Board, therefore, generally
included among other things:
(a) The ability to rrake a down payment of from 25% to 100% of the tost
of the land or housing;
(b) The applicant be preferably a wage or salary earner; it helps further
if the applicant is a Government employee or an employee of a
Government agency. This is because the salary or wage earner,
particularly in Government, is more likely to be eligible for a loan
credit for housing. The mortgage and other housing credit facilities
in the country are designed for the benefit of wage or salary earners
because most of these are Government-sponsored or guaranteed.5
Moreover, in a country where record-keeping is as yet an exception
rather than the rule, the incomes of the self-employed or 'informal'
sector persons are not lnown, and can hardly be guessed. Tracking
such persons in the event of a default is a near impossible task. The
salary or wage earner, therefore, has the best known income 'track
record' and it is easier to enforce re-payment of debts through his
employers in case of default -- and so his better credit standing.
This requirements of wage or salary-earning implies also that the
large group of people engaged in self-employment are virtually ex-
cluded from the available public or quasi-public financed housing
development credit facilities -- the possible exceptions to this
being those self-employed persons who are wealthy enough to make
complete or near-complete down-payments for the land or housing
allocated -- that is, those who require no credit.
(c) The applicant's current and regular monthly salary or wage and other
incomes must be at least four times the amount of the monthly install-
ment re-payment of the loan which might be applied to the purchase
of the plot of land or housing. Often times these loans are operated
by the Board itself. This condition is designed to ensure that the ap-
plicant can pay the monthly installment on the land or housing and
5
See also Table 6.45 of Chapter 6.
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still have enough left to take care of his family or household expenses.
(d) The applicant must be under 45 years of age, since he is required to
be able to amortize the whole loan before age 55, which is the of-
ficial retirement age in the country.
An applicant who is over 45 years of age, or is of low income, or is not
a wage or salary earner, requires a guarantor with acceptable collaterals, which in
most cases is simply either not available or are not acceptable to the Board. The very
limited amount of credit available to would-be low income land and housing purchasers
or home builders, therefore, contributed pove rfully to limiting their access to the
urban land and housing opportunities offered by the Board.
The criteria and conditions of allocation of plots or housing to prospective
applicants is summed up in the declaration which the Board requires applicants to sign
with their applications. It reads:
I wish to purchase a freehold plot of land with the details and
conditions set out in this application.. .I understand that if I
am offered a plot and accept the offer, I must pay the full
purchase price within 30 days of the date of offer. I under-
stand and undertake to commence building on the plot within
six months of its being allocated to me and I will not sell
the plot, or any part thereof, without the written authority
of the Board. I understand that in the event of my not
complying with these conditions, the allocation may be
withdrawn from me without notice, or if a conveyance
has been executed, legal action may be taken against
me to enforce surrender of the plot.
In fact, in most if its freehold housing schemes, the Board required appli-
cants to either (i) pay the full purchase price in cash , or (2) be sponsored by the
"African Staff Housing Scheme" of the federal and state Governments(which, as had
been pointed out, implies that the applicant must have to be a civil servant, as only
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civil servants are eligible for this scheme), or (3) obtain loans from the Nigerian
Building Society or any other qualified loan association, which again has essentially
the some eligibility conditions as (2). Most of these loan associations are guaranteed
by the Government, for which only civil servants. are eligible. Referring to the
type of people who benefit from its land and housing schemes, for example, the
Board pointed out that,
By for the biggest customer are the civil servants, who
receive 100% loans from the Federal Government African
Staff Housing Board; and in this re.spect, this Department
(the Estate Department of the LEDB) works in close
cooperation with the Ministry of Establishments.
The N.B.S. is another financial institution where civil servants and others
receive loans6 for the purchase of the Board's lands. In addition to the manner of
payments for the Board's lands, the Board on its letter of allocation stipulates the
conditions (covenants) and specifications to be complied with by the allocatee, con-
ditions some of which further constrain or limit the beneficiary types and define the form
and type of development required by the Board. Some of these conditions include
provisions that the allocatee:
(a) Pay all taxes, rates, development charges, duties assessments, or out-
goings of whatever description that may be imposed, charged, or as-
sessed at such rate per centum as may seem to the lessor (the Board) or
seller expedient and reasonable on the land or the buildings thereon
or upon the occupier thereof or on the proceeds of transfer, assignment
or sale of the demised property. These rates, taxes, and charges are
subject to periodic upward revisions in the case of leaseholds.
6 LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts for the Year 1965/66, p. 22.
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(b) To fence and erect on the land allocated within two (2) years from
the date of allocation, residential buildings sited and constru:.ted
in accordance with plans and specifications approved by the Board.
(c) Not to permit any articles to be exposed for sale on the land allo-
cated, nor to use or permit to be used the land allocated for trading
or business purposes. This presumably is to prevent subsidiary use of
residential buildings (which is common in Nigeria), and therefore
to prevent slumification.
(d) The offer of the plot of land or house can only be accepted by the
allocatee and he is not to assign, sublet, or otherwise part with the
land except when developed, and this with the consent of the Board.
The consent may be given with new or additional conditions imposed
by the Board. This is supposedly to prevent trafficking in the Board's
lands in a way to defeat the objectives of the Board and public policy.
(e) The Board must be given the first option to re-purchase the property
on the developed plot, if it is to be sold.
(f) Not to permit any person other than the lessee, his family and dom-
estic servants to reside upon the land allocated. This implies that
only single-family, ostensibly owner-occupied houses are allowed to
be put up on such Board-allocated plots; rental apartments, there-
fore, are not allowed.
(g) Only first-class development, the building plans and specifications
of which must be approved by the appropriate authorities, will be
permitted.
(h) That if the allocatee shall absent himself from Lagos for a period ex-
ceeding three months, he shall appoint an agent whose name shall
be notified to the Board prior to the departure of the lessee and who
shall be responsible for the due performance of all the obligations of
the allocatee under the lease and the Board may require such appoint-
ment to be by power of attorney. This clause is ostensibly to prevent
absentee landlordism, and ensure that only those who live permanently
in the city benefit from the allocations.
From the foregoing conditions for allocation, it is clear that a prospective
beneficiary has to have a fairly strong resources base to meet these conditions and
qualify for allocation. A greater proportion of the Board's schemes were specifically
designed for such people with the ability to pay which may be reasonable ordinarily.
The point in this case, however, is that the Board's or public lands are by def'nition
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subsidized and this beneficiary class of people were proportionately very small in
relation to the rest of the urban population, and if the criterion of access in public
ownership and management is that of the "highest bidder wins" or "ability to pay",
then public ownership and management may be no better than the private market sys-
tem in this respect, and certainly not the traditional system - all of which it seeks
to replace. The pioportional size of the Board's schemes devoted to the high and
middle income segment of the population and the proportion of resources devoted to
these schemes were disproportionately very high. An examination of the income and
employment structure of the general population in the next section shows that this
"middle and high income" class for whom over 60% of the Board's schemes (in both
size and resources costs) were devoted constituted less than 10% of the urban working
population of Lagos.
From the point of view of the resolution of the other objective problem --
the amelioration of the urban housing situation and improvements of its quality -- the
various restrictive conditions imposed on those who got the plots with respect to the
type of development, militated against the achievement of these objectives. The
constraints placed on type of development would tend to constrain the maximizing of
housing units production, which could have helped relieve the acute housing deficit,
which in turn would provide the leverage for improvements in the quality of housing
and that of the general urban environment.
7.2 Lagos: Employment and Income Distribution Structure
Lagos had grown up as both the administrative capital and as the industrial
and commercial hub of Nigeria. The rate of in-migration to it is a result of ih po-
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tential for employmen t, and its housing and other social problems are a result of
this concentration of people.
The employment structure consists broadly of civil servants, industrial and
commercial workers, and a host of the self-employed -- mostly traders and tradesmen
of one commodity or another. Table 7.2 shows the occupational structure of Lagos
in 1950 and in 1963, according to the census figures of those years.
In either year, craftsmen, production workers, and labourers are the largest
group -- 45% in 1950 and 33% in 1963. These are followed by sales workers and
clerical workers. The professional, technical, administrative, and managerial groups
constitute about 5-6% of the work force. There was no significant agricultural pop-
ulation -- only about 2.4% -- the only large Nigerian town without a significant
agricultural population.
A 1961 Lagos Housing Enquiry also surveyed the employment in Lagos by
type of employers (Table 7.3) . It reflected the characteristics of Lagos as the
national administrative capital, as well as the industrial and commercial hub of the
nation. Approximately 38% of adult males employed in establishments of ten or
more employees were Government or quasi-Government employees, and approximately
30% were employed in industrial and commercial establishments. The self-employed
were the next largest group, with about 19% of the adult male employees.. These
were composed mainly of traders and other service and craft workers. If pensioners
are added to the self-employed category, the proportion of the self-employed will
rise to approximately 25%.
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TABLE 7. 2 : Occupational Groups in Lagos 1950 cnd 1963
Occupational Group
Professional, technical &
related a
Administrative, Executive
& Managerialb
Clerical
Sales Workers (traders)
Farmers, fishermen, hunters,
loggers, and related
Miners, quarrymen & related
Transport & communications c
Craftsmen, production workers
& labourers
Service, sport & recreationd
Unspecified or Inadequately
described
* 1950 was for gainfully employed males only. 1963 was for both male and female.
a Includes scientists, University lecturers, artists, etc.
b Includes also traditional Chiefs, diplomats, directors, managers, and working proprietors
c Includes engineers, canoemen, chauffeurs, transport managers, etc.
d Includes policemen, hotel managers, cooks, domestic servants, wardens, photographers,
hospital workers, cleaners, etc.
SOURCE: Tabulated from Population Census of Lagos 1963 (F.O.S. Lagos 1963).
No.
2,836
1,560
9,953
6,678
1,788
3,326
32,850
10,643
2,859
72,493
1950*
% of Total
3.9
2.15
13.7
9.2
2.5
4.58
45.3
14.68
3.9
100.0
No.
15,692
4,188
41,811
73,780
6,651
235
19,360
92,583
26,632
2,773
283,705
1963
% of Total
5.53
1.48
14.74
26.01
2.34
0.08
6.82
32.63
9.39
0.98
100.00
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Table 7. 3: ,.agos: Employment of Adult Males 15 Years and Over, 1961
Type of Employer
federal public service
Public corporations
Lagos Town Council
Industrial/Commercial firms
Voluntary Agencies
Self-Employed and those
employed by businesses of less
than 10 employees
Students
Unemployed (including the aged)
No. of Employed
Adult Males
22,200
25,500
2,700
39,850
3,250
25,050
5,600
7,250
% of Total
Adult Males
16.9
19.4
2.0
30.3
2.5
19.1
4.26
5.5
TOTAL
Source: Prepared from "Report on
Statistics, Lagos, 1962).
131,400 100.0
the Lagos Housing Enquiry, 1961 (Federal Office of
38.3
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As Table 7.2 on occupational groups shows, only 6% of the work force are
in the professional and technical occupation group. This group received between
t2,000 and t 4,000 ($6,000-$12,000 approximately) per annum in the early 1960's.
A relatively small middle class earned between t 400 ($1,216) and t 800 ($2,432)
per annum, and the much larger class of low paid (low income) workers earned be-
tween t 120 ($365) and t 400 ($1,216) per year. The ratio of the disparity in income
between the upper and lower income classes was approximately 20:1 .*
Table 7.4 depicts the full income structure of the population of Lagos in
1961-62. The mean income per month in 1961-62 for income-earning adult males
was t 18.2 ($56.00). This worked out at approximately 1 218.0 per annum ($663.00).
This income reflected basic income (wages and salaries) plus over-time pay. Women
were ostensibly not widely employed in income-earning occupations at the time, so
that if they were taken into account in these computations, the average monthly
income of about t 18.2 $56) would in all likelihood have dropped significantly below
that figure.
This income enquiry also showed that 95% of adult males employed in large
firms earned below t 570 ($1,733) per annum, and 58% earned below t 210 ($638) per
annum.
Given these facts, if a maximum of t 400 ($1,216) per annum were assumed
to be the upper limit of low income at the time (which amount in actual fact was con-
sidered a middle-income level at the time), it meant (based on Table 7.4) that 91 000
*The comparable ratio in London at the time was 8:1. (Source: Report of the
Working Party on Statutory Corporations and State-owned companies; Appendix II:
Analysis of Government and Corporations Salary Structure, p. 48, Lagos Minist-y7of
Information, 1966).
Table 7. 4: Lagos: Basic Income Distribution Structure
A
Estimated Total
Income t '000
Income
t p.a.
0
Under 90
90 - 150
150 - 210
210 - 270
270 - 390
390 - 570
570 - 810
Over 810
B
No.
300
6,900
16,400
13,200
9,300
9,100
5,100
1,800
1,200
Estimated Total
Income t '000No.
1,600
8,100
8,100
1,800
1,900
1,700
800
500
500
No.
10,900
450
700
100
350
200
150
C
Estimated Total
Income t '000
30
80
20
90
70
70
400
2,000
2,400
2,200
3,000
2,400
1,200
1,200
Total 63,300 14,800 25,000 4,100 12,850 360 101,150.
Avg. Income
Per Month t 19.5 t 13.7 t 615.4*
A: Employed in Federal Public Service, by a Public Corporation, by Lagos Town Council, by a Voluntary Agency or by a
Commercial Firm employing 10 or more persons
B: Other Employees and Self-employed
C: Other adult males
* Those with an income
Source: Federal Office of Statistica, Lagos, "Lagos Housing Enquiry". (1961).
500
1 ,000
300
500
600
400
300
Total No.
of Persons
12, 800
15, 450
25,200
15,100
11 ,550
I ,000
6,050
2,300
1,700
Income Distribution StructureTable 7. 4': Lagos: Basic
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persons out of a total of 101,150, or 90%, were in the low income group. The
middle income group people at the time were people who earned between t 400 and
t 800 ($1,216$2,432) from regular wages and salaries. Only 8,350 persons out of
a total of 101,150, or 8.2%, were in this group. Only 1,700 or 1.6% of the work
force earned over t 810 ($2,500 approximately).
Chart 7.1 more succintly brings out the income distribution structure of the
city. The distribution is extremely positively skewed with the modal income group
being the t 90-150 ($275-$450) income group. The median income was t 194 ($590)
which implies that there were as many people below this income (t194/$590) as
were above it at that time; the maldistribution being underscored by the fact that the
median income is lower than the mean income.
Since this survey was undertaken, however, there had been some wages and
salaries revisions which had culminated in the doubling of wages and salaries. The
lowest wage and salary now is t 360 ($1,100 approximately) (that is for those who
are 'formally' and regularly employed). The official estimate of Nigeria's per capita
income in 1975 was t4205 ($312 approt imately).8
To have a full appreciation of their implications for accessibility to the
Board's lands under discussion, these income levels and their distribution structure have
to be seen in relation to the cost of living trends during that same period. Table 7.5,
7 Federal Office of Statistics: Urban Consumer Surveys -- Report on Enquiries
into the income and Expenditure Pattern of Lower and Middle income Wage-Eamer
Households in Lagos, 1950-1960, p. 2 (Published by the Chief Statistician, Lagos, 1963).
8Federal Republic of Nigeria: First Report of the Anti-Inflation Task Force
1975, p. 14.
-273-
CHART 7.1
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TABLE 7. 5-: Lagos Consumer Price Index 1966-1972
Group Incides
All Food & Tobacco Fuel & Other Purchases/ Other
Period Items Accommodation Drinks & Kola Light Clothing Household goods Trpt. Services
Weights 1.000 128 502 37 31 99 60 72 71
Yearly Average
1966 127 128 131 91 120 128 121 127 128
1967 122 132 119 90 122 130 125 128 127
1968 124 137 117 91 124 136 130 134 127
1969 136 142 144 95 127 143 132 135 124
1970 154 147 166 106 145 155 145 142 125
1971 175 151 205 107 140 166 157 142 120
1972 180 155 207 108 144 171 164 156 121
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos: Digest of Statistics, 1972 ( p. 72).
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for example, shows the Lagos consumer price indices from 1966 to 1972. In additon
to a consistent 4-5 point annual increase, the weighted yearly average for expendi-
ture on accommodation was clearly and consistently above the weighted yearly av-
erages for expenditures on all items throughout the 1960's. The same persistent annual
increases in the cost of housing (accommodation) continued through to 1975 (Table
7.6) with no less than 2% points annual increase throughout the period. This is
despite the generally low quality level of housing in Lagos. The average monthly
rent per room (100 square feet) was 52 shillings in 1961 and today (1976) it is more
than double that figure, at about 120 to 140 shillings. Increase in rents between the
three year period 1957-1960 was 24%, an average increase of 8% per year. Rent
as a proportion of income of the residents of Lagos had risen from about 13-15% in the
late 1960's to about 30-40%9 for all income groups in the mid-1970's. The 1975
Report of the Anti-inflation Task Force, noting that rents had moved in step with the
general price level, if not faster, observes, however, that, "What has made rent such
a sensitive issue is not so much its rate of increase, but rather the fact that it accounts
for a substantial proportion of total consumer spending."9 This, of course, is due to the
fact that there was and still is an acute housing shortage. Table 7.7 shows the rents
paid for Federal Government rented accommodation in different areas of Lagos, in
1975. The relative economies in the different types of housing costs is evident from
the table, i.e., the cost of apartments compared with the cost of duplex/bungalows
and single family houses.
Although for various reasons the Government is often a high cost purchaser
("bad bargainer") as well as a high cost producer, these rents would still be considered
91bid., p. 42.
Annual Variations in Consumer Prices (Lower Income Group) 1960 to 1975
*Accommo-*
dation
Fuel &
Clothing Drinks Food Light
Tobacco &
Kolanuts
Other
Transport Purchases
1961 6.3
1962 5.3
1963 -2.8
1964 1.1
1965 3.9
1966 9.7
1967 -3.7
1968 -0.4
1969 10.0
1970 13.8
1971 16.0
1972 2.8
! 73 5.4
1974 13.4
Avg. 1969-74 10.2
9 Avg. 1961-74 6.8
Avg. 1975 (Jan.-
June 1975) 4.7
% Contribution to
avg. 1970-74 ----
2.6
3.2
2.6
2.4
2.8
2.3
2.5
2.4
2.9
2.9
2.1
2.3
2.3
1.8
2.0
2.0
0.5
2.6
3.9
4.9
7.7
4.1
2.0
2.5
1.6
6.1
7.8
8.2
3.9
0.4
15.2
16.8
8.0
6.1
2.6
8.3
7.9
5.8
0.0
3.7
6.2
-1.9
0.2
9.9
1.8
1.9
4.3
4.0
18.4
1.2
4.5
4.5
5.4
10.0
7.5
-9.6
-0.9
4.5
20.5
-10.4
-5.6
18.9
23.5
28.5
2.5
3.2
15.7
3.2
10.1
10.0
1.1
3.1
-5.1
9.8
0.6
7.2
-0.1
2.8
9.5
11.5
10.3
-2.4
3.8
5.7
4.4
6.0 8.1
4.8 66.5 2.4
All
ItemsYear
Other
Services
-0.5
-0.5
-1.1
-0.9
-11.2
-0.7
-0.3
1.6
3.7
5.3
1.8
3.9
-3.4
7.0
3.5
0.8
0.3
1.1
1.0
1.6
2.6
3.0
11.9
1.0
1.3
4.6
1.4
8.6
0.4
3.8
9.9
30.5
7.8
5.8
1.9
6.8
1.0
1.7
1.9
3.1
2.0
3.3
3.8
9.7
14.5
12.4
8.6
2.7
1.5
12.7
7.5
5.6
5.9
4.2
1.7
4.2
8.6
2.7
3.2
1.2
-1.6
0.2
0.2
3.6
1.0
2.8
9.0
9.5
3.7
3.3
0.8
3.3
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria; First Report of the Anti-Inflotion Task Force, October 1975 (p. 80); Federal Ministry of
Information, Printing Division, Lagos, 1975.
TABLE 7. 6': Percentage
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exceedingly high even when the additional cost arising from the Government's "Lad
bargaining" has been taken into consideration. The relevant point, however, is that
what the Government pays for accommodation has impacts on the general rent level
as builders and developers take the cue and prefer to rent or sell only to the Govern-
ment, rather than to private individuals. Supplies, too, are adjusted by builders
and developers to the type of houses or accommodations that the Government
prefers to buy or rent -- duplex/bungalows and single-family houses. The resulting
reduction or withdrawal of investments from apartment or rooming-type housing that
the majority of people demand means that the Government is pricing the ordinary
citizen out of the housing market and thereby further exacerbating the problem.
This is much more serious because of the magnirude of housing demanded and rented
by the Government to meet its present policy of providing housing for senior civil
servants.
This very point, or its effect, was referred to in the World Bank Report 10
some ten years previous. The Report noted then that,
Private investors preferred to build for high incomel 1
tenants who could afford to give them a good return on
their investments. This inevitably led to a bias against
low income groups. In the context of the Development
Plan, this had an undesirable effect, i.e., it made
10IBRD: Nigerian Economic Growth: Problems and Prospects, Vol. IX (p. 4)
(November 29, 1965).
A substantial proportion of these "high income tenants" in reference are
senior civil servants and foreign consultants personnel and contractors for whom the
government is obliged to provide housing. As had been explained before, these are not
so much 'high income" as such, as they are of "high social status", and because of
their positions in the Government and in contractual relations in the Government
respectively, they have their housing provided or highly subsidized by the Government.
Because the government generally pays more for housing it rents, it tends to price out
the ordinary people in the housing market.
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Table 7.7
Annual Rents Paid by the Federal Government for Rented
Accommodation in Lagos in 1975
Location
Type of Accommodation Mainland Victoria Island
3 Bedroom Flats (Apartments) "1,400 ($2,128) W12,000 ($18,240)
Duplex/Bungalow t44,000 ($6,080) "20,000 ($30,400)
Single Family House W4,500 ($6,840) K25,000 ($38,000)
Source: Tabulated from the First Report of the Anti-Inflation Task Force 1975, p. 14.
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the gulf between rich and poor more obvious than it had
been in the past. It also tended to increase the demand
for imports.
Given then this income and employment structure of the population as has
been described, and given the cost of living trends, it is reasonable to assume that
only a very small proportion of the Lagos urban population were in a financial posi-
tion to meet the conditions of land or housing allocation by the LEDB, as outlined
in Section 7.1. The next section summarizes this.
7.3 Pattern of Beneficiary Distribution Among Socio-Economic Groups.
Given the various conditions, specifications, and criteria outlined for ac-
cessibility to the Board's lands and houses and given the structure of income distribu-
tion and general cost of living levels and trends, inferences could be made with re-
spect to what type and what proportion of people could benefit from the Board's land
resources. They would in all probability be those than can afford to pay for these
lands and can afford to develop them as required -- that is, the 5-6% of the popula-
tion that apparently could financially afford to meet these conditiors . On first
thought, this sounds very reasonable, natural, and 'as it should be'. It makes sense
to allocate lands to those who can afford to pay for them and can develop and build
such land with a view to providing more housing supplies to the city, particularly
rental housing for all segments of the urban population.
But from the foregoing conditions and criteria for qualifying for allocation
and from the terms of the covenants to be complied with by allocatees, and from the
character of the Board's directly constructed housing and other forms of its land de-
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velopment, the conclusion is inevitable that LEDB land and housing were not ori-
ented in the direction of increasing housing supplies to all segments of the urban
population, nor were they oriented to the segment where the need was greater.
About 90% of the urban population could not possibly meet the Board's specifica-
tions and criteria for the allocation of most of its lands and houses.
Table 7.8 shows the distribution of the Board's houses/housing units, and the
costs according to the intended beneficiary socio-economic groups. Noteworthy
is that 62% of the total housing expenditure was used to produce the least number
of housing units -- 1,308 out of a total of 6,714 (approximately 20%). This 20%
of the total housing units was produced on 62.5% (400 acres) of the total area
(640 acres) involved. The moderate and low income units (1,638 and 1,368 units
respectively) were produced on 9.8% (63 acres) and 8.8% (56 acres) respectively
of the total area involved. As would have become obvious, most of the free-
hold houses by the LEDB (which claimed 62% of the Board's total housing expendi-
ture of the period; 62.5% of the total land area devoted to the Board's housing and
which produced only 20% of the total housing units) were meant by the Board for
the high and middle income persons who could afford to pay for them. The Board
explained that, "The Board, in pursuing this policy, does so in order to meet the
continuous housing demand in Lagos for those who can never be considered for any
future subsidized housing schemes." 12 This implies of course that the high and
middle income group would have to be provided for first and now, lest they no
longer be provided for in the future, whilst the poor who presumably are certain to
be subsidized would have to wait. The underlying rationale for such reasoning is
difficult to understand. More so when, in most of these housing schemes, there was
12 LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts, 1957/58.
-281-
TABLE 7.8; Distribution of LEDB Housing Units & Expencitures According to Beneficiary Income Groups
No. of Units Total Cost (t)
Percent of Total
Housing Program
High & medium income
(freehold housing)
Moderate income
(Metropolitan scheme)
Low Cost
(low income)
Rehousing*
400
63
56
120
1,308
1,638
1,368
2,400
4,290,645
136,176
1,155,184
1,357,979
640 6,714 6,939,984 100.0
Source: Calculated from Annual Reports of the LEDB 1957/58 - 1965/66
* The Rehousing program which makes up 19% of the total housing program is a special case.
Firstly, the people being rehoused were displaced by the LEDB, therefore had the
obligation to re-house them, even though it was for a temporary period. And at any
rate, these houses were not additions to the housing stock, as they were cancelled out by
the greater number demolished by the Board. In fact, there was a net loss of housing
stock in the demolition as all the 20,000 displaced could not be re-housed. Secondly,
the 20,000 people involved included both the rich and the poor, and therefore
it is difficult to disaggregate them into income groups. The 2,400 units are mostly
one-room units.
Income
Group
Size of
Area
(Acres)
62.0%
2.0%
17.0%
19%
Grouo
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no limitation as to the number of the Board's thouses that could be acquired by a
single person. The Board had argued that the loans for their development were
secured from commercial banks and that, "It was in the interest of the Board to
dispose of these houses as quickly as possible, so as to reduce the interest charges
and to further the next phase of the programme."* The conditions or mode of pay-
mentsweretherefore designed to achieve this quick recovery of costs, and under-
scores the point made in Chapter Six, that the freehold mode of public land dis-
position favours only the economically strong who are able to make heavy down
payments for the plots of land or houses.
Thus, during this period (1950-1970) the only housing projects designated
low cost by the LEDB (which is not necessarily synonymous with 'low income housing')
is the Lagos Housing Scheme, or what was called the Workers' Scheme. This cost
1,115,184, or 17% of the Board's total housing schemes during the period. Al-
though this scheme was designated for the low income, however, and the criteria
for its allocation specifically outlined by the Government, it was clear that many
of the people who got them were not low income as defined by the criteria set out,
which was not surprising, as it is a general experience that during extreme shortages
of housing as have been perpetually experienced in Lagos (when all economic
groups except the very rich suffer from the lack of housing), subsidized houses
seldom go to those for whom they are intended -- being often covered by groups
that are economically stronger. In this case, many middle-class families re-
purchased houses from poorer families who lacked the resources to make regular
payments on their lots or houses or to pay for urban services, even though most of
these property transfers were illegal under Government and the Board's regulations.
*Federal Republic of Nigeria: Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs
of the LEDB, op. cit., p. 158.
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The overwhelmingly high cost and therefore high income housing alloca-
tion bias of the Board was despite the stated policy of the National Development
Plan of the period 3, which had piously planned that for Lagos, "At least 24,000
housing units must be provided, of which 60% will be for low income receivers;
30% for middle income groups and 10% for persons in the upper incorre brackers."*
This meant 14,400, 7,200, and 2,400 housing units respectively. A comparison
of this with Table 7.8 brings out the wide gap in theoretical public policy goal
setting, between the 'expected' and the 'observed' (actual).
Freehold land (building plots) schemes were both as a matter of explicit
policy and by implication, not designed for the other than the well-to-do. The
natural presumption was that the poorwould not have the resources to develop and
build on such plots, the standard or specifications of houses that would be accept-
able to the Board.
As had been pointed out earlier, the building plots schemes were designed
to "provide developed land for both middle class and better class residential de-
velopment."14 Policy in this regard (mode of distribution of urban land and
housing resources among income groups) was also outlined in the First National
Development Plan, which, recognizing the close inter-relatedness of housing and
land policy, went on to set out a series of guidelines for tackling it as follows:
13Nigerian National Development Plan, 1962-68, p. 94.
14 LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts 1957/58, p. 94.
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It is intended to develop land for lease at economic rates
for upper income housing For this purpose it is intended
to auction Government-owned building plots, a reserve
price of not less than half the present market value being
fixed. By this method, the profit of land developments
will become available for investment in further develop-
ment.
For middle income housing, it is intended to supplement
land development and leases at economic rents with the
provision of adequate financing facilities at unsubsidized
interest rates.
And for low income groups, it is intended to develop the
land, and to turn out by mass-production methods shell
houses at a cost which will allow individuals to pur-
chase them at a price which is lower than the rent paid
at present. 15
While theoretically, this was a very sound line of approach to urban land
and housing policy a great gap existed between policy statements of objectives of
this nature and the actual practice or implementation of those stated objectives.
The policy was being implemented as stated for the first two income groups --
upper income and middle income, which is not surprising because these are the
groups that make and implement the policies. Table 7.9, for example, shows the
distribution of a sample LEDB plots scheme at Apapa, among socio-economic (oc-
16
cupational and professional groups). Most, if not all, of these groups are what
one would regard as the upper and middle income groups of the society in question.
15 Nigeria, First National Development Plan 1962-68, p. 94.
1 6 Occupational and professional grouping is used as a proxy for income
group, as it is very difficult to obtain accurate money incomes of the individuals
concerned. Occupati.onal and professional grouping also has the added advantage
of giving an indication of the social and political power and influence of those
concerned, which in the context of the society under consideration, is more potent
than mere economic power alone, and in this society, socio-political power and
economic power could be mutually exclusive.
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Table 7.9
Beneficiary Distribution of LEDB
Socio-Econ. (Occupational)
Group
Legal* (Lawyers and Judges)
Medical Doctors
University Academics
Politicians and Civil Servants*
Other(Traders & Businessmen, Bankers
and Traditional Chiefs)
Institutional/Commercial Firms
LEDB Officials
Classification uncertain
plots among Socio-Economic Groups.
No. of Beneficiaries % of Total
4 t
21
12
2
50
30
38
10
12
12
6.9
1.1
28.6
17.1
21.7
5.7
6.9
Total 175 100.0
Source: Calculated from the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the
Lagos Executive Development Board, 1966, Appendix VIII:"Apapa Plots: Allocation
between 1-10-60 to 31-12- 65" (p. 25 0); and Appendix Ill:"Rent Arrears in respect of
Apapa plots as at 31-12-66", (p.231).
* These classifications are just approximate, for most of the time, these groups are not
mutually exclusive. Most lawyers are politicians and most politicians belong to one other
profession or occupational group, or the other. A more strict classification would show the
political class with over 70% of the plots.
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The Table shows the politicians as usual, the lawyers, doctors, and businessmen
controlling the urban land resources. The same pattern of distribution is repeated
in most of the Board's building plots schemes in Surulere, Ikoyi and Victoria Island;
and in most of its freehold housing schemes (see Table 6.4). The LEDB or public
land management seemed therefore, by use of public (state) legal instruments, to
have been assemblying land for the elite which they could not assemble for them-
selves.
As had been pointed out earlier, these LEDB plots, backed as they were
by Government instruments, were of the very best titles in a society where genuine
title to land is hard to ascertain. Coupled with this is the fact that they sold at
less than the private real estate market prices -- the stated Government policy
being "... to auction Government-owned building plots, a reserve price of not less
than half the present market value being fixed." 17 The result was a lot of traf-
ficking in LEDB/Government (public) lands, as these professionals used their
powers and influence to obtain such lands and re-sell them at enormous profits to
themselves. The LEDB itself acknowledged at a point that the plots were "changing
hands at a fantastic premia (six), in some cases, ten times more than the Board's
annual rent." 1 8 Of the 175 plots shown on Table 7.9, for example, 32, or 18.4%
were transferred or re-assigned or re-sold at great profits. Table 7.10 also shows
a list of LEDB staff who used their positions to secure these LEDB plots and houses
and re-sell at enormous profits. The Table shows profit ranges of 32% to over 100%
in such transactions.
17 Nigeria: First National Development Plan 1962-68, p. 93.
18LEDB Memorandum to the Tribunal of inquiry into the LEDB.
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TABLE 7.10: Profit Scale in the Re-Sale of Publicly (LEDB) Allocated Lands
Purchase Price
Paid to LEDB (t)
Private Re-
sale Price (t) Profit (t) Profit Percent
497
461
460
461
534
510
1,135
430
6.25 leasehold
6.0 leasehold
* Leaseholds
Source: Calculated from Appendix XI1:
and houses allocated to them",
Affairs of the LEDB.
"List of LEDB Staff who have transferred plots
p. 260 of Report of Tribunal of Inquiry to the
Serial
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1,000
800
800
700
800
895
1,500
800
930
1 ,200
503
339
340
239
266
385
365
370
923.75
1,194
101.2
73.5
73.9
51.8
49.8
75.5
32.2
86.0
14,780.0*
19,900.0*
.ai .E B(F
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Such racketeering by officials certainly underscores the point made in
the analogous issue of land banking, to the effect that,
The existence of public corporations with broad powers
of land acquisition requires a high level of public con-
fidence in the integrity of the civil servants concerned...
and that,
. . for developing countries, land banking raises serious
questions on civil service incorruptibility on the disposal,
as well as the acquisition, side of the process. 19
Such a concern also had prompted a public commission report20 to ad-
visedly insist that,
LEDB plots of land, being of the very best title at
present available in Lagos, care should be taken that
these plots of land, the genuineness of which is guaran-
teed by the State, should not fall into the hands of
financiers to the detriment of the common man. We
take the view that a scheme of this sort should cater
for and build houses to suit the pocket of the common
man whose interest, we are sure, the State has~ in
mind.
It was not certain, however, that the State had the interests of the
'common man' in mind in its urban land and housing policies during this period.
This is borne out by the acknowledgement by the Government itself that,
19Doebele, William A.: A Commentary on Urban Land Policy in Sweden
(IBRD Draft Discussion Paper, December 1974, p. iii).
20 Federal Republic of Nigeria: Report of the Tribunal of Enquiry into the
Affairs of the Lagos Executive Development Board for the Period Ist October 1960
to 31st December 1965. (Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos,
1968).
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The Government has traditionally tended to leave the field
(urban land and housing) almost wholly to private effort,
restricting itself to the provision of a limited number of
residential quarters for its officers. The late 1950's and
early 1960's saw increased, but still rather limited,
intervention by Government in the provision of housing.
This took the form of the development of a few middle
class housing estates (using the newly created regional
housing corporations), the introduction of mortgage lending
through the establishment of the Nigerian Building
Society and the Staff Housing Loan Schemes designed to
promote owner-occupation by civil servants. Until
very recently, the Government did not explicitly accept
any social responsibility for providing houses for the
masses and therefore did not deem it necessary to parti-
cipate actively in mass housing programmes, apart from
re-housing schemes necessitated by occasional slum
clearance activities. 2 1
Seen, therefore, in the light of the privileges which the Board's staff
had of purchasing these plots of land at reduced rates, it was not surprising that
those of them who ordinarily had not the need for these plots, found it profitable
to purchase them nevertheless at reduced rates, and sell or transfer them to members
of the public at prices much higher than they paid for them; this is much less sur-
prising when the loans they used for purchasing the lands in the first place, were
as a matter of policy subsidized by the Board itself. "When a member of the staff
purchases a house/land under the Staff Housing Scheme, he is charged 4% of the
loan from the Nigerian Building Society, and the Board subsidized the cost by paying
the difference of what the Building Society charges to outsiders.'22 The full Nigerian
Building Society interest rate at the time was 8.5%, which means that the member
2 1Federal Republic of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan 1975-
1980, Vol. i, p. 308.
22 LEDB: Memorandum to the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the
Lagos Executive Development Board, Lagos, 1967.
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of staff is sibsidized to the tune of 4.5% interest on his loans for purchase of tPe
Board's lands.
These profiteering transfers or sales, and these official- privileges that abetted
them, were on lands that had been compulsorily, and often times, forcibly, ac-
quired from their owners (who more often than not are the poorer elements of the
society), by the invocation of "public purpose" instruments. The Board, often in
such transfer cases, appeared helpless (albeit connivingly) to do much about such
situations, even though specific clauses in the covenants stipulate that lands gotten
from the Board could not be transferred or sold without the written penmission of
the Board, which in any case is required to be given the first option to repurchase
such plots of land or houses. Rather, the Board preferred to resignedly argue that,
"As the interest conveyed is a fee simple absolute, the Board has no means of en-
forcing any covenants not observed for the benefit of the Building Schemes as a whole,
such as covenants to develop or to control transfers." The evidence, however, was
that the Board was not enthusiastic in preventing these transfers when many of its
senior officials were themselves involved in the practice, and when it found it
politically inexpedient to enforce such covenants. After all, the Board had the
power of compulsory acquisition. These facts tend to underscore the point often
made by opponents of public ownership or management of land, to the effect that
public ownership or management simply,"...personifies the state on a few fallible
human beings who often use such state powers to enrich themselves, leaving the
general public interest the loser in many cases."
Given also that in the process of compulsory acquisition of land for scme
*Report of the Inquiry into the LEDB, op. cit., p. 157.
+Walters, A.A. et al.: op. cit., p. 45.
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of these schemes, a lot of people got moved out and displaced (e.g., the Victoria
Island scheme in which four villages were moved out, or the Central Lagos Clear-
ance Scheme in which 20,000 people were displaced), the equity of the processes
and criteria that excludes most of such people from access to some piece of land
which they had owned, simply on grounds of their income inadequacy or imposed
standards, remain very questionable. This is more so when the eventual beneficiar-
ies make economic fortunes out of the plots by manipulation of public instruments
or by taking undue advantage of the loop-holes in the letters of the law.
7.4 The Character of LEDB Land Development and its Impact on Urban Land
and Housing Supplies
Closely related to the question of land supply is the density of develop-
ment. Generally, the lower the density, the greater the amount of land needed
for a given quantity of housing; conversely, the higher the density, the smaller
the amount of land needed for a given quantity of housing. Within reasonable
limits, - higher residential densities would mean more efficient use of land.
The criteria and conditions for obtaining land from the LEDB emphasize develop-
ment on such lands of owner-occupied single-family houses. Apartment housing
development was not encouraged. Ostensibly, the Board was pursuing a policy of
improving the quality of housing in the metropolitan area. As overcrowding was
the most serious housing problem, the Board might have thought that low density
forms of development and putting restrictions on occupancy rates, was an effective
way to improve housing quality. In a situation of acute housing shortage, however,
improvements in housing standards are generally only possible when the production
of new housing has caught up with the housing deficit. Moreover, in addition to
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the numerical physical shortages of housing, as such, the housing problem is often
essentially an income problem, and one of the major goals of public urban land
management policy has generally often been to facilitate access to urban land and
housing resources for those with income problems.
The Board's conception of land development and its appreciation of the
problem of access were by implication best demonstrated in the lands and houses
it developed and constructed itself. In most of these developnents, as has already
been pointed out, the middle and high income were the major target groups, by
virtue of the prices of the houses, in relation to the general income levels. Table
7.11 shows some details of the different types of houses built by the Board under its
freehold housing schemes, the numbers and prices of each type. A careful examina-
tion of the Table shows that most of the developments were detached and semi-
detached single-family bungalows. These totalled about 1,308 by 1966, and cost
about t 4,291 ,000, or 62% of the Board's housing and re-housing expenditure pro-
gram during the period. The price for the cheapest of the freehold types (ti1,120,
or about $3,405) was higher than the annual income of 95% of the city's population
(it had been noted that 95% of the city's adult male work force earned below
t 570 ($1,733 at the time).
Public urban land management is said to make for efficiency in land use
and management -- efficiency in this context implying the goodness of maximizing
the use of the quantity of land available without increasing environmental dangers.
Higher residential densities could be maintained without necessarily endangering
the en'?ironment. Low densities are not necessarily synonymous with good quclity
Chart 7.2 -293-
HOUSING TYPE DENSITY IN DWELLING UNITS PER ACRE
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135
One- and Two-Family
1-Family Detached
1-Family Semidetached
1-Family Attached 
-
2-Family Detached
2-Family Semidetached
Multifamily
2 Story (Garden Apts.)
3 Slory
6 Story
9 Story
13 Story l I I
18 Story
24 Story
25 Story and Over
NOTE: All densities indicated are approximate
and should be used as a guide only.
Source: DeChiara, J. and Koppelman, L.: Manual of Housing Planning and Design Criteria (Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, (p. 79).
DensHy Ranges
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environment. Greater efficiency in land de velopment and housing units produc-
tion could have been achieved by devoting more land to higher density develop-
ment than the Board did.
The degree of inefficnency involved in the Board's forms and types of
development can be inferred from a comparison of the Board's adopted housing
types and residential densities, and the standard densities (that are obtainable
from other housing types and characters) for conventionally acceptable aesthetic
and environmental qualities. Chart 7.2 shows housing types and their convention-
ally associated densities in dwelling units per acre. It shows that the one-family
detached house types give only about five dwelling units per acre. Table 7.11
shows that most of the Board's developments were of this type and density.
Table 7.12 by the LEDB also confirms that these freehold houses were
developed at the low densities of 5 - 5.75 houses (housing units) per acre.
If these houses were developed as storeyed apartment houses, more eco-
nomies in the use of land would be obtainable. The low cost housing blocks, in
the Table, for example, each contains 4 housing units. At about 14 blocks per
acre, this comes to about 55 to 58 housing units per acre -- a difference of at least
50 more housing units per acre than in the freehold housing schemes. And freehold .husing forms
occupied some 62% of the total areal size of the Board's housing schemes. Even
from Chart 7.2 (which is more conservative than the LEDB low cost housing density
on Table 7.12), it could be seen that a two-storeyed apartment type would provide
25-30 dwelling units per acre, as opposed to only five in the detached types; and
a three-storeyed apartment 'block' would ersure a dwelling density of 40-45 dwel-
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TABLE 7.11: Character and Types of LEDB Housing Development
The following tables show in detail different types of houses and the number so far built under the Board's freehold housing
scheme, and low cost housing schemes.
Section A. Freehold
Type
Housing Scheme:
Freehold Area of Housing Units
Scheme House Description Total Price (t) (sq. ft.)
No. 1 TI/4 4 Roomed detached bungalow 70 1,670 806
T2/4 4 Roomed semi-detached bungalow 4 1,520
1
T1/3 3 Roomed detached bungalow 16 1,470 812
T2/3 3 Roomed semi-detached bungalow 12 1,320
T2/2 2 Roomed semi-detached bungalow 2 1,120
No, 2 A. 3 Bedroom detached house 12 2,880
C. 4 Bedroom detached house with garage 12 3,370 1,763
No. 3 A4. 4 Roomed detached bungalow with garage 34 2,300
A5. 4/5 Roomed detached bungalow with garage 31 2,470
A6. 5/6 Roomed detached bungalow with garage 78 2,670 1,480
No. 4 C. 4 Bedroom detached house with garage 37 3,370 1,763
No. 4A C. 4 Bedroom detached house with garage 25 3,370 1,763
A6. 5/6 Roomed detached house with garage 4 2,670 1,480
Phase I T1/4 4 Roomed detached bungalow 51 1,870
A6. 5/6 Roomed detached bungalow with garage 56 2,870
C. 4 Roomed detached bungalow with garage 43 3,570 1,763
Phase II E. 3 Bedroom detached house with garage and two
boy's quarters 35 5,500 2,046
D. 7 Bedroom detached house and two boy's
quarters including garage 5 5,500 2,647
Phase Ill T1/4 52 1,870
A6. 37 2,870
C. 30 3,570 1,763
Phase IV T1/3 3 Roomed detached bungalow 100 1,850 812
T1/4 4 Roomed detached bungalow with car port 100 2,250
A6. 6 Roomed detached bungalow 200 3,100
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TABLE 7.11(cont.)
Freehold Area of Housing Ur
Scheme Type House Description Total Price (sq. ft.)
Phase IV B. 3 Bedroom detached house including garage 20 3,500 1,550
(cont.) C. 4 Bedroom detached house including garage 25 3,750 1,763
D. 2 Bedroom flats house including car port
and two boy's quarters 32 5,500 2,260
F. 3 Bedroom including guest room, garage,
and two boy's quarters
Phase V T1/4 4 Roomed detached bungalow with carport 56 3,500
A6. 6 Roomed detached bungalow 56 4,600
C. 4 Bedroom detached house including garage 49 4,800 1,730
Phase VI T2/3 3 Roomed semi-detached bungalow 6 2,100
South West T2/4 4 Roomed semi-detached bungalow 6 2,500
Ikoyi A6. 6 Roomed detached bungalow 6 3,500
C. 4 Bedroom detached bungalow 6 4,200
SECI ION B. LOW-COST HOUSING SCHEME
2B 1 Bedroom in single-story block 2,098 396
1A Studio (efficiency) in single-story block 1 ,843 257
3A 2 Bedrooms in single-story block 2,437 551
S2 1 Bedroom in 2-story block 2,334 528
S3 Studio or efficiency in 2-story block 3,271 683
Sources:
i ts
Section A: From Annual Reports and Accounts of the LEDB for the Year 1965/66.
Section B: From Koenigsberger, Otto et al.: Metropolitan Lagos, Appendix V-A (p. 141).
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ling units per acre as contrasted to 5-10 per acre in the detached and semi-detached
house types that the LEDB concentrated on. On the basis of these comparisons, it
is possible to calculate an index of land waste or inefficiency in the Board's forms
of residential developments as follows:
Gx - Pmx x 100 where,
Gx
Gx - number of dwelling units per acre obtainable under the most effi-
cient (economical) housing type (say, apartments)
Pmx - number of dwelling units per acre obtainable under the particular
LEDB housing types and form of development
Using this formula and using various actual LEDB predominant develop-
ment densities (5,10) and using various 'possible' densities, based on Chart 7.2,
Table 7.13 shows the relative amounts of inefficiency (waste) involved in some of
the LEDB forms or densities of developments.
The table shows that these 'indices of waste or inefficiency' varied be-
tween 70% and 90% on the average. This implies that 70% to 90% more housing
units per acre could be produced from given LEDB freehold schemes.
Such a degree of inefficiency becomes much more significant when considered
along with the fact that housing conditions in the city over the 1953/54-1972/73
period were as shown on Table 7.14. The Table shows that over 74% of the house-
holds in the city and its metropolitan area occupied one room in 1972/73 and the
average number of persons per room wtas over 4.1.
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Table 7.12
LEDB: Analysis of Cost for Site Acquisition and Development.
Block or House Type
and plot size.
Net Density
of Houses/acre.
Cost of Land/House
or Block Net
Density Area.
Percentage of
building cost
Cost of Development
per plot..
Percentage of
building cost
Cost of Reclamation
per plot.
Percentage of building
cost.
LOW COST -OUSING.
'2B' Block
50' x 100' 14.4 235 11.1 t147 7.0 :190 9.0
'S2' Rlock
70' x 80' 13.6 t248 10.6 t165 7.0 0213 9.1
FREEHOLD H USING.
'A6' House
45' x 100' 5.75 147.25 7.5 t140 7.16 t172 8.8
'E' House
55' x 100' 5.00 t169.4 4.73 :172 4.8 210 5.86
Source: Koenigsbergor, Otto, et al: tropoli an Lagos ,U..Technical
i Appendix V_~
stance Mission,
(p. 143).
Lagos Nigeria, 1964 .
* 'Block' in the Nigerian context has a
'from street to street' meaning in the
different meaning from what it is in the U.S.. It
U.S. which always contains numerous buildings.
means one building, as opposed to its
Each of the house 'block' types in the
above table contains 4 housing units, which comes to 55-58 (13 .6 . x 4 - 14.4x4) housing units per acre (cf. with 5-6 housing
per acre for the freehold housing house types).
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Table 7.13
LEDB Actual Densities or Forms of Development Compared with 'Possible' Densities, as Index of Efficiency
LEDB Densities in Index of Waste Assuming LEDB
Possible* Densities the Freehold Housing in LEDB form of .Densities (no.
Form of (no. of housing units Schemes (no. of Development of housing Index
Development per acre) housing units/acre) (per cent) units/acre) of Waste
Assuming 2 story (apt.) 30 5 83.3 10 66.6
Assuming 3 story (apt.) 45 5 88.9 10 77.7
Assuming 4 story (apt.) 55 5 90.9 10 81.8
Assuming 5 story (apt.) 60 5 91.6 83.3
*Acceptable limit of density that is possible without sacrificing environmental quality.
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72.5% of the households were occupying one room in 1970/71 with an
average occupancy rate of 3.8 persons per room. In 1952/54 and 1959/60, the
proportion of households occupying one room was 79.1% and 81.8% respectively.
Though the proportion of households occupying one room seems to have declined
slightly, over the period (1953-1973), the level was still unacceptably high --
above 70% -- a reflection of the acuteness of the housing problem in the city.
Conventionally, the ideal adequate accommodation (occupation ratio)
is one person per room. Two persons to one room is also acceptable, but upwards
of three persons per room is considered unacceptable, as adequate accommodation.
Table 7.15 shows that of 385,000 people in the sample of Lagos Housing
Enquiry in 1961, 231,350, or 60%, lived at least four persons to a room. 63,650,
or 16.5%, live at an occupancy rate of over 6 persons per room of about 100
square feet in area.
Over 70% of all dwellings were of the rooming type. A survey conducted
in 1967/68 (Table 7.16),for example, showed that about 20% of the dwellings in
Lagos were of single-family types; 7.3% as flats or apartment types, and 73.2%
as of the rooming type. 2 3
Surulere, which was almost completely developed by the LEDB, has the
highest percentage of single family type housing. With the overwhelming pre-
23 LEDB Planning Department: Draft Master Plan for Lagos (1971).
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Table 7.14: Lagos Housing Conditions 1952/53 - 1972
% of Households
Occupying Avg. No. House w/ House w/ House without
Year 1 Room Persons/Rm. tap water flush toilets any toilets electricity
1972* 74.2 4.1 65.8 42.5 16.4 89.6
1970/71** 72.5 3.8 71.7 43.5 -- 93.2
1959/60** 81.6
1953/54** 79.1
* Survey of Housing Conditions in Selected Urban Centers in Nigeria by the Physical Planning
Division, NISER, Ibadan
* Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos 1970-71: Housing Conditions in Selected Nigerian Towns
1953/54 and 1959/60: Urban Consumer surveys for Lagos
House w/
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dominance of rooming type housing, the right priorities would have expected the
LEDB -- a public agency -- to emphasize more of apartment (flat) housing rather
than house types, where such needs and demands existed, particularly with the
very high average room occupancy rates of 3.8 - 4.0 persons per room in the
city.
While it is true that setting high constructional standards for the housing
of the poor in cities, and especially for the migrants from rural areas, may be
excusable and sometimes even desirable on human grounds, it will inevitably
turn out to be mistaken and counter-productive because the resources do not exist
to bring those high standards to enough people. The policy would succeed only
in keeping a high proportion of people from even the most basic form of shelter,
and ultimately encourage overcrowding and slums.
Recognizing that the housing problem is essentially an income problem,
and cognizant of the very high percentage of rooming type houses (over 70%), a
realistic approach even to the sanitary problem would have emphasized more
apartment housing types, to enable those in rooming type houses to gradually up-
grade into apartment housing, if possible; those who need single-family houses
can always build one themselves with their private funds.
As had been observed by Aribiah, 24 'The paradox in the housing situation
that quality has been rising at the expense of quantity, and, in the situation,
24 Oberu Aribiah: "Social Aspects of Urban Rehousing in Lagos" in Lagos
Notes and Records, Vol. III, No. 2, January 1972, p. 41.
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TABLE 7.15 Lagos: Number of Dwellings and Rooms by Persons per Room
Persons per Room
1 or less
Over 1 but not greater than 2
Over 2 but not greater than 3
Over 3 but not greater than 4
Over 4 but not greater than 5
Over 5 but not greater than 6
Over 6 but not greater than 7
Over 7
No. Dwel-
lings
15,350
20,950
18,450
14,900
9,600
5,600
4,250
3,750
Source: Federal Office of Statistics: Lagos Housing Enquiry, 1961.
No.
Rooms
22,850
33,550
25,500
19,750
11,600
5,850
4,250
3,750
No.
Persons
20,400
60,900
72,650
76,250
56,650
34,800
29,800
33,850
Persons
5.3
15.8
18.9
19.8
14.7
9.0
7.7
8.8
Rooms
18.0
26.4
20.1
15.5
9.1
4.6
3.3
3.0
TOTAL 92,900 127,100 385,300 100.0 100.0
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the low income earner is at a considerable disadvantage.
The 67-89% land waste index would be much higher if the conventional
private sector housing types25 and accommodation rates are used for Gx. In this
type, a standard plot of 100' x 50' conventionally contains about 3-4 dwelling
units with 16-20 persons per house on the average.
The LEDB used about 400 acres for this low density type of housing be-
tween 1958 and 1965 (see Table 6.7). At 5-10 dwelling units per acre, this would
be a total of 2,000-4,000 dwelling units; whereas, if it were the apartment type,
assuming two or three-story apartment blocks (see Chart 7.2), this would mean
12,000 - 18,000 dwelling units. In terms of the actual number of people accom-
modated, and assuming an average family size of 6 (which is a conservative assump-
tion in the Nigerian urban context), the difference between the number of people
accommodated by the LEDB type housing and the number that could have been ac-
commodated by a more economical housing type would be 84,000 people (18,000
x 6 - 4,000 x 6), or at least a difference of 210 people per acre. "Land is a scarce
resource," argues proponents of public ownership and management of urban land,
"whose management should be subject to public surveillance or control in the in-
the ,26
terest of the nation." This, then, should imply that public management itself
should be economical and more efficient in the use or allocation of this scarce
resource. A public agency's sense of priority and appreciation of the prevailing
25A conventional Nigerian house in the urban centers has 8-9 rooms and
consists mostly of two-room units, and the average number of people pe- house is
16-20, or 2-2.5 persons per room.
26 U.N.: Report of Habitat: U.N. Conference on Human Settlements
(Vancou.,r, 1976, p. 62.
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Table 7.16 Types of
Area
Lagos Island
Ebute-Metta
Yaba
Surulere
Distribution)Dwellings in Lagos Residential Areas (%
Housing Types
House Type Flat or
(Single-Family*) Apartment
3.9 0.2
4.8 4.8
3.0 9.6
38.1 12.0
All Areas 19.5 7.3 73.2 100.0
* Single-family here would include extended families or otherwise what might be termed
'compound housing'.
Source: LEDB: Draft Master Plan for Lagos, 1971.
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rooming
Type
95.9
90.4
87.4
49.9
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problems in developing so much low density, single-family forms of housing in a
densely populated urban center such as Lagos, should, therefore, be seriously
questioned.
The Board devoted a substantial proportion of its lands to low density
forms of development despite the fact that one of the major Government commis-
sions that had earlier shaped its operational orientation had warned of the neces-
sity to prevent such waste by the private building sector and suggested that the
LEDB itself, as the Planning and Development Authority of the city, should prevent
private builders from building bungalows where the land was physically suitable
for storeyed buildings. In the words of the Report,
Space has been wasted in the past by putting up bungalow
type buildings on ground which would take two or even
three storey houses. Many people regret now that they
did not put in the more costly foundations which would
have enabled them when opportunity occurred to put
another storey on to their original house... .It is im-
portant that building ground on Lagos Island be used
as economically as possible and I therefore suggest that
the Board take powers to insist on foundations which
will take two or three storey houses where the ground
is suitable. Bungalows should be built only on land
which in the Engineer's opinion will take nothing
higher. 2 7
The indices of land wastes in the Board's character of land and housing develop-
ment become more real when it is considered that,
The amount of land required for uses other than
housing remains the same whatever the net
27
T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit. , p. 33.
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residential density, and gains in gross density
are most likely to be found at thelo1wer end of
the scale 28
It has been found, too, that,
By raising net density, for example, from twenty-four
persons per acre to forty -- that is roughly from eight
houses to thirteen -- it is possible to save 17 acres of
land per thousand population; enough land to house
another 500 people at the same density and with the
same proportion of open space. 28
Greater economies of housing land use and higher indices of land waste
would be obtained if we used higher storeyed apartment buildings for Gx. But
this illustration has been limited to no more than three storeyes for Gx because
various studies29 have shown that in addition to accommodation advantages, cost
economies of construction are gained in 2-3 storey blocks and these cost economies
in building costs are said to be lost from 4-storeyes upwards. P.A. Stone 29 found
(and this finding was confirmed by the various other studies) that, "There is little
doubt that dwellings within two storey blocks are the cheapest." Colean (1944)
found that, 'The apartment is economical in the use of land improvements and un-
doubtedly offers the mcst economic means of producing very small units and of ac-
commodating families demanding considerable services.-' 2 9 Developing higher
28 U.N.: Proceedings.of the Seminar on the Supply,-Development and Allo-
cation of Land for Housing and Related Purposes (held in Paris, France, 28 March -
.6 April 1965), Vol. 1, p. 44.
2 9 P.A. Stone: "The Economics of Housing and Urban Development" (Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Part IV, Vol. 122 (1959), p. 426.
Colean, Miles L. "The Factual Findings" (American Housing: Problems and
Prospects, New York, 20th Century Fund, 1944.
Colean, Miles L. & Arthur P. Davis: Cost Measurements in Urban Redevelop-
ment (New York: National Committee on Housing, Inc., 1945).
Ludlow, William H.: 'Urban Densities & Their Costs: An Exploration into
the Economics of Population Densities and Urban Patterns" (Urban Redeve!cement:
Problems and Practices. Coleman Woodbury (ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1953.
-308-
TABLE 7.17: Lagos Housing Programme and Targets: 1962-1968
Minimum Programme Maximum Programme
1. Lagos population in 1951
2. Lagos population in 1961
3. Average annual rate of change
1951-1961
4. Lagos population in 1967
(projected by #3)
5. Population growth, 1962-1967
(rounded)
6. New housing units required*
7. Existing units necessary to house
present population
8. Replacement units needed
1962-1967
9. Total unit requirement (#6 + #8)
10. Annual unit requirements when
spread over six years
11. Average annual unit requirement:
5,959 units or 6,000 units p.a.
230,000
364,000
4.5%
466,760
102,000
17,000
60,666
7,585**
24,585
4,098
250,000
450,000
9.5%
663,750
214,000
35,666
75,000
11 ,250***
46,916
7,819
* A unit is defined as housing for six persons
** Assuming units depreciated at 2.5% per annum.
* Assuming units depreciated at 3% per annum.
Source: Nigerian National Development Plan 1962-1968, p. 97.
NOTES
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storeyed riultiple dwelling houses would spread the land acquisition and high
preparation and servicing costs over as large a number of units as possible. The
land element in housing cost would therefore clearly vary with the intensity of
development -- increase with decreasing intensity, and decrease with increasing
intensity. In a city, therefore, whose housing conditions were and still essentially
are as is depicted in Table 7.14, with over 70% of the households in the city
living in one-room units and with 3.8-4.1 persons per room, and whose income
distribution structure is as depicted in Table 7.4 and Chart 7.1, and whose housing
needs at that time as projected by the Government itself were as shown i.n Table 7.17
requiring an average annual production of about 6,000 units in order to cope with
the situation, public purpose action would have been expected to aim at measures
to ensure the accommodation of the greatest number possible in its housing pro-
grams. This would have called for emphasis on apartment type housing on multi-
story building rather than low density single-family housing emphasis, that tended
to waste a great deal of the scarce urban lands.
In fact, so much was the waste and misplacement of priority in this form
of development that the LEDB itself was sooner or later bound to recognize it. This
came during its Metropolitan Housing Scheme in 1966, which involved some 63
acres of land and some 1,600 housing units of varying sizes. Of this, the Board
emphasized that the scheme "...will be in form of 5, 4, and single-story buildings
as opposed to single-story buildings of the earlier schemes. This high rise apart-
ment is aimed at conserving building land,' the Board explained. It went on to
acknowledge that,
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This type of development has been adopted because there
is very little land in Lagos and what is available is very
costly. This makes it impossible to adopt rural type
sprawling single-story houses which could be erected
at considerably lower cost. Such a development would
involve great expenditures on land, transportation and
on the provision of water, power, roads, and other
amenities and the total cost of the scheme may in
fact not be less when an account is taken of all the
additional expenditures involved in diffused develop-
ment. On the contrary, the multi-story type of
development now envisaged vould conserve land,
lower costs of essential services, and house more
people.30
That the Board had not realized this earlier does not speak well of public
management.
Public agencies generally, for various reasons (bureaucratic red tape,
high overheads, lack of the discipline of the 'market', impersonality of costs in-
ternalization, etc.) are not efficient producers. These facts must have been in the
minds of the creators of the LEDB, for the original Act creating the Board forbade
it from constructing houses itself. Part V , paragraph 32(3) of the Act (1928)
specifically states that,
The Board shall not itself construct dwellings or
shops under a rehousing scheme, unless it is satis-
fied after due enquiry that no other person is
willing and able to construct them, and is pre-
pared to construct, maintain, and manage them
30
LEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts for the Year 1965/66, p. 12-13.
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under the control of the Board.
But the Board later made direct housing construction such a dominant
part of its activities that most people knew it as a Housing agency, as such.
The Board had later to explain that,
Housing schemes, regarded by most people as the main
spine of the Board's activities were in fact by-products
largely brought about by the Rehousing Scheme at
Surulere .31
But the Board's delving into the direct housing area was understandable.
It was more profitable than the mere installation of infrastructure, more profitable
if not to the Board as an agency, certainly to the individual Board officials.
31 LEDB: What is the LEDB? (1965), p. 19.
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SUMMARY
The conditions and criteria of LEDB land allocations were restrictive of
accessibility to the general population. They did not encourage substantial pro-
duction of housing which the situation called for at the time. The Board's land
development policy emphasis was unduly oriented in favour of the "middle and
upper income groups", who could afford to pay the Board's prices, and meet the
high development requirements. Considering the very high proportion of the land
preparation and servicing element in the Board's plots of land (which had been
noted to be capable of being reduced by 10-15%), which costs had to be reflected
in the sale price of the Board's lands, and considering the general income levels
and distribution structure (Table 7.4 and Chart 7.1), the Board's land management
and development practices were not favourable to the overwhelming majority of the
urban population who were low income and had limited access, if at all, to credit
facilities.
Where the Board directly constructed housing, the emphases, too, were
on very low density single-family type houses -- averaging some five housing units
per acre. Obviously, these low density developments involved large uneconomical
use of land in the order of 60-80% wasteage rate. This was despite the acute urban
land and housing situation in the metropolitan area. In this respect, therefore, the
saying could be said to have been true of the LEDB that, ... if public authorities
aequire most of the attractive land, and do not offer land to all groups which need
them, the public semi-monopoly of land may tend to create an extra pressure
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of demand in the land market " 2  This implies that public authorities by such
actions could create or exacerbate urban land problems rather than solve them.
The Board's land management practices therefore were hardly addressed
to the priority problem areas -- that of producing as many units as possible at costs
that would make them accessible to a majority of the people who needed them.
Rather, the Board's management practices were geared primarily to the creation
of housing opportunities for the middle and high income families in luxury sub-
divisions. The Board, however, seemed to have been mirroring the government
(public) urban land management policy of the time which,
... took the form of the development of a few middle-class
housing estates, and did not explicitly accept any social
responsibility for providing houses for the masses, and
therefore did not deem it necessary to participate actively
in mass housing programs, apart from re-housing schemes
necessitated by occasional slum clearance activities. 33
Public urban land and housing policy in Nigeria could aptly be summed up
in the words of the World Bank Report, 34 which noted that,
The housing policy of the first three years of the
National Development Plan35 was unsatisfactory
because it produced too few houses. It also pro-
duced the wrong kind of houses (emphasis mine).
32 U.N.: Proceedings of the Seminar on Supply, Development and Allocation of
Land for Housing and Related Purposes, Vol. 11, p. 196.
33Nigerian National Development Plan 1975-80, on review of past national
land and housing policy.
IIBRD (1965), op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 4.
35 The National Development Plan in reference here is the First National
Developrdent Plan 1962-1968 (Six Year Plan).
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Chapter 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Having examined the problems of Nigerian land tenure in the urban context,
and the problems and prospects of public intervention in urban land management in
this context, this chapter is intended as a recapitulation of the main themes of this
thesis; and the lessons drawn from the results of the foregoing analysis. It also em-
bodies some of our thoughts and opinions on the subject, and it suggests directions
for a more effective, efficient, and equitable approach to public urban land manage-
ment problems in the Nigerian society context. We begin with a summary of the
impacts of the Board on the urban land development landscape.
8.1 Impacts of the LEDB on Urban Land Development in Lagos.
Its problems (caused mainly by the institutional climate within which it had
to operate, and its shortage of operating funds), and its weaknesses (caused mainly
by its shortage of management skills and misplacement of priorities) notwithstanding,
the Lagos Executive Development Board made some noticeable and commendable im-
pacts on urban land development in Lagos. Various residential and industrial/com-
mercial estates (schemes) were developed by the Board, and its role in the develop-
ment of basic urban infrastructure had been very outstanding. It was noted-in Chap-
ter Six that about 45% of its expenditures in the 1928-1972 period was spent on
basic infrastructure, services, and related facilities. It reclaimed and developed
some 2,500 acres of swamp lands and by so doing added substantial building land to
the stock of land in the city. It prepared, serviced and sold or leased about 7,500
plots of land to private developers and householders (principally owner-occupiers),
and directly built some 7,000 housing units for both rent and sale. As a corollary
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to these, it had been instrumental in clearing and individualizing land ownership titles
to a significant extent through registrations of title to lands that came under it's manage-
ment, and that it disposed of. By this, title to such lands were secured and were there-
fore made easier to transact. Most, if not all, of its operational areas or schemes are
within what is classified as "Title Areas" in Lagos - that is, areas where the authenticity
of land titles is relatively no longer in doubt.
In addition to these, about five major shopping centers had been developed by the Board,
in addition to numerous market stalls. The presence of the Board in the Lagos Metropolitan area
has been tremendously felt because of the volume of work which the Board had undertaken,
and more certainly because of the controversies it had evoked in the process.
Although the LEDB had made some important contributions, it was, however, not with-
out substantial costs in resources efficiency and equity. The unintended negative effects of
its activities, sometimes to a great extent adversely affected the very goals it was striving
to achieve. In this regard, it can be said that although its activities were to a significant
extent inhibited by the problems of land tenure and inadequate funding -- which were essential-
ly external to it, its internal problems of management competence and administrative efficiency
were substantially responsible for some of its conceptual and operational problems and failures.
Certain concepts of the Board's land development practices, for example were parti-
cularly counter-productive to its urban land management goals and objectives. Among
these, two were particularly outstanding:
(i) The "Home Ownership" concept - which implied that houses should necessarily
be owned by those who lived in them; and as a corollary,
(ii) Low Density Development emphasis -- emphasis placed on small low-lying
detached estate type houses.
-316-
By the "home ownership" concept, the Board built self-contained single family
detached houses (generally bungalows), and sold them to those who could afford them.
This concept or policy was a misorientation of priorities and was wasteful of land for
many reasons:
(i) It inhibited and minimized the development of multi-family story blocks
of apartments, because the developments had to be self-contained and
necessarily detached to be sold to people as a home. By a predominant
use of this type of development (which averaged about five units per
acre), the Board wasted a lot of the lands at its disposal.
(ii) The concept of "home ownership" was a misorientation of priorities be-
cause the average Nigerian urbanite does not consider the city a home,
but rather a place of work which he would leave on retirement for his
town or village which he considers home. Most people then are satis-
fied with decent rental housing for the period of time they live in the
city. In fact,most migrant city dwellers when they have money enough
to build a house, first build such houses in their home towns or vil-
lages to which they will ultimately retire, and ordinarily - people do
not judge themselves necessarily by the quality of their housing in the
city, nor do others judge them by that. Rather, people judge them-
selves and are judged by others more by the quality of their "home town"
houses. Even then, neither the Board nor the Government itself can
ever be in the financial position to help every or even most of the
citizens in cities own a house in the city. It becomes then very ques-
tionable whether the general tax payer's money should be used to
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help a relatively few people to own houses.
(iii) In any case, there are always more peoele who require houses for rent
and can rent them, than there are those who require them to own and
are able to own them. Even then, a great majority of the people who
needed housing in the city could not be in the financial position
to fulfill the conditions required by the Board for purchase of its houses
or plots of land.
The corollary concept of "low density development" has the effect of
making such housing development more costly than they would be with alternative
(higher density) forms of development, because low density development has the
tendency to be relatively lavish with land, and therefore involve spending more Fe
land. The fact that land for low density residential development is more expensive
than land for high density development is fully recognized and practiced by the
Board itself in its land disposal practices. It, for example, leased its residential
plots of land at t 120 - t 170 per acre per annum for low density developments, aur
1at 75 per acre per annum for high density developments. Furthermore, the frpgor-
tion of land costs in the total housing development cost is often higher in low
density developments because the cost of raw land is generally dependent on the
lot size. In apartment type developments, for example, more units are pro-
laLEDB: Annual Reports and Accounts for the Year 1957/58, p. 14.
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duced on a given piece of land, and more Fesmilies are able to live on the same
piece of land that otherwise would have been occupied by only one family on one
housing unit. This would distribute the cost of land over many more housing units,
thus reducing the per unit cost of land and at the same time accommodating more
families.
Furthermore, given the inordinately high quality standards of these develop-
ments and their high costs they were only accessible to a very small proportion of
the population, and this small proportion was not the strata of the population where
the quantitative demand was most acute. In this sense, it could be said that the
LEDB acquisition of urban land curtailed the supply of urban land as much, if not
more, than the traditional tenure system, and if public authorities should acquire the
land and do not make efficient use of it by offering its resources to all groups re-
quiring them, the public semi-monopoly of land through its compulsory acquisition
powers, may tend to create extra pressure of demand and shortages in the urban land
market.
It could also be said that the Board's mode of land development and housing
production aided congestion and environmental deterioration. This resulted from
the Board acquiring large tracts of land, but producing very limited number of housing
units from them. This meant withdrawing housing land from the already tight urban
land market, and thereby forestalling whatever might have been produced by the
private traditional system, if such lands were not pre-empted by the Board.
The result was that many more people crowded into existing units, thus in-
creasing the potentials for slumification and environmental deterioration of the
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city -- the evi!s which the LEDB was initially created to remedy. In this sense, the
paradox that "the best can be an enemy of the good" could be said to have been
true with the Board's predominant form and standard of residential developments.
Secondly, the low density mode of development unnecessarily sprawls the
city with consequent diseconomies in the provision of necessary municipal services.
Such a low density approach would usually call for more money to be spent on the
construction and maintenance of more miles of roads and streets, more miles of
pipes for water and sewage, larger numbers of poles and greater lengths of cable
for electricity, telephone, and radio, thus making it more expensive to provide
necessary services to all the areas. Various studies have shown that the cost of
the provision of services rises the lower the density of development.I
The Board's land acquisitions and development practices were also dys-
functional and counter-productive in yet another way. Because of the piecemeal
and sporadic fashion of the Board's acquisition and development practices, there
was the tendency for land prices to rise around each Board scheme -- thus creating
problems of high land price spirals, and feeding speculative waves of urban land
1 Kain, J.F. "Urban Form and the Cost of Urban Services (Discussion Paper
No. 6, Program on Regional and Urban Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts).
Wheaton, W.L.C. and M.J. Schussheim, The Cost of Municipal Services
in Residential Areas (Housing and Home Finance Agency & U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
1955, p. 13).
Urban Land Institute. The Effect of Large Lot Size on Residential Develop-
ment (Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin No. 32, Washington, D.C., 1958,
p. 13).
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prices in the metropolitan area. This, of course, had further implications for ac-
cessibility to houming and other urban land facilities for the different income groups
in the city, especially for the poor. The Board itself was often a victim of such
speculative price rises, and owing also to the fact that it was required to reflect its
costs on the prices of its lands and housing, the Board was actually (though inad-
vertently) an agent of land price increases, both in the private and public urban
land sectors.
Conceptually, this phenomenon usually started with the Board acquiring land in Zone 1
(see Fig. 8.1). The Board then prepares, services and develops the land. Because
of the high amenity levels in these scheme areas, the value and prices of land sur-
rounding the scheme rises in Zone 2 -- the periphery of Zone 1. At some point in
time, the Board might decide on the expansion of the scheme and proceed to ac-
quire the lands in Zone 2. With the risen land values in this zone, the Board
theoretically at least has to pay higher prices for land here ("fair market value") --
a result of its own previous action which had inadvertently raised the land values
and prices before it could acquire these successive parcels of land. The same pro-
cess progressively takes place with the other successive zones -- 3, 4, etc. on Fig.
8.1.
This process continues with all its ramifications -- one of which is the con-
tinued inflaming of speculative waves on surrounding land in particular, and on the
urban land in general. It had not been unusual for speculators to attempt to buy
up lands surrounding the Board's schemes in anticipation of the Board's expansion
and further acquisition. Land owners around such schemes also are known to fake
"paper sales" or "transfers" imputing speculative prices to their lands, so as io have
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Fig. 8.1
Effect of LEDB schemes on the general movement of land prices. (Conceptual Illustration)
Key
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1,2,3,4, denote zones from LEDB scheme sites.
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documentary support of the "value" of their lands if and when it gets to be acquired
by the Board -- having often learned or been advised by freelance lawyers and
estate valuers that the principle of compensation assessment is the "fair market value",
and that in determining and fixing this value, it had been judicially established
that, "The price at which the purchasers bought their lands, must outweigh the opinion,
however experienced the officials, as to its actual value", because, "The price at
which an owner bought his land is a better guide of its market value, since willing
sellers do not normally want to sell at a price below what they paid" - these being
principles of judgement in similar cases, already handed down as precedents (see
Chapter 5). Just as lawyers and real estate valuers advise land owners whose lands
are already in the process of being acquired, so also do they advise owners of sur-
rounding lands about the possibilities of their lands being acquired eventually, and
what to do in the interim to enhance the values of such lands, if and when it comes
to be acquired. Their professional fees are, of course, invariably built into these
values, and land values and land prices continue their upward trends. The 1970-
1974 National Development Plan, for example, notes that, "The historical upward
trends in land prices has been introduced mainly through the activities of land
speculators in the urban areas, especially for government sponsored projects", 2
thus officially acknowledging the facts of this process and trend, though being
helpless to control or prevent it.
The implication then is that the fewer public land acquisitions, the less
this process and trend, and presumably, the less rapid and steep the increase in
urban land prices. Contrary, then, to the claimed effects of public land ownership
2 Fed. Republic of Nigeria: Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, p. 219.
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and management in controlling land prices, it in fact escalates them, particularly
where public acquisition is piecemeal. On the other hand, however, this pheno-
menon would also suggest that if the land acquisitions were comprehensive, coordi-
nated, and total, these effects may not occur, though problems of a different sort
may present themselves. In effect, the realisation of the potentials of public owner-
ship and management of urban land depends more on how and with what efficiency
the management is effectuated than on mere public control per se as a goal.
8.2 Public Urban Land Management: Efficiency, Impact and Equity as Guiding
Criteria and Measures of Effectiveness
Given the significance of urban land and considering the rationale for public
involvement in its control and management, an appropriate set of expectations against
which to gauge the performance and effectiveness of public control and manage-
ment would include such measures as efficiency (in production and costs), impact,
and equity.
Efficiency +refers to the process of minimizing waste (of land) and cost in land
development. It means economizing on total resources. The efficiency criterion asks
the question: How economically or lavishly was public use of land in development
+Conventionally, efficiency measures the relationship of benefits to costs.
An efficiency measure of 1.0 usually means that the total public costs incurred in
the development of a given program (in this case, land and housing) are transformed
into benefits of equal or maximum feasible magnitude determined by the number of
such units of benefits. A measure of less than 1 .0 means the benefits are less than
the costs; and therefore less than efficient. (In our present context, this means that
the expenditure could have been used to provide more units of housing.) An ef-
ficiency measure of .75, for example, means that $1.0 total costs produced 75
cents worth of benefits.
-324-
or in causing land to be developed?
In our present context, therefore, efficiency would refer to the extent
to which the feasible number of housing or other land development units are
produced at the minimum costs. It wo uld also refer to the adoption of resi-
dential development forms or designs that minimize these land wastes and costs.
Impact is a measure of the difference that the project or particular land
ownership and management system makes in the resolution of the existing urban
land and housing problem. An impact measure, therefore, would be the extent
to which the average person's chances of access to land and housing are more
improved by the public management mode, for example, than would
have been the case otherwise, and how many more people benefit from public
management than would have benefitted from the private or communal system of
management. If public management of urban land and housing facilitates greater
access to these facilities, the impact is noticeable or high, otherwise it is low.
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Ideally, the percentage improvement in the number of more people whose
access to urban land and housing facilities is improved than would have been
otherwise, would be a good measure of the impact of public management and
control. The extent to which public urban land development policies (in terms of
forms or types of housing development) are geared to affect (better) the urban
land and housing situation would also be a measure of its impact.
Equity refers to the extent to which the given management mode generally
benefits the people in greater need relative to the benefits accruing to others in less
need. These benefits to the more needy may accrue from the immediate effects of
the program or management system or they may result from its indirect or spread
effects. In any event, for the system to be efficient, it has to make its benefits
more generally available to those in need or achieve that in its general outcome.
"Public ownership of land," it has been aptly said, "cannot be an end in itself;
it is justified in so for as it is exercised in favour of the common good rather than to
protect the interests of the already privileged."6 One of the rationales of public
involvement in urban land is the public recognition that adequate land and housing
are not being made available to all families by the existing traditional mode
of management. Adequate land and housing are generally not available in three
senses: (a) in the sense of an absolute shortage of land and housing in
6
U.N.: Report of Habitat, op. cit., p. 66.
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the city; (b) in the sense that a family's dwelling fails to satisfy certain minimal
standards of safety and sanitation; and (c) in the sense that the family does have
satisfactory housing, but at a price which severely limits the family's ability to
afford other goods and services, particularly other necessities. The degree of equity,
then, is judged by the extent to which the public management mode makes urban
land and housing available to those most in need of it.
Most important issues in urban land management appear to be simple extensions
of these three basic concepts of efficiency, impact, and equity. A system of control
and management (be it public, communal or private), however, ought not be judged
on the basis of a single criterion to the exclusion of others (even though some criteria
are more important than others). Furthermore, poor performance by one node or system
with respect to any one criterion has to be weighed against the potential of
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alternative modes or systems to perform better under the same criterion. In gen-
eral, however, these three criteria are the measures against which the effective-
ness and desirability of public urban land management should be evaluated.
8.3 Comparative Performance Evaluation of Three Modes of Land Control and
Management
Given these measures of effectiveness and desirability defined in the preceding
section, it would be useful to make a comparative evaluation of the effectiveness
of the three modes of urban land ownership and management existing in our case city (Lagos)
so as to place the performance of the public mode in proper perspective. The
three modes are the traditional mode of ownership and management (G), the public
mode of ownership and management (Pm), and the private free market mode (M).
Using the above discussed three criteria of efficiency, impact, and equity and their
various extensions (making ten performance variables in all) as a checklist of ef-
fective and desirable performance, these various modes are evaluated one after the
other. Table 8.1 summarises this subjective performance evaluation.
The Traditional Mode of Land Ownership and Management (G)
This mode of urban land ownership and management ranks highest in six of the
ten performance variables on Table 8.1 and these include the most important var-
iables -- degree of land supplies, quantity of housing units production, distribution
across income groups; more likely to reduce the proportion of income spent on housing;
price of raw land, and control of urban land prices.
In spite of the constraints on marketability and transfers exhibited by the trad-
itional land tenure system, the traditional management system supplies most of the
urban building land in aggregate terms. These supplies, however, are in the nature
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Table 8.1
Performance Evaluation of Three Systems of Urban Land- Management and Control
Systems and Ranks
Performance Variables Pm G
1. Degree of urban land supplies
2. Housing Units* Production
3. Price of raw urban land**
4. Distribution across income groups (% low
income housing)
5. Potentials for credit or institutional
financing
6. Security of tenure
7. Ease of transfer
8. Control of urban land values/prices
9. Quality of urban land development and
environment (infrastructural and otherwise)
10. More likely to reduce proportion of income
spent on housing
++
++
++
++
++
++
+
+
+
++ +
++ ±
++ ++
+++
+++ +
+ ++
++ +
KEY
Pm = Public Management or LEDB System
G = "Traditional" system
M = Real Estate Market system
+++ = Most effective or efficient
++ = Not as effective or efficient
+ = Least effective or efficient
* Housing units here are taken to be any size units occupied by a single family.
The ranking indicates which system provides the greatest amount of accommoda-
tion to the greatest number of people.
** Raw land means land before a structure is erected on it -- whether the land is
serviced or not. Each mode or system gets lower mark, the higher its land
prices.
M
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of owner-:levelopment of lands and not necessarily in the nature of sales or trans-
fers in the market transactions sense. A relatively large amount of land is developed
each year by their traditional owners -- thus constituting the bulk of urban land
available for development. Because the bulk of the land is still held in traditional
family and communal ownerships, the bulk of land availability inevitably comes from
this source.
A good proportion of the traditional owner-developments are designed for
rental purposes and as many units as possible are derived. Most of such developments
are rooming houses. A bungalow house on a 100' x 50' plot (which is the modal size
of plots in the city) of land, for example, usually contains 8 to 9 rooms, and at an
average of 2-room units this means 4 housing units per traditional development.
Development on a similar size plot of land by the public mode of development would
contain only one housing unit, admittedly at a high qolity level, but nevertheless
at the cost of overcrowding in other (low income) housing sectors. So,
quality of housing aside, traditional or "conventional" developments produce
more housing units than the public mode or the private free market (real estate firms)
modes.
As depicted in Fig. 2.1 A of Chapter Two, in the traditional mode of owner-
ship, land is distributed across the income groups rather than monopolised by one
income group. The horizontal distribution is, however, restricted to the people
indigenous to the given place (city), and does not extend to 'strangers' or migrants
to that place. However, when the houses are built for rent, they are rented to
anybody, indigene or migrant, so that it is only the ownership that is usually restricted
to the indigenous population of a place; renting is open to all.
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Because such traditional developments are generally of lower housing quality
and service levels and of smaller sizes, their prices are relatively lower and generally
more affordable by the general population than would be the more sophisticated de-
velopments of the public or private real estate firm developments. In this sense, too,
this mode of ownership and developments are more likely to minimize the proportion
of income spent on housing.
It had been pointed out that land in the traditional land tenure system is hardly
sold and when exchanged or transacted, it is not done on a market pricing principle
(see Chapter Six). The price is conditioned by the degree of relationships (often
times consanguinal) between the seller and the buyer. Because of the limited trans-
actions in land and the generally "below market pricing" context, urban land prices
are kept in check more than would be the case in a private market situation in
which speculation is more potent and in which the "highest bidder wins".
The traditional land ownership system,in spite of these good features, is not
without its disadvantages.* These disadvantages have to do with its constraints on
land assembly for major projects, and with its constraints on transactions in land and
rationalization of land uses. The quality of its developments are generally low and
with minimal servicing. The result is that they often create some environmental
problems. The generally ill-defined and therefore uncertain and insecure titles to
land in this mode make financing of land development in it difficult from the point
of view of finance institutions. In some respects, too, it can be said that its feature
of "non-sale" to 'strangers' or people non-indigenous to the given place, in some
ways would tend to inhibit the social and political integration of the country.
*These disadvantages are dealt with in more detail in Section 2.6 of Chapter Two.
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The Public Mode of Ownership and Management (Pm)
The Public Management System (LEDB) was the most effective in three of
the ten performance variables on Table 8.1. These were the potentials for credit or
institutional financing, security of tenure, and the quality of urban land develop-
ment variables. Given its government backing, these features are understandable.
Lending and mortgage institutions would feel safer financing public developments
because the government guarantees such financing. Lands from the public manage-
ment mode are more secure in their titles because the public agency has a semi-legal
power to transfer and confer valid titles which cannot be questioned by anybody--
power derived from the eminent domain powers with which the management agency
(LEDB) is vested.
The public management system, too, creates the best quality urban land
and housing developments. It fully prepares and services its lands with the necessary
basic infrastructural and housing services. Where it builds directly, it develops
good housing on relatively large lots and therefore at relatively low densities.
Paradoxically, however, from its quality of developments stem many of its dis-
advantages. Although by our calculation, the LEDB was responsible for about 11%
of all building land available in the city each year, production of housing units from
these lands accounted for under 5%* of the total units produced yearly in the city.
This relatively small proportion could be explained by the generally low density
bungalow type developments that it predominantly produced or caused to be pro-
duced by its requirements for the development of lands that it leased or sold to people.
*Estimated.
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Because of high quality land servicing and developments prices for itd lands
and houses understandably were higher than those in the traditional developments
because it was required by its enabling legislation to reflect all costs of develop-
ment in the prices for those developments when they are leased or sold. The ex-
ceptions were those developments that were as a matter of public policy subsidized,
and these were relatively few.
The Public development mode had high social status emphasis. Therefore, the
distribution of its land resources were skewed in favour of this group, as is shown in
Chapter Seven. Given this emphasis, it was not likely (either directly or indirectly)
to minimise the proportion of income spent on housing by the average urbanite. Its
scale of land acquisitions would tend to affect the amount of land available in
traditional hands and therefore the amount of land developed by the traditional sec-
tor which supplies a preponderant proportion of the conventional urban housing --
thus indirectly limiting the amount of housing units that could have been available.
It could be said that its emphasis on attempts at tackling the housing quality prob-
lem without or before tackling the housing quantity problem had tended to exacerbate
both the quality and quantity problems of urban land and housing. In sum, there-
fore, it could be said that although the LEDB (or the public mode) overall produced
some high quality land developments, it was also true that many of the assumed ad-
vantages of public land ownership and management were not red ised in its opera-
tions in spite of its public character. This was particularly true in the areas of fa-
cilitating access to land by all segments of the population, more economic use of
land resources, and in the control of urban land prices.
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Private (Real Estate) Market Mode (M)
This mode is as yet very negligible in scale, as a result of the still predominantly
traditional land ownership pattern and as a result of the traditional tenure system's
reluctance to trade on lands. Its land prices are the highest of the three modes.
Its main advantage lies in the fact that it sells to the highest bidder and is an avenue
through which 'strangers' (traditionally shut out of the land market) can own land in
the city if they can afford it -- it ranks highest of the three in the "ease of transfer"
variable.
Its main disadvantage is that it would concentrate accessibility of urban
land and housing on those who are able to pay the economic rents or prices for them,
and the social consequences of this outcome would be serious for the society as a
whole. It is considered the least desirable of the three modes, and its negative
consequences are often the rationale for public intervention in the urban land and
housing market.
Given these virtues and vices of these modes, it is possible to surmise what
type of city would result if one only of these modes of management were to dominate
in a given city.
Taking the traditional control system first, the city would be one in which
all the land and houses would be owned by the indigenous population (indigenous
to the particular city), in which rental rooming houses with little housing services
would predominate. There might be some dangers to environmental health at times,
but it nevertheless would be a system in which the average urban family (both mi-
grant and indigenous) might more easily secure shelter by renting.
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With the public management system (assuming that present trends continue),
the city would be one in which there would be a lot of high quality residential
developments housing relatively very few families, while a greater proportion of
the population live in very high densities with all the dangers that this portends.
It would be one in which mainly public servants would own land and housing or have
access to them (See Fig. 2.1C), while the host of the self-employed would be
landless and have to fend for themselves.
The private (real estate) market system would result in the monopoly of land
by a relatively few wealthy people (See Fig. 2.1 B). As maximum profit would be
the guiding operating principle, land and housing would be available to those who
can pay the price and the types and forms of developments to prevail vould be those
demanded by the 'market'. This would mean overcrowding in the relatively fewer
houses at the lower end of the quality scale, thus resulting in a city residentially
segregated along economic lines. This system, too, would tend to ignore the broader
desirable societal objectives which have no dollar values placed on them, but
which nevertheless are very vital for the peace and stability of the society.
While the theoretical potentials of public control and management of urban
land are immense, it can be deduced from the foregoing comparative performance
evaluation that the realisation of these potentials is not necessarily always a truism.
Rather, their realisation would depend a great deal on the social, institutional, and
human setting in which they are applied, on the goals, objectives, and priorities
of public policy in this respect, and above all, the administrative efficiency and
competence of the public agency involved, would always have much to do with whether,
-335-
to what degree, in what ways, and which ones of the potential benefits in public
ownership and management are realised..
8.4 Improving the Effectiveness of the Board (Public Management):Some Suggestions.
This thesis accepts in principle, the need for public intervention or
involvement in urban land management and development, and therefore accepts
the concepts of the LEDB or such similar agencies. It contends however, that
the success of such intervention or involvement in realising its set goals is
by no means a given. Much would generally depend on the processes and mech-
anisms employed in the involvement, as well as on the "quality" of the admini-
stration and management charged with the implementation of the involvement. The
thesis also recognizes that the appropriate processes and mechanisms employed in
a particular. case or cases would vary with the goals and objectives in view. In
any case, the realisation of the potentials of public urban land management
should not be taken for granted.
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Having profiled the Lagos Executive Development Board as an instrument of public
urban land management and development, and having analyzed its operations, and
noted its strengths and weaknesses, and accepting in principle the necessity for such an
agency, the relevant question then becomes: How could the LEDB (or any similar agency
7
in such a society's context) have been made to function "better", and more effective-
ly? In what directions could the Board go operationally and structurally to improve its
effectiveness in urban land management?
It is recalled that the Board's problems and weaknesses resulted from three major
factors:
(i) The land tenure situation and the problems it created for the Board in land
acquisitions, mainly in the nature of high transaction costs;
(ii) Inadequate funding;
(iii) Problems arising from management skills and competence or administrative
efficiency as well as the integrity of the personnel involved or charged
with the administration of the agency and the implementation of its
schemes.
Suggestions for the better functioning of the LEDB would then have to address
(solve) the above listed problems -- minimizing or eliminating them, as well as re-
defining the scope of functions, objecti ves, and goals of the Board. Various alternatives
are possible. (1) The first is for the Board to continue along lines of its present di-
rect and massive involvement with urban land acquisition, development, and allocation,
but to improve its management and administrative efficiency, and its goal priorities.
7By functioning 'better' is meant effecting the release of urban land for develop-
ment purposes, effecting the production of housing and improving access to these re-
sources for all income segments of the population, and effecting the maintenance of a
healthy and sanitary urban environment at minimal social and private costs and minimal
inequities.
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Each of the three problems listed above as inhibiting the performance of the Board
was a serious enough problem, but it would seem that the problem of management com-
petence and administrative efficiency was pivotal in determining the degree
of success. This is in the sense that if there were sound, competent
management and efficient administration, the problems arising from the other two prob-
lem areas -- traditional land tenure resistance and inadequate funding -- could have
been handled with more resourcefulness, more skill, and better initiative and such skill
could have minimized the degree of adverse impact or effects of these on the operations
and success of the Board. It is assumed that competent management would usually pur-
sue the right policies, goals, and priorities with the right and efficient approaches.
After all, policies, intentions, goals or objectives -- be they public or private --
are only as good and effective as those who administer or implement or effectuate them.
The question of management competence and efficient administration, how-'
ever, are essentially human problems, as opposed to technical ones, and therefore
have no easy and straightforward equation for solution. The improvements in this area
will inevitably be gradual and incremental. The raw materials or potential
for competent management as such no'doubt existed in the Board.
Perhaps a set of mechanisms and instruments to bring about periodic public account-
ability of the Board and its key executives is necessary with the expectation that the
awareness of such public accounting might help keep them and the operations of the
Board within lines of better efficiency and integrity.
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In addition to these mechanisms, other measures are possible to try to smooth
out the problems of the Board or any similar agency. It had been noted, for example,
that one of the serious problems that the Board encountered and in fact that all other
pyblic acquisitions of lands encounter was the opposition and resistance of land owners
against compulsory land acquisition (Chapters 2, 4, and 5). It was also pointed out
that these oppositions and resistances were based not only on cultural values and
norms attached to land, but also that the manner and conditions of acquisition had to
do with such opposition. This latter specifically refers to the processes of compensa-
tion assessment -- which is defined as the "fair market value" of such land at the
time of acquisition -- often to the dissatisfaction of the land owners (See Chapter 5).
If the objective of public policy, however, is a concern for the public good
of the environment or to modernize the land tenure or to implement development
schemes that are intended to benefit the larger society as a whole, one can make a
case for a "buying out" of the traditional land owners' resistances. To do this ef-
fectively would suggest that the present policy of paying the "fair market value" for
compulsorily acquired land be deemed inadequate. Considering the subjectivities
involved in calculating and arriving at the "fair market value" -- which often has
the land owner at the short end of the stick, a case could be made for a revised form-
ula that involves higher inducive compensation payments. What is being suggested is
a literal "buying out" of the resistances to acquisition by offering owners of land to
be acquired prices that are higher than the estimated market prices for land -- the
sort of price offers "they cannot refuse". This would serve as an inducement or an
"incentive for cultural change" with respect to the release of land from the cultural
constraints on land transfers, which present formula of "fair market value" (which is
often under-estimated) does not seem to achieve. This may not be too high a price
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for the Government to pay if the long run benefits to the public are its overriding
concern, and if the incidence of the costs of public acquisition actions on individual
owners are considered relative to the incidence of the financial cost to the wider
society. The wider public can better absorb the incidence of such financial costs
than an individual or small group of individuals could.
The "buying out resistance" or "incentive for cultural change" concept will
go a long way to minimizing the opposition to public land acquisition, and in fact,
could prove less than the overall financial costs to the public involved in these
compulsory acquisition exercises. In fact, it can be argued that given the protracted
nature of compulsory land acquisition occasioned by the resistances of the land owners
through the Courts, that the direct, indirect, and hidden costs involved in the pre-
sent state of things, if calculated, might be higher than the suggested "greater than fair
market value" formula. In another sense, this approach will ensure that lands are
acquired because they are really needed, for appropriate public purposes.
(2) Alternative to this "buying out" approach would be to adopt the approach
that the LEDB used earlier in its history -- turning back 80% or even lesser per-
centage of the land to the land owners after preparation and servicing, while ap-
plying the remaining 20% or so to defray the costs of land preparation and installa-
tion of infrastructure. It was said of this strategy then that with it, "opposition died
rapidly and the Board was looked on as the layer of the golden egg."* This, how-
*Hoskyns-Abrahall, op. cit.
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ever, was deemed suitable when the Board was primarily preoccupied with eradicating
and preventing slums and improving the environmental quality immediately after the
bubonic plague of the mid-1920's. Since then, the Board's scope of activities and
interests has considerably b roadened into many aspects of direct developments
and may no more be acceptable to public policy now than they were when it dis-
continued its use in about 1935. But it is an option that is still used for city plan-
ning in some other cities of Nigeria, for example - Enugu in Anambra State - where
the Planning Authority lays out the residential areas, subdivides and installs neces-
sary infrastructure, then charges the land owners the planning fees to defray the cost
of these basic infrastructure and overheads and then turns back the land to its owners,
who then develop or lease out the plots for development. This approach, as a
strategy, does work, then, and therefore, has the potentials of effecting some of
the desired changes in the traditional land tenure and in the quality of urban land
development.
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(3) Another alternative might take the form of some organizational, administrative, and
functional changes being made on the Board to enable it to manage and administer urban
land indirectly through positive encouragement and regulation, rather than by direct
massive involvement. Positive encouragement in the nature of the Board assuming
the functions of a mortgage or credit agency, or of a mortgage or credit insurance
agency, and using that position to create positive climate of incenti ves that are
conducive to desired land developments, activities, and standards, could be evolved.
This would mean that having prepared and laid down the plan and standards for
urban development and for the required housing types and densities, the Board would
use its credit or mortgage insurance leverage to ensure that these types of develop-
ments are followed. Preferential treatment for low income and lower middle class
development loans, for example, could be made to developers at incentive rates
for such required developments.
As a way of taking advantage of the existing traditional land tenure system,
credit or mortgage insurance could be made available to land owners to develop
their lands themselves as required, and these loans recovered from the land owners
from their proceeds after development.
This strategy would also obviate the need for and the consequent problems of
the Board having to directly acquire lands itself and develop them directly; as
welras also obviate the otherwise financial inability of many land owners to de-
velop their lands themselves. This indirect incentives approach would enable more
houses of different quality and price levels to be produced, and therefore made
more accessible to all segments of the urban population who need them. It is
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also likely to minimize wastes of land and other resources that are involved in the
Board's direct involvements. This approach, of course, would have to be accompanied
by a more strict enforcement of town planning laws, particularly with respect to the
layout of plots or subdivision controls, building codes, health and sanitary codes,
and zoning laws.
In effect, by this organizational and administrative role, the Board would be
in a better position to support a steady flow of urban land to all user groups, thereby
reducing land speculation and distortions in land pricing, than if the Board continued
to involve itself, directly and massivelyinadhoc land development schemes, which
themselves tend to fuel land price rises.
Furthermore, the relative shortage of public investments funds and the heavy
competitive demand on the available government funds for various National Develop-
ment plan projects, as well as the desirability to build up a responsible class both
of entrepreneurs and consumer spenders (which has been a policy goal of the govern-
ment) would recommend this indirect incentives approach to public urban land man-
agement, as this would minimize demands on such public funds and at the same time
achieve the envisaged goals. Moreover, this indirect approach vo uld be likely to
reduce the Board's needs for money for comp ensations and developments, which
need was a serious source of weakness in its operations and which at a point forced
its change of orientation.
The private sector has hitherto been responsible for over 80% of Nigeria's urban
housing supplies, unaided by institutional financing. With credit and mortgage guarantee
or insuronce assistance, there is no reason why it could not do better still, including
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improvrnents in the area of environmental and sanitary quality.
In this sense, then, the Board's function would essentially consist of admini-
strative measures directed at:
(i) Facilitating the development of urban land through the guaranteeing
of financing to land owners and developers.
(ii) Regulating and encouraging the design, installation and use of simple
standards components and sanitary fittings, thereby ensuring that
environmental quality standards in housing are improved and main-
tained -- standards that are not "over-designed" or too sophisticated
for the people's level of development and income.
The importance of adopting simpler standards cannot be over-emphasized
becovse insisting on idealistically high standards would worsen the situation in the
city with its rapidly increasing population and already serious housing deficit.
As neither the people themselves nor the Government, nor the LEDB has the
resources to provide housing to all the people, much less at the ideal quality levels
that the Board seemed to envisage and prescribe, insistence on unduly high stand-
ords would be reminiscent of a recommendation once made for Lagos by the Hoskyns-
Abrahall report, to the effect that, "The Township regulations and by-laws be more
strictly enforced with a view to forcing out unwanted people, "9 and this, if en-
forced, of course, might mean forcing out over 5 0% of the population of the city.
It is better to have rooming houses built, even if they are potential slums, than to
have no new houses or limited numbers built for letting, by an imposition of unduly
high standards. Regulations defining and controlling overcrowding would usually
gradually help to improve the living conditions even in the rooming houses, and be-
1I. Hoskyns-Abraholl: Report with Recommendations on the Planning and
Developrnent of Greater Lagos (1946), para. 28, p. 40.
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cause of the very great shortage of accommodation, it would be impracticable to
try to control overcrowding until the housing shortage has been substantially re-
duced. Consequently, if overcrowding and therefore the living environment is
accepted as a serious social problem, the major aim of any land and housing policy
would be to reduce the land and housing shortages by the provision of more building
land and more accommodation at acceptable rent levels to a majority of those in
need of accommodation. Requiring or adopting simpler standards will help towards
the achievement of this purpose.
(4) Finally, the Board or any such other agency has to be adequately funded
for the purposes assigned to it, if it is to function effectively. It is true
to some degree that,
Institutions are ineffectual unless they are given access to
and control over the resources necessary for operation.
The increasing gap between the mandate of many human
settlement institutions and the resources effectively
placed at their disposal is one of the principal causes
for the widespread crisis in urban management, in
industrialized and developing countries alike.
The Board should be adequately financed and provided for in the regular
annual Government budgeting process. Enough funding should come from this source
to take care of the Board's normal operating expenses including infrastructural de-
velopments and services. When some selected social projects need be undertaken,
a separate ad hoc vote should be provided for it in the Government budget. The
tying of the funding mechanism to the usual governmental budgeting process would
also help to keep the Board's managerial accountability to the Government and the
8 U.N.: Report of Habitat, op. cit., p. 80.
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public (through the legislature's public accounts committee reports and debates),
in constant focus and hopefully thereby keep the administration of the Board more
alert to efficiency and productivity.
To aid the financing of private developments, as proposed, the Board es-
sentially has to act as an instrument for removing institutional obstacles to financing
the needs of all the people in urban land development by the administration of loan
or mortgage guarantees. This would not involve need for direct funds by the Board,
but only the credibility to be accepted as guarantors of loans by commercial banks
and other credit institutions for those wishing to borrow for urban land development.
With necessary arrangements, the Government can provide this guarantee through
the Board as Government guarantees are always good for credit. The merging into
the Board of the other Government or quasi-government urban housing credit insti-
tutions like the Nigerian Building Society and the Federal Mortgage Bank will
greatly improve and facilitate this proposed financing function and improve urban
land development goals and objectives in general.
In conclusion, it cannot be over-emphasized that the success of whatever
alternative that is adopted will depend to a great extent on the efficiency, inte-
grity, and sense of purpose of those actually charged with the organisation and
management of urban land.
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